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Abstract* 
 
This technical note analyzes international experiences and practices of public 
technology extension service programs. Technology extension services 
comprise varied forms of assistance provided directly to enterprises to foster 
technological modernization and improvement, with a focus on established 
small and mid-sized enterprises. The note discusses the definitions, 
rationales, and characteristics of selected technology extension service 
programs, drawing on examples from Europe, North America, and other 
regions. It presents four detailed case studies: the U.S. Manufacturing 
Extension Partnership; the National Research Council-Industrial Research 
Assistance Program in Canada; EnglandÕs Manufacturing Advisory Service; 
and Tecnalia, an applied technology organization in Spain. The case studies 
address several program elements including the history and evolution of the 
program, structure, program scale, financing structure, services and clients, 
governance, personnel, monitoring, and evaluation. The analysis highlights 
common and distinctive characteristics as well as program strengths, 
weaknesses, and key practices. The note provides a framework for 
positioning technology extension services within the broader mix of policies 
for technology transfer, business upgrading, and innovation, and offers 
conclusions and insights to support efforts to strengthen technology 
extension services in Latin America. 
 
JEL codes: L6, O2, P5 
Keywords: technology extension; technology diffusion; industrial extension; 
technology centers; small and medium-size enterprise; SMEs; institutions; 
policies; programs 
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1.  Introduction 
The objective of this technical note is to analyze the international experiences and good 
practices of public technology extension service (TES) programs. The note begins with a 
discussion of the definition of TES, addressing key perspectives on providing services to 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), rationales for TES intervention, and selected 
characteristics of TES programs. The note explicitly gives a definition of TES and 
distinguishes it from other services (i.e., what TES is not), and draws on examples of 
programs from Europe, North America, and other regions. 
This project provides detailed studies of four programs: the U.S. Manufacturing 
Extension Partnership (MEP); the National Research Council-Industrial Research Assistance 
Program (IRAP) in Canada; EnglandÕs Manufacturing Advisory Service (MAS); and SpainÕs 
Tecnalia, an applied technology organization that includes some TES-like services in its 
portfolio. Each of the programs was chosen to highlight particular aspects of TES and the 
variety of organizational formats. The detailed case studies address several program 
elements including the history and evolution of the program, structure, program scale, 
financing structure, services and clients, governance, personnel, monitoring, and evaluation.  
The technical note provides a framework for positioning TES within the broader mix 
of policies for technology transfer, business upgrading, and innovation, and considers the 
range of activities and services typically associated with TES programs, as well as the 
rationale and justification for the public support of TES services. Following an in-depth 
discussion of the four selected TES cases, an analysis highlights common and distinctive 
characteristics, and identifies strengths and weaknesses of the programs. The work closes 
with conclusions and insights, which will be useful for efforts to strengthen TES in Latin 
American countries. 
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2.  Technology Extension Services 
This section reviews the scope, justification, and characteristics of technology extension 
services (TES), drawing on available literature and documentation. The review addresses 
four key areas: (i) scope and definition, (ii) rationale and market failures, (iii) basic program 
characteristics, and (iv) policy mix and institutional setting. It draws on selected key literature 
with relevance to TES from diverse global perspectives. 
 
2.1. Defining TES  
 
Technology extension service (TES) is defined as assistance provided directly to enterprises 
to foster technological modernization and improvement, with a focus on established SMEs. 
Although the literature on small business assistance is extensive, the literature on TES 
programs is more specific and bounded. Bellini (2003) refers to a diversity of potentially 
relevant terms for the former, which include but go beyond TES: business support services, 
business development services, industrial and manufacturing assistance services, external 
assistance or external advice. Bellini distinguishes these as Òreal servicesÓ in that they 
engage in activities directly with companies that transfer knowledge and stimulate learning 
using nonfinancial means, enabling innovation and economic development. In contrast, 
indirect assistanceÑsuch as tax creditsÑsupports firms but does not directly engage with 
them. 
Technology diffusion and absorption related policies and interventions, including 
TES, are an important part of the mix of research and development (R&D), technology, 
business support, human capital, and related policies that economies at national and 
regional levels can apply to stimulate and bolster economic development and innovation. For 
example, interactions between the upgrading of skills, technological change, and learning 
have been identified as major factors underlying productivity growth (De Ferranti, 2003). 
Approaches to technology diffusion and absorption, however, have evolved over the past 
few decades. Supply-push technology approaches (forming part of what has been termed 
the linear model) were highlighted in the 1950s to1960s. This model follows the notion that 
policy can publicly support research and technology development, in the hope that diffusion 
and adoption by firms will occur further down the line. Despite critiques that the linear model 
overlooks feedback loops, market signals, and learning, it is still prevalent in contemporary 
innovation policy. In contrast, more recent demand-pull models reflect the idea that 
companies have certain problems or needs for which technologies can be engaged to 
provide solutions. DemandÐpull approaches, while beneficial in terms of considering user or 
market demand, have also been challenged for being too narrow and at times backward 
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looking, and for focusing on the immediate rather than longer-term opportunities. TES 
straddles these two idealized models. On the one hand, unlike supply-push, TES reaches 
out to businesses to ensure a connection between technology and the needs of business. 
On the other hand, it also gives importance to strategic trends in both hard and soft 
technologies and techniques to encourage and support businesses, especially SMEs, to 
have sufficient confidence and capacity to adopt these practices. 
Technology extension services can be positioned within a framework that places 
them in the overall policy system for innovation. A general example of such a framework 
organizes TES relative to other services for small businesses along a continuum comprised 
of technology focus and firm lifecycle (Figure 1). The y-axis shows a range of firms from 
those with a very limited focus on technology to those dealing with mature technologies and 
those dealing with advanced technologies. The x-axis displays firms along a life cycle from 
new start-up firms to existing industries to declining companies. The services are shown in 
the area under the curve. Technology extension spans the market from post start-up to pre-
declining firms and from firms with more than limited use of technology to those with a 
relatively advanced technology focus (though not necessarily technologies at basic science 
or speculative levels). It thus complements services for advanced high technology firms 
(such as incubators, technology licensing offices, and university R&D centers), traditional 
services for entrepreneurs and very small businesses (such as the review of business plans 
and small business loans), and services for declining firms (such as trade adjustment 
assistance). Policy intervention is very common in the top left quadrant associated with 
advanced high technology firms, under the assumption that these investments will have a 
propulsive effect on the economy. Likewise, interventions associated with basic 
entrepreneurship are common among policy interventions. Moreover, when a firm declines 
and risks dissolution, urgent bailouts and adjustment assistance may be pursued, and this is 
generally not the time for longer-term technological assistance. Services to help regular 
mature SMEs to adopt technologies fit within these axes. Typically, however, such services 
are not emphasized in the policy mix.  
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Figure 1. Positioning of Technology Extension Services 
 
 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
 
The differentiation of technological extension is not necessarily cut and dried around 
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found it best practice to link shop floor productivity services (which are at the core of TES) to 
business and marketing efforts (which are at the core of basic business assistance). The 
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business assistance (i.e., basic business planning and basic marketing) and sales planning 
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a resolution to crisis or radical economic transition, as it requires a reasonably stable 
industrial base (Shapira, 2001). 
TES also may be characterized in terms of a set of service offerings (Box 1). These 
services can be grouped into the following categories:  
¥ Providing information to an SME in response to a problem 
¥ Sharing and comparing of practices within an industry or across industries 
¥ Engaging in in-depth projects through technical assistance or consultancy to 
address problems 
¥ Helping SMEs identify and utilize third party providers (i.e., brokering) for 
certain types of services, including financing resources 
¥ Leading training programs to disseminate knowledge mostly to company 
managers but also to nonmanagerial employees 
¥ Working with groups of companies from different industries or within a given 
supply chain 
¥ Linking and coordinating collaborative projects involving multiple firms 
¥ Giving ongoing coaching and mentoring for strategy development  
¥ Encouraging the take-up of growth services that will eventually lead to new or 
improved product and market development  
There are other services that can complement typical TES offerings; these services 
are frequently focused on infrastructure such as for testing and machining on 
nontechnological needs related to human resources, accounting, and financing assistance.  
Not all TES services focus on manufacturing. Manufacturing is at the core of TES 
services because it is an important trade sector. Maintaining the manufacturing base is not a 
given, and is not easily replaceable if it is lost. Many developed countries focused on post-
industrial sectors in the 1990s and 2000s, but have since reemphasized policies and 
programs to promote advanced manufacturing. 
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Box 1. Typical and Related TES Services 
TYPICAL TES SERVICES 
¥ Information provision 
¥ Benchmarking and assessment 
¥ Technical assistance or consultancy 
¥ Referral, links with finance 
¥ Training 
¥ Group or network services; supply chain 
development 
¥ Collaborative projects (R&D, 
implementation) 
¥ Strategy development; coaching and 
mentoring 
¥ Growth services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RELATED SERVICES 
¥ Testing, finite element analysis 
¥ Machining  
¥ Modeling and simulation 
¥ Rapid prototyping, additive manufacturing, 
3D printing 
¥ Machine and equipment design 
¥ Computer-aided design 
¥ Bar coding, RFID 
¥ Incubator, accelerator 
¥ Technology transfer 
¥ Intellectual property searching 
¥ Human resource programs (basic, technical 
skills training) 
¥ Recruitment 
¥ Accounting, business valuation, trusts 
¥ Funding for technology, capital, training, etc. 
¥ Export assistance 
¥ Computer hardware/network systems (e.g., 
operating systems, LAN, communications, 
computer networks) 
¥ Website, e-commerce (e.g., search engine 
optimization, traffic monitoring, site mapping, 
re-design) 
 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
 
Technology extension service is incompletely defined by a particular set of services 
alone. It can also be viewed as a set of activities that leverages tacit knowledge built up 
throughout the careers of TES professionals. This tacit knowledge is made available to 
SMEs through a locally distributed network and has the ability to address particular problems 
brought to the program by the local manufacturing facility in a demand-pull fashion (although 
the program may use follow-on project opportunities to encourage the adoption of the 
aforementioned services). 
 
2.2. Rationale 
 
The rationale for TES programs is typically based on market failures that are endemic to 
SME operations (see, for example, National Academies, 2013). There are market failures on 
both the demand and supply sides. Market failures on the demand side deal with SMEs 
lacking information, expertise and skills, training, resources, strategy, and confidence to 
adopt new technologies and techniques. Market failures on the supply side involve the costs 
for vendors, customers, consultants, and other business assistance sources to reach and 
service SMEs. System level failures are present in areas such as the limited quantity and 
sometimes poor quality of education and training services available to SMEs, lack of access 
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for SMEs to universities, national laboratories and technology centers focused on research 
missions and high-end technologies, and existing government programs focused on 
economic development or generic nontechnological services.  
TES programs vary in the ways in which they link the broad market and system level 
failure concerns with their particular program objectives. For instance, field service programs 
such as the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) in the United States and the 
Manufacturing Advisory Service (MAS) in the United Kingdom exemplify services, which 
address the information and market failures in markets for technology related services. Other 
programs such as the Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) in Canada also use 
this justification but further address market failures related to underinvestment in innovation 
by firms.  
There are also strategic concerns associated with economic competitiveness. Many 
countries have de-emphasized manufacturing, as their large corporations focused on core 
competencies, particularly in financial services. The economic downturn of the late 2000s 
demonstrated the need for rebalancing, a greater focus on manufacturing, and more of an 
emphasis on exporting. As a result, many developed countries have initiated major efforts to 
enhance the manufacturing ecosystem and increase support for advanced manufacturing. 
Furthermore, new rounds of technological growth are anticipated around supply chains and 
regional clusters to foster local and regional economic development. 
Finally, recent technological and systemic trends create challenges as well as 
opportunities for SMEs. These trends include vertical disintegration; flexible specialization; 
the increasing presence of open markets; globalization and offshoring to low-cost but 
technologically capable competition; shifts from economies of scale to economies of scope; 
and new, open approaches to innovation (Caputo et al., 2002; Lpez-Estornell et al. 2012; 
Mas-Verdu, Vaviera-Puig, and Martinez-Gomez, 2008; Shapira, 2001).  
 
2.3. Organizing TES 
 
There are a range of approaches for organizing TES around the common theme of providing 
direct services to enterprises, fostering technological modernization and improvement. 
These various approaches reflect differences among countries in industrial structure, the 
landscape of existing services, institutional capabilities, and policies. While every program 
has some distinctive elements, we can identify three primary broad ways through which TES 
is organized and delivered: (i) dedicated field services, (ii) technology-oriented business 
services, and (iii) applied technology centers (see also Table 1). 
Dedicated field services provide TES to enterprises through discrete or free-standing 
programs which are primarily organized for this purpose and which have their own 
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management structures, staffing, funding, and branding. The underlying rationale for 
establishing such programs typically relates to market and other system failures, including 
lack of enterprise awareness of new technologies, access to tacit knowledge, and 
weaknesses in other private and other public services (as discussed in Section 2.2). 
Dedicated field services usually provide referrals to other programs and services where, for 
example, enterprises can obtain financial, applied research, or further private consulting 
assistance.  
 
Table 1. Approaches to Organizing Technology Extension Services (TES) 
 Dedicated Field 
Services (DFS) 
Technology-oriented 
Business Services 
Applied Technology 
Center Services 
TES 
organization 
and delivery 
¥ Discrete TES field 
services program 
¥ TES organized in 
association with 
other business 
support and financial 
services 
¥ TES is one 
component of a 
portfolio of applied 
technology and 
contract research 
services 
Rationale ¥ Lack of awareness, 
access to tacit 
knowledge, 
weaknesses in 
private and other 
public services 
¥ As for DFS plus 
weak businessÐ
technology linkages 
(including finance) 
¥ As for DFS plus 
under-investment in 
and exploitation of 
applied R&D 
Selected TES 
operational 
features 
¥ Core set of highly 
experienced field 
staff 
¥ Small and mid-size 
manufacturing 
business orientation 
¥ Delivery of a set of 
technology and 
management 
advisory services  
¥ Referrals to other 
business and 
technology services 
¥ Decentralized 
networks of offices 
¥ Core set of top 
managers 
¥ Small business 
orientation 
¥ Range of small 
business needs, 
including technology 
and management 
advisory, 
entrepreneurship, 
finance, business 
assistance 
¥ Decentralized 
networks of offices 
¥ Mix of in-house staff, 
consultants, students  
¥ Range of 
government, large 
and small business 
clients 
¥ Primarily contract 
applied R&D, testing, 
material analysis, 
instrumentation as 
well as TES services 
¥ Physical technology 
centers, may be 
organized in 
networks of institutes 
 Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
 
A variation on this approach is technology-oriented business services where TES is 
provided in association with other business support and financial services. In this approach, 
the program provides enterprise services to address a range of small business needs, 
including technology and management advice, entrepreneurship, and finance. Technology-
 8 
oriented business services may provide start-up assistance to new ventures as well as 
working with established SMEs.  
A third approach is to provide TES in the context of an applied technology center. In 
this organizational format, TES is one component of a portfolio of applied technology and 
contract research services that the center offers. Applied technology and research centers 
have physical facilities that may include laboratories and equipment, and their staff profile 
will include researchers as well as staff (who may or may not be research active) who 
provide TES advice and consultancy directly to firms. Technology-oriented business services 
and applied technology centers each have their own particular rationales, but the TES 
components of each of these two broader services have rationales that are similar to those 
of dedicated field services. 
 
2.3.1. Dedicated Field Services 
A dedicated field services approach uses experienced technology specialists, often with 
engineering and industrial expertise, to work with SMEs. This work is usually accomplished 
in a decentralized manner, including through direct engagement at the company location, to 
address its technical and business needs. Dedicated field services programs have their own 
identities, management, funding, and staff, although they coordinate with and refer to other 
business, applied research, training, and consultancy programs and services. Two examples 
of this approach are the MEP in the United States and the MAS in the United Kingdom 
(Table 2).  
The U.S. MEP is a decentralized program delivering TES to manufacturing SMEs 
through a system of 60 centers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
administers the program. NIST provides one-third of the funding for these centers, which 
they must match with two-thirds from with nonfederal sources. The centers provide a 
pragmatic set of services related to process improvement, product development, marketing, 
energy, environmental, and human resources. Most also connect manufacturing SMEs with 
other private and public assistance sources. 
The MAS is a government program providing business support to manufacturers in 
England.1 The program is overseen by the UK Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills and is managed by a consortium of private consulting firms in four large English 
regions. At the heart of the program are 120 highly experienced field specialists who offer 
strategic support, process efficiency, and commercialization services to manufacturers. 
                                                             
1
 Economic development and business support are among the devolved functions within the UK. In Scotland, the 
Scottish Manufacturing Advisory Service is administered by Scottish Enterprise (the agency responsible for 
supporting business and fostering growth and investment in Scotland). Separate programs to provide technology 
advisory services and innovation assistance are also offered by development agencies in Wales and Northern 
Ireland. In this study, the Manufacturing Advisory Service in England is examined, which is the largest program of 
its kind in the UK. 
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Justifications for a dedicated field services approach include concerns about the lack 
of awareness of pragmatic technologies and techniques and the importance of tacit 
knowledge to adopt these practices. In addition to these market failures, a dedicated field 
services approach to TES is likely to emerge where there are concerns about public or 
system failures by existing institutions (such as universities or established small business 
programs) to support technological upgrading in SMEs. 
The MEP and MAS share several operational characteristics: a core set of highly 
experienced field staff, a manufacturing orientation, delivery of a set of services that 
resonate with manufacturing SMEs, and a decentralized network of offices. The MEP is a 
partnership between federal and state governments whereas the MAS is centrally funded by 
the national government. The MAS has an explicit structure to involve the private sector in 
the management of its centers and in making referrals to clients, whereas the MEP uses a 
flexible range of approaches for service delivery. 
 
Table 2. Selected Programs Using Dedicated Field Services 
Characteristics Manufacturing Extension 
Partnership 
(MEP, United States) 
Manufacturing Advisory Service 
(MAS, England) 
Orientation Pragmatic manufacturing services, 
dedicated field agents 
Pragmatic manufacturing services, 
dedicated field agents 
National governing 
agency 
National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 
Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills 
Service operation Cooperative agreements with state 
and local MEP centers with varied 
organization including private, 
nonprofit, university, and state 
government 
Contract with privately-
administered service delivery 
consortium 
Geographic scope 50 U.S. states Four regional divisions in England 
Service delivery 60 Centers 10 Offices (in England) 
Staff  1,300 120 
Annual funding US$300m federal, state, and fee 
income (including US$123m 
federal funding)  
US$48.2m (government funding) 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
 
2.3.2. Technology-oriented Business Support  
Technology-oriented business support programs address a range of small business needs 
including entrepreneurship, finance, and business assistance. These programs address 
weaknesses in business technology linkages, including the ability to obtain financial capital 
to support the adoption of technology. Within this category, our work focuses on the IRAP 
because of its integration of TES, and finance and entrepreneurship services. The IRAP is a 
centrally run program with a decentralized network of field offices and is administered by the 
National Research Council of Canada (Table 3). It uses highly experienced specialists to 
 10 
work with companies, offers funding for applied R&D projects to SME clients and 
collaborates with partner organizations to provide services to entrepreneurs. 
 
Table 3. Selected Technology-oriented Business Support Program 
Characteristics Industrial Research Assistance Program 
(IRAP, Canada) 
Orientation Business support, applied R&D, technology 
extension 
National governing agency National Research Council 
Form of entity  Public 
Geographic scope Distributed across Canada 
Number of offices 120 
Staff  240 
Annual ÒcoreÓ government funding US$292.8m 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
 
2.3.3. Applied Technology Centers 
Applied technology centers perform contract R&D for companies and other types of 
organizations; general manufacturing and advisory services are also provided to 
complement this R&D support. These TES services might be offered under a contract with a 
state or local government to SMEs in the region. Public support for applied technology 
centers usually aims to address underinvestment in, and exploitation, of applied R&D. Five 
examples of applied technology centers are: the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (Germany), the 
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) (Taiwan), Public Industrial Technology 
Research Institutes also known as Kohsetsushi centers (Japan), Carnot Institutes (France), 
and Tecnalia (Basque region, Spain) (Table 4). 
The Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft is comprised of about 60 research institutes that carry 
out contract research for government (at national and state levels) and business 
organizations. A mix of in-house researchers and students perform most of the R&D at each 
institute. Each Fraunhofer Institute has a particular R&D specialization. The ITRI is a private 
nonprofit institute administered by the Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs to perform 
advanced R&D primarily for large multinational companies in emerging electronics and 
related areas. It has had several very successful spinoffs including the United 
Microelectronics Company and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation. The 
ITRI has a single location supplied with state-of-the-art equipment for prototyping and 
testing. The Kohsetsushi centers in Japan are one of the oldest TES service networks. This 
publicly sponsored network uses a stable set of specialists to offer free or low cost TES 
services to Japanese SMEs. The centers offer a set of standardized services that include 
applied R&D, testing and instrumentation, technical assistance, and information provision. 
The Carnot Institutes in France are public research institutes designed to bridge the space 
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between FranceÕs basic research capabilities and industrial needs. The Carnot Institutes 
share some features of the Fraunhofer program in that Carnot emphasizes contract research 
with industry. Tecnalia is another Fraunhofer-style program that offers technology services, 
collaborative R&D, exploitation of research through licensing and spinoffs, and services for 
organizational innovation and business diversification through 10 centers located throughout 
the region.  
Across these programs, the ITRI performs the most high-end research oriented 
toward the creation of new industries. Tecnalia and Kosetsushi tend to do more basic 
applied R&D in areas such as testing and materials analysis and Kosetsushi incorporates 
field specialists who meet with SMEs across their program. Fraunhofer has a strong 
customized R&D track record that is contract research driven. Carnot is more focused on 
developing linkages between research and industry. Within this category, our work focuses 
on Tecnalia because of its potential comparability to Latin American situations. 
 
Table 4. Selected Programs Supporting Applied Technology Centers 
Characteristics Fraunhofer 
Institutes 
(FhG, 
Germany) 
Industrial 
Technology 
Research 
Institute  
(ITRI, Taiwan) 
Public 
Industrial 
Technology 
Research 
Institutes 
(Kohsetsushi, 
Japan) 
Carnot 
Institutes 
(France) 
Tecnalia 
(Basque 
Country, 
Spain) 
Orientation Applied R&D Advanced and 
Applied R&D 
R&D and 
technology 
assistance for 
SMEs 
Applied R&D Applied R&D 
National 
governing 
agency 
Fraunhofer 
Society 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Affairs 
Ministry of 
Economy, 
Trade and 
Industry 
National 
Agency for 
Research 
Tecnalia 
Corporation 
Form of entity  Private not-for-
profit 
Government-
owned 
Public (local 
government) 
Public research 
institutions 
Private not-for-
profit 
Geographic 
scope 
Distributed 
across 
Germany 
Main site in 
Hsinchu (beta 
site in Tainan) 
All prefectures 
in Japan 
Distributed 
across France 
Distributed 
across the 
Basque 
country 
Number of 
institutes 
60 1 180+ 34 10 
Staff  20,000 5,730 c. 7,000+ 19,000 1470 
Annual 
funding  
US$723m 
(core 
government) 
US$300m ~US$1,000m US$2,540m 
(consolidated 
budget) 
US$70m 
Source: National Academies (2013); Shapira, Youtie, and Kay (2010). 
 
 
2.3.5. Other Examples of TES-like Services 
Other countries, including medium-income and developing economies, also offer technology-
oriented business support services. For example the Small and Medium Industry 
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Development Organization (KOSGEB), an agency of the Ministry of Industry and Technology 
of Turkey established in 1990, runs a number of overlapping programs to support SME 
capacity development in Turkey. KOSGEB does not generally provide consultancy services 
itself except for the TEKMER program (an incubator program for start-up and microfirms 
physically located in collaborating host universities) but it provides money for firms to buy 
this service from the open market. In some programs, SMEs are allowed to use the facilities 
of KOSGEB (office, machinery, etc.) and obtain subsidized laboratory services for SMEs. If 
the firms benefit from certain other KOSGEB programs, these laboratory services are free. 
Labs are located within 11 regional offices and 12 TEKMERs are located within 
university campuses (KOSGEB, 2010, 2012). Thirty-five percent of KOSGEBÕs more than 
1,000 staff resides in the Ankara headquarters facility with the remainder distributed across 
75 regional service centers. The 2010 budget amounted to around US$160 million, of which 
about two-thirds was used directly for service provision (KOSGEB, 2012). In 2009 
KOSGEBÕs mandate was extended to cover nonmanufacturing SMEs as well. KOSGEB 
support used to be more in-kind in nature, including in-house consultancy, but in the last five 
years there has been a trend towards providing financial support to SMEs to obtain these 
services from the open market (KOSGEB, 2010). 
In China, there are a number of programs aimed at increasing the manufacturing 
capacity of SMEs. One of the main priorities of ChinaÕs 12th S&T Five Year Plan is 
innovation in manufacturing. Technology-oriented business services and applied technology 
centers are used to offer TES-like services in China. The Spark program is one of the 
longest-established examples of programs focusing on SME capacity building. Since the 
1980s, the program has helped Chinese rural enterprises (i.e. town and village owned 
enterprises) to use science and technology with the ultimate goal of fostering rural economic 
development. Besides affording funding to large impact and key projects, the Spark program 
has provided guidance for projects receiving technical assistance. SparkÕs science and 
technology correspondents visit rural areas to offer technical and entrepreneurial assistance 
to rural enterprises. While the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) administers this 
program, much of the program management is done at subnational levels including province, 
prefecture and county (Li, 2012c). Cumulative investment in the program by the Chinese 
government reached roughly US$1.9 billion by 2006 (Yan, 2006)  
Another relevant program is the Chinese National Engineering Research Center 
(NERC) program established in 1992 with the aim of promoting industrialization and 
upgrading traditional industries through the use of engineering research and investment in 
human resources and laboratory infrastructures. NERCs are considered one of the main 
instruments for providing technical assistance (Li, 2012a). They specialize in particular areas 
of technology and operate by engaging in research contracts for firms, conducting joint 
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research projects with industry and providing consultancy and technical services in the form 
of product prototyping, turnkey engineering, process development and laboratory services. 
Roughly half of the 264 NERCs (by 2010) were established by the private sector while the 
rest represent collaborations with universities and public research organizations. MOST 
provides financial resources for the initial setup of the NERCs, but they are financially 
independent by charging for their services (annual revenue for this is around US$10.4 
billion), receiving income from research contracts and in rare instances receiving grants from 
MOST for special projects. The World Bank also provided financial support for a number of 
NERCs. Since the National S&T Infrastructure Construction Plan in 2004, NERCs have 
gained importance in providing services to industry. NERCS employed over 65,000 staff by 
2010 and MOST invested around US$16 million in them that year (Li, 2012b).  
Finally, the InnoFund program, established in 1999, is a funding instrument to 
support Chinese SME manufacturing efforts through grants, loans and equity investment. 
The budget for this program was about US$288 million in 2012.  
In Thailand the National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) 
has been operating the Industrial Technology Assistance Program (ITAP) since 2001. The 
program aims to increase competitiveness of industrial SMEs, facilitate technology transfer 
and operate a national network of qualified staff. ITAPÕs activities include information 
services, feasibility studies, technology acquisition, techno-business matching, networking, 
technical consultancy, industrial needs assessments, and various other consultancy and 
dissemination activities (Supattaraprateep, 2010). The program supported 2,820 projects 
between 2006 and 2011 based on a public investment of US$56 million, matched two-to-one 
by beneficiary SMEs. It has 10 regional nodes employing around 50 project managers and 
45 other staff. Most of the ITAP projects are focused on the food and agriculture, wood and 
furniture, and health sectors; although there is a wide variety of industrial coverage. 
(Supattaraprateep, 2010; Wanichkorn, 2013). A UNIDO study (Dhanani and Scholts, 2002) 
reports that ITAP advisers were inexperienced and the program was concentrated in the 
Bangkok area. The NSTDA has received technical assistance from the Canadian Industrial 
Research Assistance Program (IRAP) in reforming ITAP and increasing staff capacity. 
Besides the NSTDAÕs ITAP Program, ThailandÕs National Innovation Agency also runs the 
Innovation Coupon program and the SME promotion agency runs a Consultancy Fund. The 
latter underwrites the cost of services for commercial production as opposed to ITAPÕs 
coverage of a wider range of services for R&D and laboratory testing, proof of concept, 
prototype, pilot and commercial production. 
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2.3.5. Approaches to Organizing Technology Extension Services  
This overview highlights the variations evident in different countriesÕ approaches. Each 
approach has its advantages and limitations. Applied technology centers are usually most 
appropriate in regions with advanced technology ecosystems and SME customers willing 
and able to pay for contract assistance with advanced technological issues as well as 
pragmatic service adoption. Technology-oriented business services are particularly relevant 
to markets with a large set of microenterprises or other types of SMEs with a need for 
integrated financial and technological assistance services. A dedicated field staff approach 
requires a relatively stable base of SMEs, but otherwise offers the flexibility of working with a 
broad set of customers and in environments with multiple private sector suppliers (in which 
case the field staff acts as a broker) as well as in local environments with few alternative 
sources of knowledge and assistance. All three approaches can accommodate various 
combinations of collaborations and alliances to provide program support (e.g., manufacturing 
associations), specialized services not resident within the program (e.g., incubators and 
other startup services or specialized machining and prototyping), and add capacity when 
necessary. 
 
2.4. Policy Mix  
 
TES programs differ not only in objectives and approach (as our three-part categorization 
indicates), but also operate within the context of particular national and regional innovation 
systems and capabilities, each with their own strengths, weaknesses, and dynamics. In 
these innovation systems, other complementary policies and actions are required to make 
TES programs really effective. Policy and programmatic actions to upgrade SME capabilities 
include labor market (e.g. vocational and technical training), fiscal (e.g. grants, loans, tax 
credits), legislative and regulatory (e.g. the cost of regulation) initiatives. There are 
considerable country-level differences in SME policy mix emphasis. The U.S. policy 
framework places less emphasis on vocational training and upgrading (because education 
tends to be primarily operated at the state and local levels), while cost and regulatory issues 
are of primary emphasis. In contrast, Japan takes a more centralized approach to labor, 
fiscal, legislative, and regulatory policies while there are structural constraints on flexibility 
and innovation (Shapira, Youtie, and Kay, 2010). 
Ideally, TES programs should operate within well-integrated policy and institutional 
settings (Molina-Morales and Mas-Verdu, 2008). However, in most cases, the policy and 
institutional setting is not very well connected. Hence, one important role of TES is as a 
gateway to other fragmented services, including private consulting services and public 
programs. The innovation systems and institutional context, such as where the program is 
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located in the innovation system and how it relates to other actors, deserve commentary. 
Some programs (such as the MEP) reside in the standards laboratories within the commerce 
function while others (such as the IRAP) reside in the research function. There are often 
complex historical reasons for programs being situated in particular institutions, including the 
lack of an ideal organizational setting. The most important emphasis of the different cases is 
how the programs operate, with appropriate attention given to the institutional context within 
which the programs reside (Shapira, 2001; Shapira Youtie, and Kay, 2010). 
 
2.5. TES Assessment and Evaluation Models 
 
There are variations in approaches to assessing and evaluating TES. Countries with the 
most extensive assessment and formal evaluation approaches include the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Canada where assessment and evaluation are often guided by a 
program logic model (Shapira and Youtie, 2013). The model begins with program 
intervention. Program interventions are the easiest to measure and are typically captured 
through monitoring and tracking systems that count instances of assistance provided and 
customers served. Ideally, a customer and activity reporting system is used to track program 
interventions (although sometimes self-reported information is relied upon). A program-wide 
reporting system would have the capacity for the decentralized input of information, 
standardized definitions of customer and assistance characteristics, and periodic reporting 
capabilities.  
An intervention leads to several successive changes within the SME and beyond. 
This model reflects the contribution of private sector firms in terms of human and financial 
capital resources, which is much greater than the value of a day of TES assistance received 
from the program in the same terms. Subsequent effects begin with changes in intermediate 
outputs; including capacity for change; adoption of new practices; and improved firm 
capabilities. Examples of intermediate output measured include enhanced knowledge about 
business, scientific, or technical areas; improved use of existing equipment; increased 
investment in skills; improved just-in-time manufacturing practices; better utilization of space; 
attainment of certifications (e.g., ISO 9000); and increased capital investment. Firm-level 
business outcomes often result from these intermediate outputs; in this regard, labor 
productivity (e.g., value-added per employee) is a common measure of business 
performance resulting from TES, although measures such as increased/retained sales and 
cost savings are also gauged. These types of outputs require customer surveys and, to 
address rival explanations such as selection bias, comparative econometric approaches 
showing results for nonbeneficiary and beneficiary firms. Broader economic impacts typically 
focus on job benefits, although sometimes TES can result in fewer jobs in the short run as 
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the client becomes more productive and may not need certain low skilled workers but is able 
to retain most workers as a result of these productivity gains. Typically business outcomes 
are run through an input-output model to extend direct benefits to other parts of the 
economy. Case studies are commonly used to draw out linkages between the assistance 
and these types of outputs, outcomes, and broader impacts. 
 To conclude, multiple methods are required to capture the full logic model associated 
with TES interventions. There is, however, a paradox associated with evaluating these types 
of programs. While TES evaluations seek to measure the impact of the program on client 
firms, they tend to ignore the situation of firms within value chains and networks (including 
technology centers, manufacturers, services providers, entrepreneurs, investors). Thus the 
key role of convening and connecting, which goes beyond the specific client firm to the 
broader ecosystem is usually not well captured in a typical TES evaluation. Special studies 
of the role of partnerships or global value chains must be conducted to capture the 
convening and connecting role of TES. 
 
2.6. Summary 
 
TES represent important measures for providing assistance to the typically underserved 
existing industry base of a country. Although TES can overlap with other services, several 
characteristics are central to the concept: an orientation toward established businesses, the 
use of expert specialists, and decentralized service provision. TES may be organized 
through a dedicated field staff, technology-oriented business support or R&D center 
approach. Many of the differences between TES-like programs lie in the distinctive policy 
frameworks of particular countries. 
Several debates about the service orientation of TES support are ongoing. First, 
there is a debate about the relevance of TES for manufacturing versus nonmanufacturing 
sectors. This consideration is appropriate given the extensive literature on innovation in the 
services sector in Latin America (Aboal and Garda, 2012; Alvarez, Zahler, and Bravo-
Ortega, 2012; Tacsir, 2011) as well as in OECD countries (Garcia-Quevedo and Mas-Verdu, 
2008; Mas-Verdu, 2007). Most TES programs either target manufacturing; or they target 
other industries that are related to manufacturing; or they are trade sectors that provide 
value through sales outside the local economy. TES programs are either oriented to 
manufacturing (e.g., the MEP) or they have a manufacturing-plus orientation (e.g., the 
IRAP). Logistics/distribution is one such manufacturing-plus industry. On the other hand, 
high-end service sectors such as information and communications technology (ITC) tend to 
be less relevant for TES services and more relevant for advanced services such as 
incubators and R&D centers.  
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Second, there is a debate in the literature about whether services should have a 
focus on technology, sector, or region. Different countries take different approaches to these 
orientations. In Japan, every prefecture has one general center and the rest are sector 
focused. In Spain, services such as the Federacin Espaola de Entidades de Innovacin 
(Spanish Federation of Innovation and Technology Organizations or FEDIT) or Tecnalia 
have a sector focus. For FEDIT, this helps to secure corporate membership. Additionally, 
Spain has many geographically clustered industries, rendering a focus on sector more 
logical. The Fraunhofer Institutes have a highly technological orientation, reflecting the 
needs of its highly specialized base of firms, but this orientation requires closures and 
openings of new institutes every few years to keep pace with technological advances. These 
approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive; rather they reflect the broader needs and 
makeup of a countryÕs industrial base.  
Finally, there are debates about how to design TES programs. These debates 
include whether or not to focus on dynamic firms with growth potential, SMEs in strategic 
positions in global value chains, specific sectors or technologies, or to broadly service the 
SME base. Likewise, designs will have to determine how to prioritize the types of market 
failures or problems experienced by the SMEs in the market. For example, while most 
programs focus on problems SMEs have in acquiring information, knowledge, and resources 
to adopt pragmatic technologies and techniques, SMEs also face supply-side issues. Large 
customers, vendors, and consultants find it too costly to support SMEs and trade 
associations are lacking. The role of TES is not to crowd out these suppliers by offering 
publicly subsidized services that compete with these private sector providers. Rather TES 
serves a brokering role by reducing the high cost of marketing that these suppliers would 
experience in their efforts to reach SMEs, as well as a coaching and mentoring role to 
provide ongoing contact with SMEs that would be too costly and outside the scope of a 
typical private sector engagement. These supply-side gaps mean that TES programs must 
also help coordinate these potential service suppliers and balance these efforts with the 
delivery of assistance to SMEs.  
 
3.  Overview of Case Studies 
To probe TES operations and institutional contexts, and to provide in-depth understanding, 
this section presents four operational case studies. These TES and TES-like programs were 
selected based on their relevance for drawing lessons applicable to Latin American 
countries. The experiences of these programs are primarily oriented around public TES 
programs that target firms, either directly or through private operators. This section 
 18 
discusses the rationale for case selection, the methods used to develop the cases, and 
highlights of cross-case findings. 
 
3.1. Case Selection 
 
Four case studies were developed:  
¥ The U.S. Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) 
¥ The Manufacturing Advisory Service (MAS) in England 
¥ The Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) in Canada 
¥ Tecnalia, based in SpainÕs Basque Region 
The criteria used to select these case studies considered the need to incorporate a 
sectoral and / or territorial focus in the provision of services, the extent of diversity and 
clustering in the customer base, the quality and availability of program specialists, the types 
of services offered, use of evaluation for program improvement, and role of public funding. 
The programs chosen for case studies were found to offer insights applicable to a diverse 
range of companies, flexible and decentralized, and providing services with more of an 
application orientation than a research orientation. Each case represents a different TES 
organizational approach. Most importantly, they all have manufacturing bases with some 
stability. In addition, these cases have applicability to middle-income countries, as well as 
advanced economies.  
The U.S. MEP and the MAS in England are two programs that most clearly fit the 
definition of technology extension (as discussed in Section 2). However, their institutional 
context and program operations differ. The U.S. MEP is larger, with a broad variety of 
centers and range of services; and significant involvement of state government and other 
partners. It serves a broad base of manufacturers through a decentralized field service 
delivery system. The MAS program is a smaller, centrally funded service delivered through 
private delivery organizations. It offers experienced field service assistance offering 
structured services. The Canadian IRAP is an example of a centrally run technology-oriented 
business services program; it offers a wide range of services, works with nonmanufacturers, 
and combines technical assistance, field service, and financial support to companies in one 
program with a network of decentralized service delivery locations. Tecnalia is an example of 
an applied R&D center network that also offers TES-like services. Headquartered in the 
Basque region of Spain, Tecnalia also presents a regional perspective. All four case studies 
can be applied in the Latin American context. The previous section offers initial introductions 
to these cases. The remainder of this report provides substantive detail and analysis of the 
four cases beginning with an explanation of the case study approach. 
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3.2. Case Study Approach 
 
Key probes were developed to analyze TES programs and case studies (see Box 2). With 
regard to the case studies, information was obtained through a review of websites and 
reports about the program, interviews with program managers, an analysis of budget and 
other financial information and evaluation documents.  
 
Box 2. Key Probes for Analyzing TES Programs and Case Studies 
TES programs and case studies are examined using the following set of probes: 
 
 History and evolution: how the program was started, relevant pre-history, and how/why the TES was 
housed in the particular institution. 
 Structure: key partners; budget for TES versus other types of services (advanced and basic); major 
service providing organizations; structure at agency level, program level, and provider level; how 
coordination takes place. 
 Program scale: annual budgetÐoverall and normalized by number of manufacturers; number and type 
of institutions involved; number of offices overall and per state; number of staff; changes over recent 
period (last 3 to 5 years) in terms of budget and service orientation. 
 Financing: financing structure; funding mechanisms; degree of financial sustainability; incentives for 
firms and institutions involved in the program; recent changes; any performance-based financing 
schemes. 
 Services and clients: core TES services (e.g., needs assessments); and range of services provided, 
including whether or not there is a planned progression of services; marketing/outreach methods; 
provision of specialized services not available in-house; provision of adjacent services; industry 
segments served (if any); pricing structure and whether it varies by company size or location (urban vs. 
rural); evolutions and challenges in service provision; linkages to labs, equipment, other infrastructure.  
 Governance: how does the TES make decisions about opening or closing centers; how the TES 
combines flexibility and oversight; who sets goals for the program; examples of a cooperative 
agreement with changes highlighted; incentives for involvement of institutions and staff; governance of 
the program and or institution(s) involved, private sector participation in the design and monitoring of 
the program, and composition and selection of advisory board members for the program; and what 
types of decisions are made at the central program level versus the regional level.  
 Personnel: educational, experience, and certification qualifications of staff; the program's policies for 
attracting, hiring and retaining highly qualified staff; training activities; certification programs; key 
specialization(s) of extension program staff; use of performance-based incentives. 
 Monitoring and evaluation: various evaluation methods and metrics used for monitoring and 
evaluation methods used; and impact of the programs in the beneficiary firms; challenges in measuring 
impacts and implementing frameworks and methodologies; evolution of evaluation methods over time. 
 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
 
Each case includes at least one state or provincial level example. The funding, 
services, and operation of the Georgia MEP (a university-based extension service) and the 
South Carolina MEP (a private nonprofit MEP service) have been profiled in the context of 
the U.S. MEP. For the IRAP, the largest region, Ontario, is presented. With regard to the 
MAS, the West Midlands and Northwest and Northeast regions are profiled because these 
regions account for nearly one-third of all manufacturing employment in the UK. Tecnalia in 
Spain already represents a regional focus. Because the IRAP and MAS are centralized 
programs, the regional profiles provide a window into central program operations rather than 
a distinctive management approach to TES. In contrast, the MEP is decentralized, so the 
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two regional examples were carefully selected to illustrate a diverse range of operations. The 
South Carolina MEP was one of the first three centers established by the program in 1989. It 
is a private nonprofit center with a long history of developing assessment tools and operates 
in an economy with a diverse range of potential clients. The Georgia MEP is one of the two 
oldest university-based programs in the United States and is very well regarded for its 
management, the flexible use of industrially experienced personnel, and its ability to 
leverage and manage resources from the university (including faculty and students) and 
other related federal and state programs.  
Case studies of the four programs were conducted over the four-month period of July 
to November of 2013. The case studies were guided by an inception report; a review of 
literature, definitions, and frameworks; discussions at a project kickoff meeting in 
Washington, DC, in June of 2013; and feedback from IDB, including in-depth comments on 
early drafts of the MEP and IRAP cases. Additional feedback was obtained through an IDB 
workshop on technology extension in Buenos Aires in March of 2014. The cases include 
information about the program at national level as well as state, provincial or regional 
examples. 
In each case write-up financial amounts are presented in the countryÕs home 
currency. In the cross-case analysis current budgets are presented in U.S. dollars at current 
exchange rates.2 Detailed accounts of each of the four TES programs follow in the next four 
sections. 
4.  U.S. Manufacturing Extension Partnership 
The Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) is a national network of manufacturing 
specialists with centers in all 50 U.S. states. The federal government portion of the financing 
is matched by centers with funds from state, private sector, and other sources. The objective 
of the MEP is to enhance the competitiveness of the U.S. manufacturing sector through 
working with manufacturing SMEs. The program allows for flexibility in the structure and 
operation of centers, enabling states to take advantage of local historical conditions and 
assets in the configuration of their centers, while maintaining robust governance and 
extensive monitoring and evaluation.3  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
2
 US$ 1 = 0.613 GBP, 0.727 EUR, and 1.0582 CAD.  
3
 This case study is based on personal interviews with managers at NIST MEP, SCMEP, and GaMEP performed 
in July and August, 2013, and reviews of websites, and program and center reports. 
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4.1. History and Evolution 
 
The creation of the MEP arose from concerns about the competitiveness of U.S. 
manufacturing in the 1980s (OTA, 1990). These concerns reflected the ascendancy of 
strong European and Japanese manufacturers, which relied on advanced technology and 
techniques rather than lower costs. U.S. manufacturers were confronting heightened 
competition in both domestic and export markets and the nationÕs former trade surplus 
became a deficit. Not only were there challenges in mature industries such as textile and 
steel, but also in complex subsectors such as the automobile, machine tool, and 
semiconductors and electronics industries. Warnings about the prospects for U.S. 
manufacturing led to several major policy reports, activities and initiatives. In 1986, the 
National Research CouncilÕs Manufacturing Studies Board published ÒToward a New Era in 
U.S. ManufacturingÓ about key transformational manufacturing technologies and policies to 
address these changes (1986). That same year, the Council on Competitiveness was 
founded by the former head of Hewlett Packard and chairman of President ReaganÕs 
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness to provide a forum for leaders from business, 
university, and government to raise topical national competitiveness issues in the 
manufacturing sector in the U.S. policy arena.  
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act was signed into law in 1988 primarily 
to address industrial competitiveness concerns and the expanding U.S. trade deficit.4 Part of 
it dealt with technology challenges and established regional manufacturing technology 
transfer centers within the newly renamed and reoriented National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in the U.S. Department of Commerce. In 1989, three manufacturing 
technology centers were selected in an initial start-up phase: the Great Lakes Manufacturing 
Technology Center at the Cleveland Advanced Manufacturing Program in Ohio (now called 
MAGNET, the Manufacturing Growth and Advocacy Network); the Northeast Manufacturing 
Technology Center at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York (now part of the 
New York Manufacturing Extension Partnership); and the South Carolina Technology 
Transfer Cooperative based at the University of South Carolina in Columbia (now the private 
nonprofit South Carolina Manufacturing Extension Partnership). Two additional centers were 
established in 1990 in Michigan and Kansas and two more in 1991 in Minnesota and 
California. These new manufacturing technology centers built upon a history of prior state 
and federal initiatives in manufacturing extension (see Appendix 1). Georgia, Iowa, 
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Pennsylvania had 
industrial extension services in their states and the Department of CommerceÕs State 
                                                             
4
 PL 100-418. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-102/pdf/STATUTE-102-Pg1107.pdf. 
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Technical Services (STS) funded pilot manufacturing technology transfer programs in the 
1960s and early 1970s (Shapira, 1990). While these centers were not the first experiences 
with technology extension in the United States, they did represent the beginning of a 
nationwide system. 
Expansion to other states came through the Department of DefenseÕs Technology 
Reinvestment Project (TRP), created in 1993 to foster dual use commercialization. A further 
27 manufacturing technology centers were created through TRP. These centers were all 
managed by the U.S. Department of Commerce, and transitioned to Department of 
Commerce funding by 1997, after which they were integrated into what became the 
Manufacturing Extension Partnership. By the middle of the 1990s there were MEP centers in 
all 50 U.S. states and Puerto Rico.  
The founding legislation in 1988 did not envision an ongoing role of federal funding 
for TES services, although this was subsequently changed. Originally, it was anticipated that 
the federal co-funding share would ramp down from 50 percent of the centerÕs budget in the 
initial years to 33 percent after the third year. A sunset provision stated that the federal 
match would cease after the sixth year as the centers became self-sustaining. This was 
found to be unworkable (i.e., precipitating center closure) and in 1998, the Technology 
Administration Act eliminated the six-year sunset clause, allowing for an ongoing federal 
role. 
The programÕs strategic orientation has evolved since its inception. The initial design 
called for centers that would transfer federal laboratory technologies to small and medium-
sized manufacturers; however, a 1993 National Academies study observed that besides 
technology services small and medium-sized manufacturers needed a broader range of 
management and training services (National Research Council, 1993). This finding led to a 
reorientation of the program toward off-the-shelf proven technologies and techniques rather 
than laboratory technology transfer. In the early to mid-1990s the MEP engaged in the 
building of a program to achieve national coverage, establish local service partnerships, and 
create an evaluation system to demonstrate business and economic impact. By the early 
2000s, the direction of the program advanced toward system-wide initiatives. Offers of 
standardized services were put into place across the MEP system (e.g., tools for 
companywide assessments and delivery of quality system services such as ISO 9000 and 
lean manufacturing).  
National efforts to train MEP specialists were extended through the MEP University, 
which provided training in manufacturing services. The program explored ways to provide 
services in the context of national and global supply chains. The 2000s was a period of 
shoring up support for the program in the face of efforts to reduce or eliminate its federal 
funding. The late 2000s placed an emphasis on growth strategies. During the Obama 
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administration, efforts have been made to build up the manufacturing ecosystem through 
multi-agency solicitations around manufacturing and cluster development and through a new 
Advanced Manufacturing Partnership guiding a series of initiatives. These include a National 
Network for Manufacturing Innovation, comprised of regional manufacturing technology 
centers fostering the development and adoption of leading edge technologies.5 By early 
2014 four manufacturing innovation institutes had been established and additional institutes 
are planned. Within the framework of U.S. manufacturing programs these institutes 
undertake advanced technology development and demonstration activities, generally with 
consortia of research organizations, selected larger companies and sophisticated smaller 
firms. The MEP continues to work downstream, offering pragmatic technology deployment 
and other TES services targeting the broad base of manufacturing SMEs. 
 
4.2. Structure 
 
4.2.1. Federal Agency Organization  
The MEPÕs national office is situated in the NIST facilities in Gaithersburg, Maryland and 
houses 45 staff members (National Academies, 2013). It reports to the NIST Associate 
Director for Innovation and Industry Services. At the program level, the MEPÕs organization 
includes a director, deputy director, and managers for systems operations, center 
operations, program development, and policy and research (Figure 2). The MEP has had 
three directors over its nearly 25-year history, all of whom emerged from management 
positions in government laboratories. The regional account managers are accountable to the 
systems operations manager and are responsible for overseeing a set of centers in a given 
region. The program development manager is responsible for new service delivery 
initiatives. The operations manager oversees the financials and cooperative agreements for 
each of the centers. The manager of policy and research designs, collects, and analyzes 
center-reporting metrics. The Gaithersburg office does not house any MEP center 
specialists. 
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Figure 2. NIST MEP Organization Chart, June 2013 
 
Source: National Academies (2013). 
 
4.2.2. State Structures 
 
The MEP is a decentralized and flexibly structured system that allows individual centers to 
develop strategies and services suited to local conditions. The structure of centers varies 
according to the history of programs for manufacturers in each state or region but is required 
by law to be affiliated with a nonprofit organization.6 Nearly two-thirds of the centers are 
structured as nonprofit organizations (under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Service code which allows exemption from federal income taxes for designated public 
purposes); 17 centers are based in universities or community colleges; and state 
governments, usually commerce departments, run four centers. 501(c)(3) centers are 
typically set up as standalone private nonprofit organizations with independent boards. 
University centers are organized as a separate unit or embedded in the engineering college, 
school or university. Programs run by state government take in federal funds, centrally 
manage reporting and contractual requirements, and usually set up or use universities or 
separate 501(c)(3) organizations to deliver services.  
The national program specifies that each center should have a director, a board of 
directors, and field specialists, but no other organizational arrangement is required. There is 
                                                             
6
 Regional Centers for the Transfer of Manufacturing Technology, 15 U.S.C. 278k, 2012. 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/CFR-2012-title15-vol1/CFR-2012-title15-vol1-part290. See also 
http://www.nist.gov/mep/legislative-history.cfm.  
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often a manager responsible for the field specialists and regional offices. Some centers 
divide their staff into account managers who develop projects and technical specialists who 
deliver services and some have managers of key service areas such as continuous 
improvement or growth services (i.e., services that lead to increased sales such as product 
design and development assistance). Because many centers work with third party providers 
and partners, there may be managers responsible for partnerships and subcontractors. 
There is also usually someone responsible for reporting and metrics information. While 
centers may manage other federal, state, or local programs (e.g., a center may provide 
training for small businesses in how to respond to government contracts as one of the 
Defense Logistics AgencyÕs Procurement Assistance Centers), all work with manufacturing 
SMEs is subject to reporting and metrics requirements of the MEP program. 
The MEP does not have a requirement at the federal or center level to work with any 
particular partner organization. A range of partner organizations are involved with the MEP. 
One study found more than 700 partners formally listed in the MEP reporting system 
(Shapira, Kingsley, and Youtie, 1997). The federal program has formal partnerships with the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Economic Development Association, Association of 
Procurement Assistance Centers, E3-Energy, Economy and Environment (initiative of the 
Department of Commerce, Environmental Protection Agency, Small Business Administration 
(SBA), Department of Labor, Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture), American 
Association of Community Colleges, Economic Development Administration, International 
Trade Administration, and Department of Transportation.7 The program also has a 
cooperative agreement with private nonprofit intermediary organizations such as the State 
Science and Technology Institute (SSTI) and, through SSTI, the National Governors 
Association (NGA), and as well as with private firms. At the center level, diverse 
organizations have been involved, including universities, colleges, economic development 
organizations, technology centers, federal labs, utilities, and different kinds of private sector 
consultants. Some states require that certain partners work together at the regional level but 
no national requirement for local partnership collaboration exists. 
Some of these partnerships provide matching funds for new initiatives. The following 
two federal-level partnership examples are illustrative. In 2013, the MEP collaborated with 
the Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce and the 
Department of LaborÕs Employment and Training Administration to write and jointly issue a 
multi-agency federal funding opportunity (FFO) announcement entitled ÒMake it in America 
ChallengeÓ to award up to US$40 million from the national program budget for a maximum of 
15 projects in distressed regions. The FFO promoted projects that encouraged re-shoring by 
                                                             
7
 http://www.nist.gov/mep/partners/partnershipagreements.cfm 
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constructing or rehabilitating physical infrastructure, providing technical assistance, and 
offering workforce training. The MEP offered US$6 million or US$125,000 per project out of 
the national program budget to MEP centers serving the distressed regions.8 In 2011 the 
MEP granted US$300,000 to co-sponsor a manufacturing innovation policy academy with 
the NGA to work with governorsÕ administrations in eight statesÑColorado, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. The academy agenda 
exposed the states to progressive practices, cutting edge research, and peer-to-peer 
learning for state issues increasing the economic development orientation of universities, 
cluster strategies, manufacturing roadmapping, and various workforce needs. The academy 
hosted three meetings during the year, which brought in speakers and consultants.  
Some partnerships extend the operational capabilities and offerings of the program. 
For example, the E3 partnership furnishes assessment tool capabilities enabling MEP 
centers without these capabilities to provide sustainable manufacturing services to their 
clients. Partnerships with the SBA enable MEP centers to provide services to small 
microenterprises, usually through referrals to Small Business Development Centers for 
business plan development and through referrals to various SBA financing programs.  
These types of programs are not usually evaluated separately in the MEPÕs 
monitoring and tracking system, because the system is primarily focused on the 
performance of a client firm and center but special studies have been undertaken to assess 
the effectiveness of these partnerships. For example, one such study by Yin, Merchlinsky 
and Adams-Kennedy (1998) found that a special program at the national level providing 
funds to selected centers to encourage partnerships between MEPs and SBDCsÑwhere the 
MEP would provide technical services and the SBDC would provide business and market 
planning servicesÑwas not more effective than partnerships that emerged organically at the 
center level without the planned federal effort. 
 
4.3. Program Scale 
 
The MEP has 60 centers that operate 370 offices (Map ) staffed with 1,450 specialists 
(National Academies, 2013). The average center employs 27 full-time equivalent staff 
members of which two-thirds are professional and technical staff.9 In the mid-1990s, there 
were 75 centers because a few states (e.g., New York, California, Ohio) had multiple 
centers; these centers have since merged into a single statewide network with the former 
centers becoming offices in the statewide system. Pennsylvania remains a multicenter state. 
At one point, the MEP had several super centers comprised of multiple states, which were 
                                                             
8
 http://www.manufacturing.gov/make_it_in_america.html 
9
 According to data from MEPÕs quarterly reporting system. 
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expedient for states without infrastructure for the program. However, they have all since 
dissolved as the directors of these super centers retired and individual states sought to have 
more control. 
Map 1. MEP Office Locations (MEP, 2006) 
 
Source: MEP (2006). 
 
4.4. Financing 
The overall annual budget for the MEP is about US$300 million, including federal, state, and 
private sources (National Academies, 2013). An estimated US$123 million is sourced from 
the federal budget (in the financial year (FY) 2013) and roughly 80 percent of these federal 
funds financed the basic operations of the centers (Table 5).  
 
Table 5. NIST MEP Federal Budget (FY 2013) 
Item  Millions of Dollars Percent of Total 
Center Renewal Funding   93.5  76.0 
Strategic Competitions   3.9  3.2 
Support for Centers   11.4  9.3 
Programmatic 
Requirement/Administration 
3.2 
 
2.6 
 
Centralized MEP System 
Support  
8.2  6.7  
NIST MEP Labor + Benefits   7.8  6.3 
Other Objects   0.9  0.7 
NIST Overhead   5.5  4.5 
Total   123.0  100.0 
Source: National Academies (2013). 
 
The funding model for the MEP is that centers receive one-third of their budget from 
NIST and match the other two-thirds themselves. Allowable matching contributions are: 
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funds from state and local government sources, fees for services performed, revenue from 
licensing and royalties, and in-kind contributions of personnel; although the latter cannot 
account for more of half of the cost share (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2013). The funding model sought by NIST is: one-third federal (NIST), one-third state 
government and one-third fees charged to manufacturing SME clients. The state 
government share has been less reliable in recent years as some have cut their program 
match in the wake of financial shortfalls. Raising cost sharing dollar requirements have led to 
more fee-based services, larger more sophisticated firms and those in highly urbanized 
areas (GAO, 2011).  
The MEP has also experienced considerable fluctuations in its federal budget. The 
initial budget for the MEP was US$5 million in 1989 (three centers for US$1.5 million each 
plus program administration). The budget rose as centers were added: US$7.5 million in 
1990, US$12 million in 1991, US$15 million in 1992, US$17 million in 1993, US$40 million in 
1994. Through the transition from the Department of Commerce and TRP (Department of 
Defense) funds, the MEP appropriation rose to US$95 million by 1997 (Hallacher, 2005) plus 
some supplements for Y2K (Year 2000 information technology) assistance. In the 2000s, the 
federal budget for the MEP fluctuated from around US$100 million to US$130 million. It was 
at the lower end of this range in the early 2000s (indeed its budget was reduced to around 
US$40 million in 2004), but has incrementally grown in the period from 2010 to 2013. The 
MEP budget grew by nearly 3 percent from 2010 (US$124.7 million) to 2011 (US$128.4 
million), but dropped back to US$123 million by 2013 (Figure 3). Efforts to maintain support 
for the program have been coordinated by the Modernization Forum and the American Small 
Manufacturers Coalition advocacy associations. 
 
Figure 3. MEP Federal Funding, By Year 
 
Source: National Academies (2013).  
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Given that the MEP is the primary federal technological service for small and 
medium-sized manufacturers, its budget is relatively small in comparison to the budget for 
general assistance to small businesses and R&D. Its budget is 75 percent of the Small 
Business AdministrationÕs noncredit budget line (based on an average of the budget for 
fiscal years 2012Ð14), 0.1 percent of the federal R&D budget and 7 percent of the budget for 
the Small Business Innovation Research and Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTR) programs. 
The U.S. investment in the MEP as a percentage of GDP was around 0.0009 percent in 
2012. Ezell and Atkinson (2011) reported that, notwithstanding issues of comparability, in 
2009 the overall budget for CanadaÕs extension program was 10 times larger than that of the 
MEP as a share of GDP, GermanyÕs was 20 times larger, and JapanÕs was 30 times larger. 
In 2011 (the most recent year of manufacturing data available), the MEP federal budget 
amounted to US$436 per manufacturing establishment.10  
The average center receives US$1.5 million from the federal government, but there is 
a wide range: allocations run from less than US$500,000 for smaller states (Delaware, 
Hawaii, South Dakota, West Virginia) to more than US$5 million for larger states (California, 
Texas, New York). The federal sponsor does not offer performance-based financial 
schemes.  
 
4.5. Services 
 
Two basic service delivery models exist in the MEP system. This first is the in-house 
specialist model whereby the majority of services are delivered by internal staff. The second 
is the broker model whereby consultants provide specialized services or capacity and the 
MEP brokers the services by qualifying external consultants and managing relationships 
between these consultants and manufacturing clients. Nearly all centers provide some form 
of a mix of these two models. The Georgia MEP is among the centers that provide almost all 
services in-house; the Oklahoma Manufacturing Alliance is among those that are primarily 
marketing and project management organizations with nearly all services provided through 
third party consultants.  
Most MEP centers deliver assistance through a range of services including lean 
process, energy management, quality systems, business process and supply chain 
management, product and market development, information technology, and human 
resource development (Table 6). There is no natural progression of services, rather services 
are dependent on client needs; and services are not standard. They vary widely in terms of 
description of services, number of hours involved, milestones, and costs. Likewise, centers 
                                                             
10
 Based on 295,643 manufacturing establishments with at least one employee from County Business Patterns in 
2011 and a fiscal year 2011 MEP federal budget of US$129 million. 
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usually charge for these services based on the effort required not on the type of service 
provided. Prices are subsidized but no specific formula is used.  
One of NISTÕs federal roles is to signal strategic changes in direction for the overall 
MEP system. For example, in 2008, NIST developed a Next Generation Strategies (NGS) 
document to guide center services. NGS emphasizes the need to address Òfive key critical 
areas in concertÓ: (i) continuous improvement, (ii) technology acceleration, (iii) workforce, (iv) 
supply chain, and (v) sustainable manufacturing (NIST, 2008). In the last five years, the MEP 
has placed greater emphasis on growth services including product development, marketing, 
and technology acceleration.  
 
Table 6. MEP Services and Next Generation Strategies 
Core service Elaboration 
Continuous Improvement Lean manufacturing 
Process improvement 
Quality systems 
Standards training 
Technology Acceleration/Growth Services Product design and development 
Marketing assistance 
Commercialization assistance 
Supplier Development Markets 
Integration 
Costing 
Sustainability Energy assessments and management 
Environmental, health and safety 
Environmentally friendly materials 
Workforce Training 
Leadership development, executive coaching 
Source: NIST (2008). 
 
The national program has provided resources for the development of tools to support 
exporting, product development, technology scouting, and business continuity services.11 
Over several years, the MEP has engaged with various private organizations and public 
agencies to develop tools and service approaches, for example: 
¥ USNet (training and capacity building for network-based delivery of services), Supply 
America Corporation (a supplier development approach) 
¥ 360vu (a national branding program to facilitate work with supply chains) 
¥ Eureka! Winning Ways (product and market development process) 
¥ Make it in America (re-shoring initiative including total cost of ownership tools) 
¥ E3 (partnership with the aforementioned five federal agencies to use a review and 
assessment process to reduce energy, production, and environmental waste).  
                                                             
11
 http://www.nist.gov/mep/manufacturers/ 
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In 2010 the MEP funded 22 projects expanding capacity or developing new tools and 
services. One of these contracts was with five MEPs to develop a set of supply chain 
management simulation and optimization tools and services. Centers are also given 
flexibility to develop their own services and tools and product development is a common 
activity, although it tends to be self-financed. The South Carolina MEPÕs creation of an initial 
plant assessment tool called Competitiveness Review (CR), which is licensed to other 
centers, is an example of this approach. 
Many TES services with individual enterprises begin with an assessment or a brief 
engagement designed to identify problems and match services to a firmÕs needs. A second 
approach originates from manufacturers calling the center to solve a particular shop-floor or 
other problem; once the initial problem is addressed, known as a point solution, other 
services with greater companywide effects are encouraged. Projects usually involve 
provision of business and process improvement advice, pilot examples of good practice, and 
linkage to other solution providers (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Typical MEP Client Service Model 
 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
 
The MEP frequently delivers TES services on a one-on-one basis with the 
manufacturing establishments. Group engagementsÐincluding quality circles, lean consortia, 
CEO forums and virtual groups using readily available applications such as LinkedInÐoffer 
peer-to-peer learning, through benchmarking one anotherÕs practices, and training; 
participating firms are usually geographically close and not direct competitors. Most centers 
offer open enrollment training courses to multiple manufacturers on a particular topic such as 
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value stream mapping, as well as customized training to employees and managers of a 
given client manufacturer. 
MEP centers often work with, or refer to, private sector consultants of which there are 
many in the U.S. The strength and diversity of private consultants varies by area (urban and 
rural). The MEP is aware of the need to work with this consulting community and not crowd it 
out. Many state programs use private consultants in delivering services and all make 
referrals to them. The MEPÕs involvement is helpful for outreach and diagnosis in reducing 
the transaction costs for private consultants serving SMEs.  
Aside from the national program website, the MEP does not have a major 
countrywide marketing effort to manufacturers. Each center is responsible for its own 
marketing. Some have technical specialists who are also responsible for business 
development and others have separate sales/account managers. Most centers use formal 
marketing approaches such as direct mail to manufacturers, telemarketing, electronic 
newsletters, introductory visits, and road show presentations. Open enrollment courses 
typically lead to more intensive projects with manufacturing participants. Field specialists are 
encouraged to become embedded in their communities through participation in chamber of 
commerce activities, civic clubs, economic development groups, and other local-based 
efforts to obtain referrals. Partnering with state and local economic development and 
manufacturing organizations is another avenue for reaching new clients.  
 
4.6. Clients 
 
The MEP served more than 31,000 clients in the fiscal year 2012 and has provided 490,000 
project engagements since the late 1990s (Manufacturing Extension Partnership, 2013). 
MEP services target managers and employees of small and medium-sized manufacturing 
establishments. Local centers may provide services outside of this target, for example to 
nonmanufacturers, but cannot use federal dollars for this. Some centers have used targeted 
marketing approaches designed to serve important industries in their regions; the national 
program encourages targeted marketing and cluster-based strategies, but these are not 
required. 
MEP centers typically operate within their own states or sub-state regions. While 
there is no contractual restriction on working in other regions, common practice for doing so 
involves notification to the home center and inclusion of its staff if warranted. Product 
development or supply chain efforts are among those services that may lead to working with 
out-of-state manufacturers.  
There is currently no national pricing structure for most services to clients, although 
some of the more recent innovation services are leaning in that direction. The MEP highly 
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encourages that some of the nonfederal funds come from fees from client firms, as the 
willingness of the firms to pay for the service is an indicator of its relevance to the company. 
Centers often vary pricing structures based on the size of the firm. 
 
4.7. Governance 
 
The core governance mechanism for the MEP is the cooperative agreement (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013). A cooperative agreement allows for 
substantial involvement of both the federal government partner (NIST MEP) and the center. 
This contrasts with regular contracts, which have an orientation toward outsourcing and less 
ongoing involvement of the sponsor. The topics covered in a MEP cooperative agreement 
are presented below (see Box 3). 
 
Box 3. NIST MEP Center Cooperative Agreement: Main Elements 
The Cooperative Agreement is the core document used by NIST to partner with individual MEP 
centers. An MEP cooperative agreement typically covers the following items: 
 
 Development of plans, startup-up plans, operating plans 
 Reporting of surveys, studies, manuals 
 Substantial involvement of the MEP national office through assistance and guidelines, linkages to 
the national system, guidelines for performance data collection and evaluation, timely response 
requirement, assistance to address technical and managerial problems, framework for high 
performance standards, participation in activities of centerÕs host organization to address any 
issues 
 Center obligation to develop and submit plans and budgets, complete tasks in a timely manner, 
review national system products prior to in-house tool development, participate in MEP meetings 
and conferences, submit technical and financial reports, participate in program reviews 
 Submission of modifications to work, plans, management in writing 
 Establishment of and regular meetings with a board of directors or trustees  
 Participation in multi-center and national meetings and activities 
 Engagement with NIST MEP in continuous improvement of program 
 Record-keeping of administrative and financial information 
 Approval of key personnel changes by NIST MEP 
 Reporting on tools, systems, resources, and equipment with a value of US$10,000 or more 
 Approval of sub-awards over US$100,000 
 Submission of detailed financial and technical reports to the NIST MEP management information 
reporting system as specified by reporting guidelines 
 Participation in statutory merit panel reviews 
 Termination of center 
 Contribution and documentation of cost sharing and matching 
 Audit requirement 
 Post-client project follow-up 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
 
All centers must abide by the rules of the cooperative agreement. The MEP assigns 
a regional manager and a federal program officer (FPO) to monitor compliance and 
cooperate with each center toward its success. Center leadership communicates with the 
regional manager on a regular basis. The manager participates in group or advisory board 
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meetings. The FPO is the principal link between the centerÕs financial and reporting staff and 
the NIST Grants Office that oversees the cooperative agreement. 
The advisory board is another governance mechanism. This may be a fiduciary 
board to guide management on the running of the center or an advisory board to provide 
input on the wants and needs of manufacturers; some boards serve both functions. The 
frequency of advisory board meetings varies by center. The MEP requires that a majority of 
board members be manufacturers.  
All centers are required to participate in a review process. Centers in good standing 
are on a two-year panel review cycle, with a mini-review undertaken every other year by the 
regional manager, and those undergoing transition are on an annual cycle. Centers must 
submit a progress report 120 days prior to the review. A committee consisting of center 
directors and other knowledgeable individuals, and chaired by a NIST MEP official, conducts 
the panel review. In the early history of the MEP, panel reviews were done in person at the 
centerÕs site. Today they are done through conference calls, visits to the NIST campus, or 
site visits to the center. The committee then provides feedback to the center on its 
successes and where there is room for improvement. The center may provide a formal 
response to these recommendations but needs to take appropriate action on them prior to 
the next review. The recommendations and responses become part of the centerÕs progress 
report for the coming year. 
The MEP cooperative agreement is renewed annually for up to five years, with 
awards based on funding availability and performance. After five years a new cooperative 
agreement is awarded (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013). The MEP or 
the center may decide to terminate the award in which case the center will be re-competed. 
Typically centers are closed/restructured/re-competed because of the departure of a center 
director or because matching funds are no longer available at the host organization. The re-
competes are initiated by a published request for proposals in the Federal Register. 
Organizations submit proposals, which are assessed according to several criteria: 
demonstrated understanding of target firms in the region, existing technology resources and 
delivery mechanisms, and a management and financial plan (Department of Commerce, 
2012).  
 
4.8. Personnel 
 
The MEP does not have any formal education, experience or certification requirements for 
center personnel. A widespread practice is that MEP technical personnel should have a mix 
of engineering and/or business education. Several years of industry experience is usually 
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necessary, but no specific industries are targeted (although personnel often reflect the 
industrial make-up of their region).  
No national compensation structure is in place for center personnel; each center has 
its own pay scale. Some centers do not pay incentives nor have indicators tied to 
compensation; others do, primarily based on revenue generation, impact, and coverage but 
the exact metrics used are difficult to generalize across the program. Private nonprofit 
organizations tend to have more flexibility to apply performance-based incentives. Most 
centers pay competitive salaries. Centers stress the flexibility that specialists have and the 
broad range of interesting work they do as intangible incentives for attracting and retaining 
specialists.  
Training has been an evolving area. In the early part of the program, the MEP had 
several mechanisms such as the National Technology Transfer Center and the MEP 
University, where courses relevant to providing services to manufacturers were available to 
new and existing specialists. The MEP University was discontinued in 2012 in favor of 
training specific to new services (e.g., engineering or exporting of innovation). In the past the 
MEP has held a national conference every year with workshops, networking, themed 
presentations, and roundtable discussions to enable training, but the conference was 
canceled for 2013 and 2014. Orientation programs for new center directors are offered 
through its regional managers. In 2009, the MEP started the Emerging Leaders Program in 
which a center specialist engages in a yearlong program of leadership and management 
training and peer-to-peer knowledge exchange from centers across the system. 
 
4.9. Infrastructure 
 
The MEP does not require that particular facilities, laboratories, or prototyping and testing 
equipment is available. Some centers are situated in technology centers, universities or 
other locations where certain types of equipment are accessible. However, it is more 
common for centers to have partnerships with public and private organizations with 
laboratory and specialized equipment capabilities.  
Housing and maintaining equipment at MEP centers was more common in the 1990s 
when some centers acquired computer-aided manufacturing systems for demonstration and 
training. Additionally, during this period, the MEP placed greater emphasis on manufacturing 
information technology as a separate service line in response to demand for Y2K and 
enterprise resource planning assistance. Centers acquired a range of IT equipment and 
software. However, many of these in-house IT oriented services ended in the early 2000s as 
other sources of information technology support became more common and less emphasis 
was placed on these services by the national program. 
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In-house equipment has its own challenges. A refreshment funding resource is 
necessary to ensure that the equipment does not become obsolete. Finding the right people 
to operate and provide training on this equipment can be a challenge. Another issue is the 
relevance of the equipment to client manufacturing processes; equipment that is lab-
oriented, experimental or untested may have limited applicability for most small 
manufacturers.  
 
4.10. Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
The MEP has a system-wide evaluation process, which includes reporting, performance 
criteria, client output reports, success stories, and external review. The federal review 
process aims to understand and improve the quality of program delivery and the extent to 
which goals are met, and to help justify the program. MEP center metrics balance coverage, 
revenue, and impact. These three goals are often not complementary. For example, service 
to a large number of firms is often less deep and thus produces lower impacts and less 
revenue.  
A third party surveys all clients for whom project work is done (using an Internet web 
site) six months to one year after completion of the initial project, satisfying a requirement of 
the cooperative agreement. Furthermore, participants are expected to report quantitative 
impacts. The NIST has used various evaluation systems to provide information for program 
justification, as well as to guide program learning. The 1990s allowed for state-level 
experimentation with evaluation studies and center-specific professional evaluators. In 2001, 
MEP standardized evaluation through the introduction of a third party survey-based system 
and Minimally Acceptable Impact Measures (MAIM) (although qualitative success stories 
were also requested) to gauge center performance and report program wide metrics to the 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget in compliance with the Government Performance 
and Results Act. Quarterly impact reports are produced from these data. The early 2000s 
saw a period of uncertainty in federal support for MEP and the national program responded 
in part through this investment in the evaluation system. In 2012, MAIM was replaced with 
the Center Operations Review and Evaluation (CORE) system. CORE uses a scorecard 
approach drawing from survey data on: 
¥ New sales: services received directly leading to an increase in sales at the 
establishment over the past 12 months 
¥ Retained sales: services received directly leading to retaining sales that would have 
otherwise been lost 
¥ New jobs per million dollars in federal funding: services received directly leading to 
creation of jobs over the past 12 months 
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¥ New investment: services leading to an increase in investment over the past 12 
months in plant or equipment 
¥ Cost savings: services received directly resulting in cost savings in labor, materials, 
energy, overhead, or other areas over what would otherwise have been spent in the 
past 12 months  
¥ Clients per million dollars in federal funding: total number of clients receiving services  
¥ New clients per million dollars in federal funding: new clients served in the past 12 
months 
Survey data is balanced along with NIST management ratings in six diagnostic areas:  
1. Strategic alignment with the MEPÕs emphasis on innovative growth services: The center 
has a plan and/or has shown progress on the execution of the plan to transition from a 
focus on process improvement to development and implementation of an innovation 
practice and has trained its leadership and delivery staff.  
2. Strategic alignment with the NGS: The center has an actionable and measurable 
strategy that is built with purposeful alignment to MEP NGS, maintains a balanced 
portfolio of services, is willing to experiment with services and provides success stories. 
3. Market understanding: The center strategy is aligned with industry targets of their service 
area and serves a mix of clients based on number of employees, industry and 
geographic location. 
4. Business model: The centerÕs business model is aligned with strategic intent balancing 
internal delivery and brokerage with subrecipients / contractors; mix of sales and service 
representation in key staff; long-term client engagement and the need to increase market 
penetration; a pipeline of revenue-generating projects; work with manufacturing leaders 
in the state; documented succession plans. 
5. Partnerships: The center has a documented plan to identify, work with, and evaluate 
partner organizations; center partners are in alignment with federal, state, and economic 
development strategies. 
6. Financial viability: The center has the financial flexibility to reinvest in itself in accordance 
with the MEP mission; and diverse and stable nonfederal funds, including growth in client 
revenue. 
In 2012, MEP centers together served 31,373 manufacturers through more than 
490,000 project engagements. Of these customers, 7,000 received a more intense level of 
service (i.e., at least eight hours) (National Academies, 2013) and more than 6,000 of these 
customers were surveyed. The survey queried impacts resulting from MEP assistance. The 
MEP reported that across all centers, respondents collectively achieved US$2.5 billion in 
new sales; US$4.1 billion in retained sales; 61,139 in new or retained jobs; US$900 million in 
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cost savings; and US$2.5 billion in new client investments (Manufacturing Extension 
Partnership, 2013). These figures for the previous reporting year were 33,838 manufacturers 
served through more than 460,000 project engagements. Again more than 6,000 of these 
manufacturers were surveyed and these respondents had collectively achieved US$3.6 
billion in new sales; US$4.6 billion in retained sales; 60,497 in new or retained jobs; US$1.3 
billion in cost savings; and US$1.9 billion in new client investments. These differences are 
primarily due to a lack of stability in client reporting between periods rather than any 
substantive differences in impact. 
This system does not use a quasi-experimental design or comparison group. 
However, the MEP has from time to time commissioned special studies to assess program 
effects. It sponsored a comparative study of assisted and unassisted firms from 1987 to 
1992 using longitudinal research databases from the U.S. Census Bureau and customer 
data from eight MEP centers. The study found that manufacturing extension clients had 4 to 
16 percent higher growth in value-added per worker than nonclients (Jarmin, 1999). This 
study has been repeated, with less definitive results (Ordowich et al., 2012).12  
The MEP has also sponsored several program wide reviews. In 2003Ð2004, it 
sponsored a study conducted by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) 
which found that the program to be well run and effective. However, it judged the MEP to be 
too oriented toward cost savings and lacking in sufficient services fostering innovation 
(National Academy of Public Administration, 2004). The National Academies recently 
completed an external panel review of the program, Ò21st Century Manufacturing: The Role 
of the Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program of the National Institute of Standards 
and TechnologyÓ (National Academies, 2013) which included a review of 65 program 
evaluations, including 15 that use comparison groups. All 15 found some positive and 
significant effect of the MEP on firm outcomes relative to those of nonclients after controlling 
for size, industry, and other factors; most studies show the MEP to be valuable despite the 
fact that six of the 15 also found negative effects (e.g., on wage levels, adoption of multiple 
technologies). The National Academies study concluded that the program is important in 
efforts to advance U.S. manufacturing but its funding is not commensurate with the 
importance of the manufacturing sector, its evaluation system should allow for more analysis 
and external studies, and there should be more sharing of best practices across the centers 
and about international technology extension programs.  
                                                             
12
 Two methods were used to model the effect of MEP on firm productivity: a Difference in Difference (DiD) model 
(which found significant negative effects) and a lagged dependent variable model (which found significant 
positive effects). The DiD model can only control for time-invariant establishment characteristics. It cannot 
account for baseline differences in productivity between the treatment and control group (beyond those explained 
by time invariant characteristics), nor can it control for the possibility that the outcome variable is correlated over 
time, hence the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable model. These results can be used to bound the impact 
estimates. 
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The MEP does not directly assess its effectiveness compared to other organizations 
(including in other countries) that provide TES services. Nevertheless, such comparisons 
have been undertaken indirectly in other independent studies. The aforementioned program 
wide reviews do foster comparisons based on budgets and service orientation; for example, 
the most recent National Academies review pointed out that the MEPÕs budget is below that 
of comparable programs in the other countries. Relative to private sector suppliers of TES 
services, Oldsman (1997) found that the MEP served more as a broker facilitating the 
creation of more business opportunities for private sector providers than as a competitor. 
 
4.11. South Carolina MEP (SCMEP) 
 
As one of the programÕs original three centers, the South Carolina MEP (SCMEP) has 
undergone many changes. The initial cooperative agreement was with the University of 
South Carolina but eventually the center was transferred to the 501(c)(3) which operates 
SCMEP to enable improved market penetration. In addition, its manufacturing base, 
comprised of 3,900 manufacturing establishments with at least one employee in 2011, has 
shifted from the textile industry to more technology intensive transportation manufacturing 
with the location of BMWÕs production facility in Greenville, South Carolina, and the 
subsequent establishment of automobile and aerospace related plants. This restructuring 
has placed ever more emphasis on the importance of the center. 
The SCMEP received US$2.3 million from the federal government and another 
US$682,000 from the state government in 2012, with the remaining 56 percent of its budget 
coming from client fees. The program worked with 250 companies in 2012 on 530 projects. 
Internal staff conducts about 60 percent of projects, with 40 percent served through third 
party providers. Workload assignments give first priority to internal specialists then the work 
is outsourced to its network of 90 to 100 mostly small subcontractors. These firms are vetted 
through an initial trial project that is closely managed by an SCMEP specialist. SCMEP 
services mirror those indicated by the national NGS. A core service of the center is its 
Competitiveness Review performed with client manufacturing firms (see Box 4). 
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Box 4. SCMEP Competitiveness Review 
The Competitiveness Review is a core service of the South Carolina Manufacturing Extension 
Partnership (SCMEP). This is a companywide assessment tool developed by the SCMEP 20 years ago to 
ensure recommendations have a broad-based perspective. The assessment tool begins with three-hour 
onsite client meeting and plant tour. The meeting is structured to gather information from documented 
sources and interviews. Key aspects of the tool are: 
 
 Company overview: founder/founding information, original business of the company, growth 
information, primary products, sales volume and projects, number of customers and suppliers, repeat 
business 
 Employee information: number of shop floor employees, pay structure 
 Plant information: size, shifts 
 Operational levels: capacity, production schedules, scrap rate 
 Lead time: customer service/order entry, design, schedule, manufacturing, warehouse, 
distribution/shipping, total lead time, major bottleneck, investment prioritization 
 Costs: raw material, direct labor, overhead 
 Inventory: raw material, work in process, finished 
 Characteristics of the operation: share that is make-to-stock, make-to-order, engineer-to-order, 
assemble-to-order; volume 
 Leadership: written business plan, extent of alignment with customer desires, extent of knowledge of 
the plan, frequency of review of progress toward achieving goals, diffusion of goals to individual 
employees and progress reviewed relative to goals 
 Culture: reward system, team-based improvement, systems for management receipt of improvement 
ideas, employee satisfaction measures (e.g., turnover of employees, time off for vacation and 
professional development, formal employee satisfaction measures) 
 Environmental, health, and safety (EHS): workers compensation rating, EHS management position, 
awareness of new regulations, environmental management systems (e.g., ISO 14000) 
 Order fulfillment: pace of work, elimination of non-value-added activities, accuracy of inventory, 
inventory turn measurement, visual management techniques, use of expediting, batch size reductions, 
supplier evaluation system, information sharing with suppliers, teams with suppliers for collaborative 
improvement, formal documented quality program, use of final inspections for defects, scrap rate 
reduction program, nonconforming goods identification, process for corrective action, preventive 
maintenance, equipment efficiency tracking, identification of large energy using equipment, evaluation 
of hazardous v. nonhazardous waste streams 
 Sales: organization of sales responsibility, method to track sales process, documentation of service 
standards, quoting system, sales growth measurement, information on primary competitors, strategic 
marketing plan, target market, information in marketing materials, market share tracking system, 
financial measurement system, results by product family, performance to the business plan, lead time 
for monthly financial closing, employee development plans, cross-training systems, certified on-the-job 
trainers, formal evaluations, health care benefits, documented job descriptions 
 Internal results: trends in scrap rates, rework costs, customer complaints, inventory turns, 
manufacturing lead time, labor productivity, product cost reduction, equipment efficiency, on-time 
shipments, customer lead time, premium freight use, shipping errors, share of sales concentrated in a 
few customers, market growth 
 Business results: trends in market share, repeat business, sales, warranty claims, operating income, 
cash flow, net income, profits. 
 
After this meeting, the field specialists return to the office to input information into the Competitiveness 
Review software. Observations and recommendations are written up. Results are printed out and, the 
following day, taken back to the client in a follow-up meeting. Usually the client and SCMEP will agree to 
one or more project engagements to address key areas highlighted in the Competitiveness Review. 
SCMEP does not charge in-state clients for the assessment. However, it does offer annual licenses of the 
tool to other MEPs along with training. For every 10 assessments, SCMEP gets 9.2 follow-on projects with 
customers. The last two years have seen a threefold rise in revenue from growth services. In addition, 
workforce development projects have increased as the state has asked the SCMEP to provide rapid 
response training to troubled manufacturers; for these manufacturers to access state funds, their 
application must include an assessment such as the SCMEP Competitiveness Review. SCMEP charges 
US$1,000 to US$1,200 a day for services to small and medium-sized manufacturers, with up to 50 percent 
paid by larger companies. 
 
Source: South Carolina MEP Case Study. 
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South Carolina manufacturers are served through seven regions. The main office is 
in Columbia. Greenville, with the largest concentration of manufacturers in the state, is the 
location of SCMEPÕs second office, which includes a set of training rooms. Other 
manufacturing specialists work from home and are responsible for specific sets of counties.  
The center employs an extensive marketing program. This program is broad-based 
rather than targeting particular industries. SCMEP employed targeted marketing in the past 
(e.g., metalworking and plastics) but the approach did not allow for sufficient revenue 
generation and client penetration goals. A successful partnership from a marketing 
perspective is with the South Carolina Department of Commerce. The Department hired a 
full-time employee to work with the SCMEP on marketing. As a result, an extensive mail and 
telephone marketing program and schedule of joint visits has been implemented to enhance 
market penetration and outreach to new clients. The SCMEP also works with a call center, 
sends out e-newsletters, and holds roadshows in various communities around the state to 
strengthen awareness and use of the program.  
The SCMEP is headed by a chief executive officer, who reports to the board of 
directors (Figure 5). Board members represent small and large manufacturers, the South 
Carolina Department of Commerce, higher education, and a human resources recruiting 
firm. Meeting quarterly, the board of directors has fiduciary responsibilities. The boardÕs 
executive committee reviews plans and financials and its finance committee reviews detailed 
fiscal data. The centerÕs books receive an annual external audit.  
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Figure 5. SCMEP Organization Chart, 2012 
 
Source: South Carolina MEP Case Study (2013). 
 
A chief operating officer in charge of planning, revenue generation, product 
development, and technical service provision reports to the chief executive officer. Under the 
chief operating officer is the senior vice president of operations, who runs the field network. 
This network is composed of manufacturing specialists responsible for business 
development and technical specialists who conduct projects. The center also has managers 
of different product lines such as supply chain and marketing.  
The SCMEP employs nearly 20 full-time staff members. The average base salary is 
about US$90,000. Compensation includes a substantial bonus and matching funds into a 
retirement plan. The center also supplies apparel, smart phones, computers, and tablets. 
Center specialists are given considerable flexibility to meet their goals with minimal 
administrative responsibilities to the extent possible. The ideal background for a center 
specialist is a college degree, particularly in engineering (which 70 percent of employees 
have). The preferred manufacturing experience is 10 years in at least two different industries 
to ensure a broader perspective. Certifications depend on the position: for lean 
manufacturing specialists six sigma and greenbelt certifications are common but in general, 
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certifications are not required. More weight is given to the level of familiarity with, knowledge 
of, and past results in the area in which the specialist works.  
The SCMEP engages in partnerships with federal, state, higher education, and 
private sector institutions to enhance the manufacturing ecosystem in South Carolina. These 
include the University of South Carolina, Clemson University, the South Carolina Technical 
College System, South Carolina Workforce and Employment, Workforce Development 
Boards, and various federal, state, and local partners (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce, 
Department of Commerce, South Carolina Economic Developers Association, Small 
Business Development Center, and Service Corps of Retired Executives or SCORE). The 
center has several energy-related partnerships including the U.S. Department of Energy, 
South Carolina Energy Office, and the South Carolina Electric and Gas Utilities. It is the 
coordinator of Lean Alliance networks in five regions of the state and has a collaborative 
arrangement with the South Carolina ManufacturerÕs Alliance. The center also partners with 
South Carolina Launch, for assisting with start-ups, and its parent organization SCRA, a 
private nonprofit that coordinates applied R&D and the construction of research facilities in 
the state. 
In terms of cooperation with other centers, the SCMEP is involved with four other 
MEP centers to develop a tool for improving supply chain management. The project draws 
from several different concepts including the Theory of Constraints to assess supply chain 
maturity and resilience. One component is a cloud-based software that pulls information 
from different supply chain systems.  
 
4.12. Georgia Manufacturing Extension Partnership (GaMEP) 
Georgia has a long history of university-based industrial extension. This history stems from 
the establishment of Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) to serve the stateÕs 
burgeoning manufacturing sector and the creation in 1934 of an engineering experiment 
station similar to the model for agriculture at the stateÕs land grant university, created in the 
wake of the Hatch Act and Smith-Lever Act. The first industrial extension office was opened 
in 1960 in Rome, Georgia with US$30,000 from the GovernorÕs office and US$75,000 from 
the local regional development commission. From 1964 to 1966, six other industrial 
extension offices were established with funding from what now is the U.S. Economic 
Development Administration and a seventh office was added in 1979 (Combes, 1992). The 
early (pre-MEP) industrial extension service had a rural flavor, based on the notion that 
outlying towns had few private vendors readily available to their manufacturers.  
The Georgia Industrial Extension Service became part of the national MEP in 1993 
as part of the wave of TRP-funded centers. The federal money was used to expand the 
network, in particular to metropolitan Atlanta where half the stateÕs manufacturers are 
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located. It expanded the range of services from a traditional focus on manufacturing 
technology, operations and plant layout to marketing, quality, information technology, 
energy, and environmental and occupational safety and health areas. It also created a more 
integrated service network by formalizing partnerships with small business development 
centers, the technical college system, and the public utility company as well as through 
hiring a specialist to connect the center to R&D resources in the Georgia Tech faculty and 
federal laboratories (Georgia Tech Research Corporation, 1993). 
The GaMEP gets US$2.55 million from the NIST MEP (Table 7). The other two-thirds 
of the GaMEP budget are comprised of program income from client fees (25 percent of the 
budget) and an allocation from the state government (just over 40 percent of the program 
budget). The GaMEP serves 800 companies in a given year, 300 of which receive more 
intensive assistance. In-house specialists deliver nearly all of the centerÕs engagements. 
Third party providers are used at times to address capacity and expertise gaps; currently the 
center is working with several energy standards specialists as part of its energy 
management standards initiative. These specialists are brought in as temporary employees 
of Georgia Tech or Tech Temps.  
 
Table 7. Georgia MEP Financial Summary 
US$ millions 
Prior year  
FY 2011 actual 
Current year  
FY 2012 budget 
Next year  
FY 2013 budget 
Income    
NIST MEP funds 2.55 2.55 2.55 
State/local funds 3.44 4.30 3.70 
Project/service fees 1.19 1.30 1.40 
Total income 7.19 8.15 7.66 
Major expenditure items    
Personnel 3.93 4.31 3.88 
Fringe benefits 0.98 1.12 0.97 
Travel 0.18 0.37 0.39 
Supplies 0.19 0.40 0.42 
Contractual 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Source: GaMEP Case Study (2013). 
 
The center is housed in the Enterprise Innovation institute (EI2) at Georgia Tech. EI2 
addresses the service mission of the university by including science, technology and 
innovation in its outreach to companies, entrepreneurs, government, economic developers 
and communities. EI2 houses and operates various complementary federal, state and local 
programs that support business and industry. These programs are provided seamlessly 
through joint visits to companies and joint projects involving MEP specialists and staff from 
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the other complementary programs. For example, the stateÕs Minority Business 
Development Agency center will bring in MEP specialists as part of the team providing 
services to minority owned manufacturers. The MEP will refer manufacturers operating in 
industries that have been adversely impacted by import competition to the Southeastern 
Trade Adjustment Assistance Center (SETAAC) also administered by EI2 so that marketing 
assessments can be provided free of charge by SETAAC as specified by their sponsor (the 
U.S. Department of CommerceÕs Trade Adjustment Assistance program). The GaMEPÕs 
energy group leverages state and federal programs to conduct energy and environmental 
assessments to reduce energy costs and air or water pollutants. There are no particular 
standard or common program combinations. The program does not track this metric (indeed, 
each sponsor has its own separate metrics requirements). What can be reliably concluded is 
that these combinations and collaborations within EI2 vary depending on client needs and 
enable the program to address more of their needs in a synergistic manner. 
A center director heads the GaMEP, and three service line managers and a regional 
network manager report to the center director (Figure 6). Each region has a manager. The 
center has a three-person marketing and event group, and it has a manager who handles 
MEP reporting and administration. In 2006, the GaMEP established an industry advisory 
board, which meets two to three times a year to review marketing, product development and 
delivery plans. Board members are drawn from small and medium-sized manufacturers and 
public and private sector service providers. 
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Figure 6. GaMEP Organization Chart 
 
Source: GaMEP (2013). 
 
The GaMEP has three service lines: (i) growth services including ideation, product 
and market development, and executive coaching; (ii) process improvement including lean 
enterprise and quality systems; (iii) and energy and sustainability. It has developed several 
lean and quality tools that have transferred into the MEP system at no cost (e.g., Buzz 
Electronics lean 101 course). The GaMEP has been awarded grants from the Department of 
Energy to develop and pilot the Superior Energy Performance certification program including 
implementation of the ISO 50001 Energy Management Standard. The cost of developing 
other new services is handled out of the centerÕs overhead budget and grants from federal 
agencies. 
Prior to joining the MEP, Georgia Tech did not commonly charge for industrial 
extension services. An informal five-day rule offered free service for smaller projects. Since 
becoming part of the national program, the GaMEP is more engaged in fee and revenue 
services. Pricing is based on the size of the company with fully loaded daily costs in the 
range of US$1,300ÐUS$1,700. The center matches two-thirds of the service cost to firms 
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with fewer than 25 employees; this ramps down to 30 to 50 percent for medium-sized 
companies and 20 percent for large companies; no cost share is provided for service to out-
of-state companies nor for firms outside the state lacking Georgia operations. The pricing 
model is applied equally to rural and urban manufacturers. Georgia TechÕs sponsored 
programs unit processes contracts and the universityÕs professional education unit 
processes training services. Invoicing, billing and collection are handled by these units.  
The center delivers services through a network of field agents. The field agents 
typically have an industrial or mechanical engineering undergraduate specialization and an 
MBA or graduate engineering degree. The center looks for people who have more than five 
years of industry experience in both operations and cross-facility project work. Knowing how 
to interface with a client, use appropriate tools, work in teams, and implement projects are 
preferred skills. Most agents have been with the center for more than two decades (some 
have worked with clients through multiple ownership changes). Salaries are competitive and 
compensation includes Georgia Tech benefits. The programÕs field agents are organized in 
nine regions in the state of Georgia. Two regions serve Atlanta: north and south Atlanta. 
Some regions have multiple physical offices shared with other business assistance providers 
such as the Department of Economic Development and/or the small business development 
center, and some field agents are home-based. Box 5 describes GaMEP services. 
 
Box 5. Georgia MEP Services 
Georgia Manufacturing Extension Partnership (GaMEP) services include assessment, technical 
assistance, training courses (both open enrollment and on-site), and coaching for implementation. The 
center does not have a standardized companywide assessment tool for all initial engagements. The 
majority of the assessments are based on knowledge and experience of the field engineer, although 
various service specific tools such as the Lean 101 guide, energy audit and assessment tools, and 
innovation engineering tools are sometimes employed. Most services are prompted by client initiated 
requests to help resolve a problem, with the center aiming to extend to company wide follow-on projects. 
GaMEP field agents primarily offer services with clients in a one-on-one setting. However, the center also 
uses lean consortium groups to deliver these services throughout the state. The consortium groups offer 
benchmarking, training, networking, leadership development and information access to help Georgia 
manufacturers (as well as those in certain service, government, and healthcare sectors) develop strategies 
for lean in their facilities and implement lean projects.  
 
The primary way the GaMEP markets its service is through relationship building and networking in the local 
community using the programÕs regional offices. The offices enable field engineers to gain a foothold with 
regional economic developers and leaders and to obtain referrals. At least 50 percent of GaMEP business 
is repeat business. A small in-house group coordinates marketing in electronic and printed media. This 
group sends emails to Georgia manufacturers to join newsletters, working groups, and classes. Open 
enrollment courses are an important source of new business and the center markets project services to 
attendees.  
 
The center does not have a separate sales or account management team; everyone is regarded as a 
business development person. Individual goals have been established for project managers to have new 
clients in line with MEPÕs new metrics for customer penetration. The center created an in-house lead 
system to support these new business development goals. It uses a proactive approach, including an 
estimation tool similar to the one developed by the North Carolina MEP, Òto discover and communicate the 
impact/value [of its work] to sponsors, stakeholders, and clientsÓ (Georgia Tech Enterprise Innovation 
Institute, 2010). 
Source: GaMEP Case Study. 
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Georgia has 9,000 manufacturing establishments from diverse industries, 40 percent 
of which are branch facilities. Just over 2,000 manufacturers are in the target 20Ð250 
employee range although the MEP considers the entire manufacturing base when evaluating 
market penetration. The stateÕs manufacturing base has declined by 1,000 establishments 
since the mid-2000s. As a result, the GaMEP has placed greater emphasis on growth 
services and gives some funds to its sister incubator program, the Advanced Technology 
Development Center (ATDC), to encourage manufacturing startups. The GaMEPÕs state 
sponsor is more broad-based in how it defines the centerÕs customer-base, including 
distribution and any type of manufacturing large or small, while the national program is 
focused on small and medium-sized manufacturers. 
The GaMEP used to operate infrastructure through the Center for Manufacturing 
Information Technology (CMIT). CMIT was founded on October 31, 1995 with US$500,000 
funding for equipment from the state lottery and MEP funds covering personnel. Vendors 
provided software. The center offered training and project-based assistance. It took great 
care in reflecting the manufacturing situation by developing a product, machining parts, and 
creating inventory so customers could relate to how production information feeds into an 
enterprise resource planning system. The center closed in 2003 as a result of changes in the 
national program.  
Partnerships exist with other parts of Georgia Tech for testing and applied R&D. The 
center is engaged in a state funded cooperative agreement with the small business 
development center to extend and customize MEP services to the needs of very small 
manufacturers in rural Georgia. It gets referrals from technical college system institutes and 
the Georgia Department of Economic Development and works with them to open 
manufacturing facilities in the state. The GaMEP participates in manufacturing associations 
and state manufacturing initiatives such as the Made in Georgia campaign or the Next 
Generation group. The center also provides thought leadership through testimony to state 
and federal manufacturing committees and since 1994 through co-sponsorship of the 
Georgia Manufacturing Survey, which provides data on the needs and use of manufacturing 
technologies and techniques. Survey results are widely cited by the national program. 
As with other MEP centers, both the SCMEP and GaMEP produce client impact data 
for the NIST. Client survey results are shown in Table 8. The results indicate difficulties in 
comparability and fluctuations in the quantitative totals. Issues have long been raised about 
fluctuations and lack of reliability in these impact numbers (National Academies, 2013). 
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Table 8. NIST MEP Survey Results for the SCMEP and GaMEP 
Impacts from NIST MEP 
Survey of Customers 
SCMEP GaMEP 
2011 2010 2011 2010 
Manufacturers served 846 798 1,770 710 
Operating cost savings $16.6 m $22.1 m $36 m $35 m 
Increased sales $59.8 m $98 m $191 m $243 m 
Jobs created or retained 1,410 1,269 950 1,350 
Source: NIST MEP Survey of Customers for SCMEP and GaMEP, 2011 and 2010.  
 
4.13. Conclusions 
 
The MEP program has several strengths as well as ongoing challenges. Its major strength is 
its focus on the needs of manufacturing SMEs across the United States. The programÕs 
successful approach to building a national infrastructure and set of services for these SMEs, 
mostly focused on process improvement and lean manufacturing, is also notable. 
Nevertheless, the program continues to face challenges with its funding. The MEPÕs funding 
has been unstable throughout its history both at the federal level, with threats of budget cuts 
and program elimination occurring at various points in the programÕs history, and at the state 
level, with certain states withdrawing support for the program in their budgets. Another 
challenge lies in the MEPÕs efforts to build up innovation services, such as product 
development and design, as part of its ÒNext Generation Strategy,Ó which have been tested 
by issues such as operating with too many single source contracts rather than sharing best 
practices across state and regional centers. Likewise, although the MEP has allocated a 
consistent set of resources for program evaluation, issues remain about what is collected, 
how reliable the quantitative impacts are, what can be learned from the results, and how 
they can be used for program improvement. 
A recent comprehensive review of the MEP by the National Academies (2013) found 
that the MEP program provides valuable help to small manufacturers, but recommended a 
series of enhancements to further improve MEP performance and its contribution to 
supporting U.S. manufacturing. In total, 37 detailed recommendations were offered, along 
the following themes: greater flexibility and experimentation for MEP centers, more 
facilitation to share best practices across MEP centers and from foreign programs, and 
further attention to rolling out more effective innovation-oriented programs. The Academies 
also highlighted the need to improve data collection of program outcomes and to ensure that 
the MEP was integrated into the evolving U.S. national manufacturing strategy. 
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5. The Industrial Research Assistance Program in Canada  
5.1. Introduction 
 
The Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) is a business R&D enhancement 
program that delivers funding, technical and business advice, and networking services to 
Canadian SMEs. The National Research Council (NRC), an agency of the Government of 
Canada, manages IRAP. The objective is to encourage applied R&D in Canadian SMEs by 
providing financial support and advisory services. The IRAP program operates offices at its 
own and partner organizations in five regions on a budget of more than C$280 million13, 42 
percent of which is focused on technology extension services; the rest is used to deliver 
applied research and development funding. Results of independent evaluations of the 
program performed every five years report a cost to benefits ratio of 1:11.14 
 
5.2. History and Evolution 
 
The IRAP was born out of concerns about the lack of industrial R&D in the Canadian 
economy in the early-to-mid 1900s. The Canadian government established the National 
Research Council (NRC) in 1916 to advance industrial R&D through the creation of 
laboratories and scholarships. The NRC created several predecessor programs to IRAP. In 
1930, the Research Information Services (RIS) was set up to respond to general technical 
questions. RIS was reconstituted as the Technical Information Services (TIS) in 1945 and 
expanded through a network of field offices in the Provincial Research Organizations 
(PROs). PROs are councils, foundations, and centers set up to promote technology based 
economic development in a particular region. The function of the TIS was to advise small 
firms on science and technology questions as part of an effort to facilitate these firmsÕ 
adjustment to economic changes following World War II (Coderre, 2011). 
The IRAP was voted into being in 1961 and received its first pilot funding allocation in 
the 1962/1963 fiscal year. It was charged with providing awards to private companies to 
perform industrial R&D. The program created a Committee on Industrial Research 
Assistance to issue awards called contributions, for R&D projects. The Committee had 
authority to grant awards up to C$100,000 to firms. The pilot budget was extended as issues 
arose around whether contributions would be given to one-time versus ongoing projects; in-
house R&D staff only versus subcontractors; all industrial projects versus those of 
                                                             
13
 Canadian dollars (C$) are used throughout this section. C$1 = US$0.945. 
14
 Based in part on interviews conducted with the Vice President of the NRC-IRAP, the current and former 
regional director of the Ontario region, and a former director general at the NRC. 
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importance to the domestic economy; those from large versus those from small firms; those 
from domestic and multinational firms with a strong R&D Canadian presence; and funding to 
associations and consultants that performed R&D. These contributions were managed 
through Industry Technology Advisors (ITAs) (Coderre, 2011).  
A major turning point in the program came in 1977 with the appointment of Keith 
Glegg, previously with the Canadian Marconi Company, to Vice President of Industry and 
Technology Transfer at the NRC. Glegg expanded the IRAP, starting with the merger of the 
TIS and the ITAs in the first half of the 1980s. The merger was furthered through a C$20 
million allocation, which allowed for 60 new ITAsÑhalf employees of the NRC and half 
contracted through the PROsÑsituated throughout the country in proportion to each regionÕs 
population. This expansion brought the total number of ITAs and managers above 200. This 
set of ITAs would have up to C$100,000 signing authority for awards to industry (which has 
since been ended). They underwent formal training and participated in monthly meetings 
(Coderre, 2011). 
The mid 1970s also saw the emergence of IRAPÕs Youth Employment Program. This 
was preceded by the Youth Internship Program (under the Youth Employment Strategy of 
the Human Resource Development Council) and, before that, the Science and Engineering 
Student Program. The premise behind this program was to enhance industryÕs capacity to 
perform R&D. Initially the program supported student internships but eventually it included 
internship support for new scientist and engineering graduates and, more recently, support 
for post-secondary science, engineering, technology and trade, business and liberal arts 
graduates (Coderre, 2011; Goss Gilroy Inc., 2012). The program had a phase in the 1970s 
and early 1980s in which several IRAP letters of the alphabet programs evolved: 
¥ IRAP-M: contributions for small projects up to C$25,000 
¥ IRAP-P, IRAP-R: contributions for large projects 
¥ IRAP-H: the Science and Engineering Student Program (now the Youth Employment 
Program) 
¥ IRAP-L: support for the use of laboratories for feasibility testing for companies lacking 
the appropriate equipment (no longer offered) 
¥ IRAP-C: the field advisory sub-function of TIS known as the Industry Technology 
Advisors (ITAs) 
¥ IRAP-F: the technical information sub-function (no longer in existence as a separate 
function) 
Industry Canada (formerly the Department of Industry and Technology) was asked to 
transfer several programs targeting SMEs to the IRAP in the 1980s and 1990s. These 
programs included the Manufacturing Assistance Program and Technology Partnerships 
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Canada funding programs and the Canadian Technology Network, the latter being a system 
of organizations and business advisors for SMEs. New loans through the Technology 
Partnerships Canada program ended in 2006 and loan repayments management reverted 
back to Industry Canada in 2012Ð2013 (Goss Gilroy Inc., 2012). The Canadian Technology 
Network was absorbed into the IRAP in 2004. Other than these programs, there is no 
substantial overlap between services offered by the IRAP and Industry Canada, although 
Industry Canada remains a key stakeholder. Indeed the program review performed by Goss 
Gilroy found that of the services currently offered in Canada, none were found to provide the 
same level of advisory services as those provided by the NRC-IRAP. The IRAP also 
operated international technology transfer efforts for the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade during the 1980s (Coderre, 2011).  
In the most recent economic downturn, the IRAP received C$100 million for a two-
year period through CanadaÕs Economic Action Plan. These additional economic recovery 
moneys went mostly to fund more contributions to SMEs for R&D projects. Fifteen percent of 
this budget was allocated to assist companies in hiring recent post-secondary graduates 
(Goss Gilroy Inc., 2012). The Jenkins report, which was commissioned to review Canadian 
R&D policy, recommended reductions in the Scientific Research & Experimental 
Development (SR&ED) tax credit and reallocation of some of these funds to the IRAP 
(Jenkins, 2011). The IRAP subsequently received an additional C$110 million of which more 
than 85 percent was allocated to contributions. (See also Appendix 2 for a chronology of 
major IRAP program milestones.) 
 
5.3. Structure 
 
IRAP is administered as one of four divisions of the NRC. There has been a debate over 
where it is administratively best situated. Concerns about the fit between the technology 
assistance mission of the IRAP and the NRCÕs laboratory orientation have been raised. 
Some see a better fit between the program and Industry Canada (which has an economic 
development mission). Today, the program is widely valued within the NRC, although there 
are challenges in the ability of NRCÕs research to leverage the IRAPÕs technology transfer 
and market intelligence capabilities (Coderre 2011; personal interview). The program itself is 
organized into five regions:  
1. The Atlantic/Nunavut (Newfoundland and Labrador, Nunavut, Nova Scotia, 
Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick) 
2. Quebec 
3. Ontario 
4. West (Alberta, Northwest Territories, Manitoba, Saskatchewan) 
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5. Pacific (British Columbia and Yukon) 
In the 1980s, there were 10 regions and in the 1990s there were seven. Each region 
has an IRAP head office ( 
Map 2). Most ITAs work out of partner organization offices throughout the region, 
many of which house a single ITA. The national office in Ottawa provides support for the 
program but does not house ITAs. 
 
Map 2. NRC-IRAP Locations 
 
Source: Ciobanu (2010). 
 
 
A vice president heads the IRAP. Senior leadership is comprised of five regional 
executive directors and a national office executive director (Figure 7). Each of the five 
executive directors has two to five regional directors reporting to them. Prior to the 2000s, 
the program had fewer directors but came to realize that additional support was needed to 
manage ITAs and process applications for contributions (i.e., delegate signing authority). In 
addition, each region has Regional Contribution Agreement Officers (RCAOs) to process 
contribution documents. The IRAP established an advisory board in 1986 comprised of 
industrial officers, industry association executives, and other organizations. This board has 
strategic and consultative, as opposed to fiduciary, responsibilities. 
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Figure 7. IRAP Organizational Chart 
 
 
Source: IRAP.  
 
 
5.4. Program Scale and Financing 
 
The IRAPÕs budget has steadily increased from a pilot allocation of C$1 million in 1962. The 
programÕs budget rose to C$6 million in 1967, C$6.8 million in 1969/70 and C$13.8 million in 
1972Ð1975, at which time it represented 22 percent of the NRCÕs overall budget. In 1986, 
the budget nearly quadrupled to C$54 million. It grew again by 50 percent to C$83 million in 
1991/92 and by more than 60 percent to C$135.8 million by the mid 1990s. The budget more 
than doubled from 2008 to 2009 due primarily to an influx of moneys from CanadaÕs 
Economic Action Plan (Table 9). It dropped back in 2011/12 to below C$140 million, then 
grew again in the 2012/13 fiscal year by C$110 million to nearly C$280 million as part of the 
SR&ED reallocation. The IRAP also gets about C$1 million from the Gates Foundation for 
Canadian HIV Technology Development and Vaccine Initiative and another C$25 
million/year under the three-year pilot Digital Technology Adoption Program. The 2013 core 
budget was C$137.6 million. The total 2013 budget was reported to be about C$280 million 
due to the additional moneys from the SR&ED for applied R&D projects. 
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Table 9. IRAP Budgetary Resources, 2007/8Ð2011/12 (in millions of C$) 
  
2007
Ð
2008 
2008
Ð
2009 
2009
Ð
2010 
2010
Ð
2011 
2011
Ð
2012 
Total  
     IRAP core funding for ITAs, administration 
      
 Personnel  32.1 33 37.7 35.4 38.9 177.1 
 Operating and maintenance  9.2 11.1 8.3 9.3 7.8 45.6 
TOTAL IRAP core operating expenditures  41.3 44.1 46 44.7 46.7 222.7 
IRAP core funding for grants and 
contributions        
 IRAP contributions to organizations 12 11 10.7 11.4 11 56 
 IRAP contributions to youth employment (Non-
TES)  
5 4.8 5.3 8.6 5.6 29.2 
 IRAP contributions to firms (Non-TES) 69.1 70.7 74.2 72.6 72.7 359.2 
TOTAL IRAP core grants and contributions 86.1 86.5 90.2 92.6 89.3 444.4 
TOTAL IRAP Core funding 127.4 130.6 136.2 137.3 136 667.1 
Special Non-TES Funding Programs (Non-
TES)*       
 Contributions to youth employment    9.6 19.4  29 
 Contributions to organizations    5.9 5.2  11.1 
 Contributions to firms    125.4 115.6 1.2 242.2 
 Personnel associated with these programs   1.2 1.2 
 
2.4 
 Operating expenses associated with these 
programs 
  0.8 0.8 0.6 2.2 
TOTAL IRAP special funding programs (Non-
TES)   142.9 142.2 1.8 286.9 
       Total IRAP Budget 127.4 130.6 279.1 279.5 137.8 954 
Source: Goss Gilroy (2012). 
Based on the budget in Table 8, roughly 42 percent of the IRAP core budget is 
estimated to be for technology extension functions such as the ITAs or contributions to 
organizations, which in turn perform technology extension-like services. The rest of the 
budget is for non-TES contributions. The total C$280 million budget is equivalent to nearly 
0.015 percent of CanadaÕs GDP and a little over C$250 per establishment (all sectors). The 
program does not involve matching funds from the provincial government or from third party 
organizations. 
 
5.5. Services 
 
The IRAP offers four main services.  
1. Nonrepayable contributions to firms. These awards cover 50Ð80 percent of personnel 
or subcontractor costs in R&D projects in SMEs (non-TES service) 
2. Nonrepayable contributions to organizations. This comprises funding to support 
specialists to provide advisory services in local organizations in the provinces 
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3. Youth employment program. This provides funds to employ technical and business 
graduates as interns in SMEs (non-TES service) 
4. Advisory service. This is a core TES-service, which can provide direct assistance to 
companies on aspects such as business advice, strategic planning, market assessment, 
strategic information, competitive technology intelligence, intellectual property searching, 
technology validation and technical engineering. 
 
The first service listed above is funding SME R&D projects through nonrepayable 
contributions. While this is not a TES, it is useful to understand how TES can be integrated 
into R&D project funding to enhance the effectiveness of such funding. More than 2,000 
SMEs a year benefit from these contributions. They are awarded to SMEs to conduct R&D 
projects not affordable with in-house resources alone. The awards are called contributions 
because per CanadaÕs Treasury Board Transfer Payment Policy certain conditions are 
attached, in contrast to grants or contracts which require that specific deliverables be 
provided at the end of the award period.15  
The award process stems from ongoing contact that a lead IRAP ITA has with a 
client firm. An application, residing in an online template on the NRC-IRAP Innovation Portal 
requires that the client provide an overview of its business, a project description, measurable 
objectives, budget, and other financial resources. Each application has to have a technical 
assessment as well as a business and financial assessment, neither of which can be 
performed by the lead ITA. The business and financial assessment is required to show that 
the firm has the finances to provide resources to complement the IRAP contribution, which 
does not cover the full cost of the project. Contributions cover up to 80 percent of personnel 
costs and up to 50 percent of subcontractor costs, and average 42 percent of the project. 
The contribution cannot be used for capital or other kinds of nonpersonnel expenditures. 
Finalized applications go to a regional director. Regional directors have approval authority up 
to C$350,000, executive directors to C$500,000, and the vice president has full authority. All 
paperwork associated with nonrepayable contributions is processed within the regions by the 
RCAO. Continuous efforts have been made to increase audit and quality control while 
balancing the burden on the SME client. Box 6 presents further details about the four main 
IRAP services. 
                                                             
15
 ÒContribution (contribution) is a transfer payment subject to performance conditions specified in a funding 
agreement. A contribution is to be accounted for and is subject to audit. Grant (subvention) is a transfer payment 
subject to preestablished eligibility and other entitlement criteria. A grant is not subject to being accounted for by 
a recipient nor normally subject to audit by the department. The recipient may be required to report on results 
achieved.Ó Source: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-
eng.aspx?id=13525&section=text#appA 
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The IRAP does not charge for ITA advisory services, nor do its organizational 
partners charge for these services. In addition, there is no standard length of time associated 
with advisory services. ITAs provide ongoing advisory services as needed to their portfolio of 
clients. The program does not deliver in-depth implementation services; rather it relies on the 
public and private sector community for these services. However, in some cases, especially 
in Northern Canada, private sector firms are not prevalent, so the IRAP subsidizes (through 
contributions to organizations) public sector organizations to fill this gap. There is no formal 
certification of consultants and quality of service from third party providers is maintained by 
the ongoing involvement of the ITA. Infrastructure services are not offered. If clients have an 
infrastructure need, the ITA will refer the client to an NRC laboratory, another public 
research organization, or another partner, such as a university. 
 
Box 6. IRAP Services 
CanadaÕs Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRA) offers four major program services: 
 
Support for R&D Projects (nonrepayable contribution of 50Ð80 percent of personnel or subcontractor 
costs in R&D projects in SMEs). One example of project type funding through this service is technology 
validation. A technology validation project may involve establishing the measurable value of a technological 
solution or working with an early adopter to test the benefits of the technological solution. The SME must 
present a project plan describing the technological solution, the tasks involved in the project, and the 
approach for measuring the solutionÕs value. The plan must also indicate how the results will be fed back 
into commercialization. The IRAP will provide nonrepayable contributions for one to three months of the 
SME clientÕs technical staff salaries (NRC, 2010).  
 
Funding to organizations providing assistance to SMEs. This is not a direct service to firms, but its 
embedding in a TES context enhances the effectiveness of organizational funding. The IRAP has formal 
relationships with approximately 125 organizations (changing each year) including business and industry 
associations, universities and colleges, economic development organizations, and other types of 
institutions. The objective of arrangements with these organizations is to reach and serve additional SMEs 
in the regions and facilitate knowledge transfer to existing SME clients. Many of these organizations house 
ITAs. Goss GilroyÕs 2012 review of the program found that their capabilities are complimentary to those of 
the IRAP in that they tend to serve early-stage firms. Contributions to these organizations cover the cost of 
expert services plus, in some cases, a modest fee to cover processing costs (but not fully loaded overhead 
rates).  
 
Youth employment. This program, which again is a funding rather than a TES type offering, enables 
recent graduates to do paid internships in SMEs. The graduates obtain work experience and the SMEs 
obtain increased technical or business capability. Participants must be aged 15 to 30 to qualify and be a 
recent graduate who is unemployed, or underemployed. The program will pay up to C$30,000 or 50 
percent of the internÕs costs for a maximum duration of 12 months (Goss Gilroy Inc., 2012). The duration of 
the IRAPÕs Youth Employment Program internship must be a minimum of six months and a maximum of 12 
months.  
 
Advisory services. Included in this category are business advice, strategic planning, market assessment, 
strategic information, competitive technology intelligence, intellectual property searching, technology 
validation, and technical engineering. These services are delivered one-on-one through a network of 
Industrial Technology Advisors (ITAs) and also through a brokering arrangement whereby the ITA links the 
SME to multiple experts and they choose the service provider. The ITA will also link companies with other 
companies within and outside of Canada to address technology or business needs. These services are 
based around the ITAsÕ inherent capabilities and knowledge of best practices rather than involving for 
example formal assessment tools. Advisory services do not include implementation (such as lean 
manufacturing kaizen events or preaudit assessments for standards certification); these types of services 
are provided through partner organizations. 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
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5.6. Clients 
 
IRAP services are open to all companies with fewer than 500 employees. Canada has 2.4 
million establishments, of which 1.2 million have employees; 99.8 percent of these firms 
have fewer than 500 employees. Firms in certain North American Industrial Classification 
System (NAICS) codes defined by the program as being product oriented are the primary 
targets. Manufacturing clients were more prevalent early in the programÕs history. The 
current composition of clients by industry indicates that one-third of the firms are in 
information and communication technologies and nearly 20 percent are in materials and 
manufacturing; about 10 percent are in each of construction, agriculture and food, energy 
and environment, and life sciences (Goss Gilroy Inc., 2012). 
The IRAP reaches about 10,000 firms a year, roughly 15 percent of potential clients. 
Approximately one-third of these firms receive contributions. Nearly 60 percent of firms 
served through contributions are in Ontario or Quebec. In contrast, the Atlantic region, which 
has fewer R&D-intensive industries, receives a higher share of funding to support 
organizations, which in turn provide services to firms.  
There is no mass marketing of the program other than the IRAP website 
(http://www.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/eng/NRC-IRAP/index.html). Marketing is conducted primarily 
through one-on-one relationships between the ITA and the SME client in its region. The 
IRAP takes a portfolio approach to the economy in a given region and the SMEs within it. 
Each ITA works from a portfolio of SMEs and is responsible for following their economic 
progress over a multi-year period (collecting data for up to 5 years after the project). A 
typical client cycle is initiated through discussions to understand a companyÕs business and 
strategy and continues with advisory assistance provided by ITAs. When the company is 
ready for a major innovation project, the ITA will help structure the project, secure the 
necessary resources and prepare the application for IRAP funding. After the due diligence 
process undertaken by IRAP personnel, the appropriate level of IRAP manager is provided 
with a recommendation for approval or rejection of an SMEÕs request for funding. The ITA 
closely follows an approved project and the implementation of results and impact on the 
companyÕs growth are monitored in the subsequent years (Figure 8). Customer relationships 
are managed through a customer relationship management (CRM) software called SONAR, 
which was introduced in 1998 and completely renewed in 2013.  
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Figure 8. IRAP Client Service Model  
 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration. 
 
5.7. Governance 
 
The IRAP is governed by NRC rules and regulations. The NRC is an agency of the 
Canadian government and oversight is provided by Parliament through the Ministry of 
Industry. The NRC has a council of appointees from the client community to provide 
strategic direction. A president, an executive vice-president, and secretary general head the 
NRC. Amongst four vice presidents one heads the IRAP. In addition, the IRAP has a 
program-specific advisory board. The advisory board is comprised of 11 members: seven of 
whom are from industry, two from the financial sector, one from a national drug and 
development center, and the vice president of IRAP. The advisory board provides guidance 
on strategic as opposed to fiduciary affairs.  
ITAs have long been given oversight flexibility. However, in recent years, their 
activities have become systemized. Indeed, a field manual was created in the late 2000s. 
The field manual resides online to accommodate the evolution and variety of situations 
encountered. It complies with Federal Finance Administration Act (FAA) regulations and is 
used primarily as a reference document. Conformance with procedures as outlined in the 
manual is standard. Directors can override these procedures but a written justification is 
required and must be stored in SONAR. 
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One longstanding governance issue for the program is the oversight of contribution 
agreements with client firms and partner organizations. A set of conditions is used to govern 
contribution agreements with firms and organizations. These include (NRC, 2013): 
¥ Responsible conduct of research if the project uses human or animal subjects (firms 
only) 
¥ Adequate financial records 
¥ Evidence of personal service and contractor efforts such as time records, payroll 
ledgers, invoices, SR&ED claims or cancelled checks (firms only) 
¥ Written notice of any changes to the project or relationships with subcontractors 
¥ Acknowledgement of the financial contribution of the Government of Canada on 
company marketing materials 
¥ Agreement to exploit the intellectual property developed through the project to create 
economic and social benefits to Canada (firms only) 
 
If these conditions are breached, the firm or organization is given written notice. A breach 
may result in a modification of the contribution or at the worst, termination and requirement 
that the company refund the program. The firm can request release from the agreement and, 
through an exit payment, be freed from further obligations. The NRC finance branch 
performs post-contribution audits on approximately 10 percent of the contributions; these are 
selected at random. The post-project audit can include holding a meeting with the client to 
determine the status of the project and what was achieved.  
 
5.8. Personnel 
 
As of 2011, the Program employed 30 managers/directors, 236 ITAs, 6 analysts, 39 RCAOs 
and 71 administrative support employees. The typical IRAP ITA has an engineering or 
science background and 20 years business experience. Young engineers or scientists are 
not considered for this type of position, while candidates with prior positions such as director 
of manufacturing, vice president of R&D, general manager, entrepreneur, or CEO are 
preferred. ITAs as a whole are probably among the most highly qualified and experienced of 
any group of extension specialists in any country and the program relies on this high level of 
embodied knowledge in order to provide services to client firms (rather than relying on an 
assessment tool, for example). ITAs are hired so as to be located close to the territory in 
which they work so that they can drive to client meetings. Their backgrounds should allow 
them to be conversant with the prevalent industries in their regions; if textile manufacturers 
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dominate a given region, for example, ITAs are not necessarily required to have worked in 
the textile industry as long as they have sufficient capabilities to serve the industry. 
The program does not see much turnover among its ITAs, for several reasons. The 
ITAs are unionized, they earn competitive salaries (within the compensation framework, i.e., 
pay levels of the NRC16, which does not include incentive pay or bonuses for example), they 
have some freedom to meet program goals, they do interesting work and they contribute to 
the success of SMEs. At one point in the IRAPÕs history, there were two classes of ITAs: 
NRC ITAs and network member ITAs. Network ITAs outnumbered NRC ITAs by four to one. 
As of April 1, 2003 the network member ITAs were converted to NRC employees.  
The IRAP has an on-boarding process for new ITAs. Orientation sessions are held at 
the Ottawa headquarters, in part to gain familiarity with other NRC divisions. New ITAs are 
teamed with veterans to call on clients and learn to use program tools. The program also has 
supported internal training in various soft skills and business areas such as in client 
engagement, marketing, and finance. More recently, Stage-Gate training has been piloted 
on a trial basis to support ideation capabilities. The ITAs have sector teams and informal 
special interest groups to enable information sharing and updating about sectoral trends, key 
players in the sector, and their needs. 
 
5.9. Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
IRAP has two main monitoring and evaluation processes. As of 2010, clients receiving 
nonrepayable contributions are required to complete three post-project instruments: a status 
of the instrument administered yearly for five years, a post project assessment administered 
at the end of the project, and an impact assessment also administered yearly (at the end of 
the project) for five years. Clients receiving advisory services only do not complete these 
instruments. Four gross client-level metrics are monitored: 
¥ Revenue: total sales, money received from sales of products, gross receipts, 
turnover 
¥ Income: revenues minus expenses, cost of goods sold 
¥ Number of employees: gross number of employees 
¥ Investments in R&D: budget lines or allocations for other R&D projects 
This monitoring does not directly tie these four metrics to IRAP related assistance per 
se, rather it is designed to provide an overall picture of the financial health of the client after 
receipt of program assistance. Customer satisfaction is addressed separately. Clients can 
                                                             
16
 See for example, 
http://www.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/eng/careers/collective_agreements/technical_category.html 
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share comments, recommendations and complaints concerning the service with the vice 
president. 
The IRAP is legislatively required to undergo an evaluation every five years in which 
the program is reviewed for its efficiency and effectiveness. The NRC performed early 
evaluations, but external evaluators have been used to conduct more recent assessments. 
These evaluations use mixed methods approaches including document review, stakeholder 
interviews, surveys of ITAs, surveys of clients (firms, organizations), and cost-benefit 
analysis. Quasi-experimental designs and comparison groups are not used, with the 
exception of a couple of special studies in partnership with Statistics Canada, which enabled 
a comparison of clients and nonclients. The most recent of these was performed in 2007, 
when the performance of 700 clients in British Columbia was compared with that of 370,000 
matching nonclients (NRC, 2007); this study found that IRAP clients had five times the 
shareholder equity of nonclients and four times the growth in average shareholder equity 
from 1998Ð2002. The most recent external evaluation used the following measures (Goss 
Gilroy Inc., 2012): 
¥ Number of companies and organizations served (typically about 10 percent of target 
clientele base of SMEs): program reach, either companies or organizations receiving 
contributions or companies or organizations receiving advisory services 
¥ Number of R&D projects funded: number of companies receiving contributions for 
R&D projects 
¥ Satisfaction with service: timeliness in funding decisions, receipt of awards, receipt of 
payments, quality of referrals 
¥ Intermediate measures of increased technical and business capacity: measured by a 
series of survey questions eliciting the percentage of IRAP clients agreeing that the 
program helped increase the firmÕs business skills and knowledge and scientific and 
technical knowledge, that it led to enhanced technical knowledge or capabilities, 
enhanced ability to perform R&D, and enhanced business knowledge/capabilities.  
¥ Intermediate measures of employment: jobs created or retained in the firm, and the 
percentage that are in R&D related positions 
¥ Intermediate measures of R&D: extent to which the program helped the client 
develop intellectual property, increase overall productivity, and create new or 
improved products or processes 
¥ Intermediate measures of commercialization: the extent to which the program 
increased a firmÕs production or service provision capacity, product or technology 
commercialization, domestic or international market share 
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¥ Rival explanation: Share of clients for which the project would not have succeeded 
without funding 
¥ Company value: shareholder equity of clients versus nonclients (NRC, 2007) 
¥ Social benefits: effect of the funded project on environmental, health, safety, and 
security for Canadians, including reducing negative environmental effects. 
¥ Benefit cost ratio: the ratio of benefits to costs of clients served as measured by the 
national budget allocation; recent evaluations have estimated this ratio at more than 
11:1 (Kijek, 2010). 
 
The IRAP does not distinguish results associated with grants and contributions from those 
associated with advisory services. For the most part, any client that received a contribution 
also received advisory services. Nevertheless, several of the indicators from the Goss Gilroy 
assessment have a more direct association with advisory services and the results for these 
indicators are: 
¥ Quality of referrals (83 percent of clients satisfied or very satisfied) 
¥ The program helped increase the firmÕs business skills and knowledge (70 percent of 
clients agree) 
¥ The program helped increase the firmÕs scientific and technical knowledge (90 
percent of clients agree) 
¥ The program led to enhanced technical knowledge or capabilities (90 percent of 
clients agree) 
¥ The program led to enhanced ability to conduct R&D (62 percent of clients agree)  
¥ The program led to enhanced business knowledge/capabilities (68 percent of clients 
agree).  
Several recommendations have been made in these evaluations. These 
recommendations concern (i) the need for more inclusive monitoring systems (across all 
services provided), (ii) a greater role for the ITAs in initial client selection, (iii) improved 
costing of contribution program management, (iv) more systematic mechanisms for client 
feedback, (v) greater integration of the program with other NRC offerings, and (vi) more 
comprehensive ongoing feedback on all aspects of the program. The IRAP-NRC is required 
to respond to each of these recommendations in writing. It has, for example, developed a 
formal monitoring system (SONAR) in response to a prior set of recommendations. 
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5.10. IRAP Regional Case: Province of Ontario 
 
The IRAP operates through a national program framework so each region operates the 
same way (albeit some regions have more offices and ITAs because they are larger). This 
case study profiles the Province of Ontario because of its size and its representativeness of 
how the program operates. Ontario is the largest province in Canada by population and 
number of establishments and accounts for nearly 40 percent of CanadaÕs GDP. More than 
one-third of all employer establishments with fewer than 500 employees operate out of 
Ontario. It is the fourth largest province in square miles, comprising 10 percent of the 
countryÕs land area. The automotive industry is strong in the southwestern part of the 
province. Information and communication technology is also prevalent in part a result of 
Waterloo-based Blackberry LTD (formerly Research in Motion) as is agribusiness and life 
sciences. Northern Ontario has nodes of activity in the technology and life sciences domains 
as well as traditional manufacturing and agribusiness. 
The Ontario provincial government has developed an active innovation support 
system. The province has supported the creation of industry/academic cooperative 
programs, centers of excellence, research fellowships, networking associations, regional 
innovation centers, business incubators and accelerators, and venture funds (Ontario 
Ministry of Research and Innovation, 2013). IRAP seeks to complement these offerings. 
Ontario has roughly 100,000 small and medium-sized establishments that are 
product or service based and interested in growing through innovation. The IRAP regional 
office in Ontario, as is the case with each region, conducts an analysis of the landscape to 
identify trends, gaps, and challenges. The program is responsible for following the 
longitudinal progress of SMEs in the region.  
Seventy ITAs located in 35 offices in the region serve these SMEs. The ITAs reside 
in the Ontario regional headquarters in Toronto, three additional Toronto locations (Seneca 
College in Markham, MaRS in downtown Toronto, and in the Oakville Corporate Centre in 
Oakville), the Communication Research Centre in Ottawa, the Accelerator Centre at the 
University of Waterloo near Blackberry LTD and various partner organizations distributed 
throughout the province such as the Northwestern Ontario Innovation Centre in Thunder 
Bay. These ITAs are managed by one of five regional directors.  
The budget of the Ontario region is about C$65 million for contributions and C$3 to 
C$4 million for salaries and operations. The operations category includes a travel budget, 
which is allotted to each territory and through which travel claims are submitted. In 2009 and 
2010, the region received additional funds in part to provide support for the downturn in the 
automotive sector in southwestern Ontario. This sector has since experienced an upswing in 
business activity. 
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The typical ITA in Ontario manages a portfolio of 60 SMEs in his or her territory. Of 
these, the ITA typically works with 40 a year, providing primarily advisory services. One 
quarter of these firms may receive contributions, which are staged throughout the year 
depending on client progress. The Ontario region issues awards to roughly 1,000Ð1,200 
SMEs a year and provides contributions to another 50 organizations for service delivery. 
Nonrepayable contributions are processed within each region. The procedure begins 
with client projects that have received recommendations from the lead ITA and the two other 
ITAs who have performed technical and business assessments. The final decision is made 
by the director or, depending on the projectÕs size, the executive director or vice president. 
The contract is let and signed by all parties. Client companies then work on the project and 
submit a claim to indicate this work. Claims are submitted electronically along with backup 
documentation. The RCAO administers all the electronic paperwork processing the claim, 
followed by a review and authorization by the ITA. The Ontario region has six RCAOs each 
managing roughly 150 nonrepayable contributions a year. Progress reports are processed 
alongside each claim and final reports are produced at the end of a project.  
 
5.11. Conclusions 
 
The IRAP is a well-established program that continues to be held in high regard in Canada 
and attracts increasing funding to expand into new areas of service delivery. One of the 
programÕs strengths is its ability to combine technology extension and R&D project funding in 
SMEs, which produces tangible benefits and returns to the Canadian economy. On the other 
hand, the program lacks a robust system to capture what its ITAs do on the nonfunding side 
of program services. As such, many of the expanded initiatives are focused on the R&D 
project funding side rather than the technology extension side of the program. Likewise, the 
program provides funding to organizations, which in turn deliver services to SMEs, but there 
is limited information on the performance of these organizations. The lack of a robust 
monitoring and evaluation system, apart from the five-year legislatively mandated 
evaluations, lies at the core of these challenges.  
 
6. The Manufacturing Advisory Service in England 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The MAS (Manufacturing Advisory Service) provides manufacturing business support for 
companies based in England with the objective of helping manufacturing businesses to 
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improve and grow. The MAS is wholly owned by the UK Department of Business Innovation 
and Skills (BIS) and is financed almost entirely by BIS.17 It is currently operated under 
contract to BIS by the Manufacturing Advisory Consortium (MAC) for three years (2012Ð15). 
The MAS represents a significant government intervention to support the manufacturing 
sector and in particular SMEs in this sector. 
 The manufacturing industry in the UK employs around 2.6 million people and in 2013 
accounted for 11 percent of UK gross value added (GVA)18 and 54 percent of UK exports.19 
In the global landscape, the UK is the 11th largest manufacturer in the world20 and 
manufacturing accounts for the largest part of UK exports. Output in the sector declined 
particularly sharply during the 2008/2009 recession, but recovered by 2010 and has grown 
modestly since then. More than 70 percent of business research and development goes into 
the manufacturing sector and goods produced in the sector account for nearly half of all UK 
exports (Maer and Rhodes, 2013). Manufacturing is vital to the economic prosperity of the 
UK and accordingly the current government has included advanced manufacturing in the first 
stage of a process entitled the Growth Review. The HM Treasury (2013) report stated that 
the sector would benefit from a range of measures, including bringing forward the launch of 
an enhanced Manufacturing Advisory Service (House of Commons Library, 2013).  
 From January, 2012, as a result of the Growth Review, the MAS was given an 
additional specific focus on strategic and technical support for SMEs developing advanced 
manufacturing capabilities and creating high value jobs. Support was also targeted toward 
enabling business improvement for manufacturers operating in global supply chains 
and linking SMEs with an apprenticeship program facilitating a minimum of 1,250 
engineering and manufacturing apprenticeships annually.  
 Manufacturing business support (along with other economic development and 
business assistance activities) is a devolved function in the current UK system of 
administrative governance. In Scotland, manufacturing advisory services (SMAS) are offered 
through Scottish Enterprise.21 During the period 2007/2008Ð2009/2010, expenditure on 
SMAS was £5.06m.22,23 In Northern Ireland and Wales, existing manufacturers can receive 
support respectively from Invest Northern Ireland and Business Wales. The MAS is the 
                                                             
17
 Some additional funding has been secured through European Commission ERDF scheme. 
18
 Gross value added (GVA) is a measure in economics of the value of goods and services produced in an 
economy or in area, industry or sector. 
19
 EEF, UK Manufacturing 2014 the FACTS - http://www.eef.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/1EC00841-E738-44A3-A837-
DFBEC00DF99B/23672/1402EEFFactCard_NB.pdf 
20
 The UKÕs world ranking is from the UN national accounts and refers to 2012 
21
 In 2012, Scottish Enterprise evaluated its Efficiency Support and this included an evaluation of SMAS.  
 Strategic Evaluation of SE Efficiency Support (including the Scottish Manufacturing Advisory Service)  
22
 British pounds (£) are used this case. £1 = US$1.631. 
23
 The total expenditure on the efficiency program over the period 2007/08 to 2009/10 was £13.2m, most of which 
was spent on the BE (non-SMAS) strand of support (£8.1m or 62 percent). Expenditure on SMAS was £5.06m 
(38 percent). The BE element was fully funded by SE whilst the SMAS element was partly funded via ERDF 
(£501,400, 10 percent) and company income (£807,400, 16 percent). 
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national manufacturing advisory service for England. Although larger companies can receive 
services (at cost), SMEs in England are the main focus of MAS publicly sponsored services. 
There are about 97,700 active manufacturing firms with 250 or fewer employees in England, 
representing more than four-fifths of all manufacturing SMEs firms in the UK About 93,000 
English SMEs employ fewer than 50 employees.24  
 
6.2. Evolution of the Manufacturing Advisory Service  
 
The history of the MAS dates back to 1977. Interim studies of the service were carried out 
during 1978Ð81. Encouraging results were instrumental in securing a marked expansion of 
the MAS in 1983.25 Since this time the service has been much reorganized and changed. It 
was re-launched in 2002 by the then Department of Trade and Industry. From 2002 to 2011 
the MAS was organized on a regional basis and was designed to offer technical and 
strategic advice to SMEs. The regional offices were titled as Centres of Manufacturing 
Excellence. Under this regional model, regional development agencies and the BIS funded 
the regional centers and they were run by separate organizations in each region; for 
example in the North West of England the Manufacturing Institute based in Trafford Park, 
Manchester, ran the service from 2002Ð2011.26  
 In December 201027 and again in January 201128 the BIS organized two MAS 
stakeholder events to inform MAS policy decisions going forward from April 2012. Topics 
discussed and reported on included the possible leveraging of European Regional 
Development Funding (ERDF) for the MAS to reach out to more manufacturers and tailor the 
service to local needs and priorities: to not only maintain funding levels but to actually 
increase funding. 
 In 2011 a decision was made by the government to reacquire the service and, 
effective January 1, 2012, the MAS became a national service. This revision of 
arrangements was linked to the abolition of the Regional Development Agencies and to the 
austerity program in the UK as the revised service would be subject to a 25 percent budget 
                                                             
24
 FAME database, accessed November 2013, enterprises in SIC 2007 codes 10Ð32 (manufacturing). 
25
 In 1987 the DTI Òclosed the productivity element of the Business and Technical Advisory Service (the 
successor to MAS) to allow BTAS assistance to concentrate on helping small and medium-sized firms put more 
effort into design, quality management and marketing.Ó 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/iese/aurep01.html 
26
 http://www.manufacturinginstitute.co.uk/ 
27
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110614205941/http:/www.mas.bis.gov.uk/news/slides-MAS-
policy-workshop.pdf and 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110614205941/http://www.mas.bis.gov.uk/news/MAS-policy-
workshop-report.pdf 
28
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110614205941/http://www.mas.bis.gov.uk/news/stakeholder-
meeting-slides-27jan.pdf and 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110614205941/http://www.mas.bis.gov.uk/news/stakeholder-
meeting-report-27jan.pdf 
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cut. The Manufacturing Advisory Consortium (MAC) now delivers the national program. This 
consortium comprises the accounting and business advisory firm Grant Thornton UK LLP, 
Pera Consulting Ltd., the West Midlands Manufacturing Consortium Ltd. (WMMC) and the 
South West Manufacturing Advisory Service Ltd. (SWIMAS). Grant Thornton leads the 
contract and subcontracts the three other organizations to run regional MAS operations.  
 The BIS ran a competitive process to appoint the consortium to run the service and 
selected the Manufacturing Advisory Consortium from the contenders. This consortium has a 
three-year contract run the service. The situation will then be reviewed and either the 
contract renewed or a further competition launched. Other consortia that bid to run MAS 
included the Manufacturing Institute. Although its consortium was unsuccessful, the 
Manufacturing Institute is still involved in the delivery of the MAS in the North West of 
England.  
 The various stages of the development of the service are identified as MAS I through 
MAS IV. At the outset in 2002, the MAS was created in recognition of underperforming 
manufacturing companies in England and designed as a response to productivity issues. 
The first two contracts for the MAS (MAS I and MAS II) were much focused on productivity 
improvement. For the third contract (MAS III) the Regional Development Agencies were 
tasked to deliver services and it evolved more as a brokerage service, a one-stop shop for 
manufacturers. Under the latest contract (MAS IV) the service offers comprehensive 
manufacturing assistance for manufacturers. Under MAS IV, everything from strategy to 
people development to productivity improvement and new product development is provided 
as a much stronger feature than it was in earlier bids.  
 Although the MAS has evolved over time (see Table 10), from a national policy 
perspective it is one of the few programs to survive the restructuring of the UK business and 
innovation support landscape. It sits centrally in the business support structure of the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills and is one of the few direct delivery schemes, 
along with the Growth Accelerator and UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) services that are 
available to businesses in the UK. From the BIS viewpoint, MAS is part of the core 
enterprise delivery that they provide and is a very specific service for manufacturing. The 
policy support team for the MAS is located in the advanced manufacturing and supply 
section of the BIS. 
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Table 10. MAS Timeline, 2002Ð2015 
MAS Phase Period 
MAS I 2002Ð2005 
MAS II 2005Ð2007 
MAS III 2007Ð201129 
MAS IV 2012Ð2015 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration from MAS reports and interviews. 
 
The evolution of MAS IV delivered by the MAC, and the introduction of a national 
consortium to lead the service, represent significant change to the program. Prior to 2012 
and the MAS IV contract, the Regional Development Agency (RDA) led the service. Until 
March 31, 2012, there were nine RDAs, nondepartmental bodies in the UK. RDAs were 
originally established in 1998 to enhance economic development and one RDA existed for 
each of the Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) level 1 regions of 
England.30 The decision to abolish them was taken in 2010 as part of the austerity agenda, 
with a view to reducing the government deficit. There was no direct replacement for the 
RDAs as the newly formed Local Economic Partnerships (LEP) tasked to take on some of 
the responsibilities of the former RDAs do not receive any funding from central government 
and local councils have not received an equivalent injection of income from central funds. 
The UK Central Government Treasury funded RDAs31 and the budget for the RDAs was 
£1.76 billion in 2010/2011. 
 The MAS core contracts were issued centrally from the BIS but to the RDAs who 
delivered the service. The RDAs complemented the service with additional funding and 
individual initiatives and activities within each region. This meant that each RDA led contract 
for the delivery of the MAS actually evolved and became quite different and that there was 
no unique and common set of indicators emerging from delivery of the MAS. All RDAs 
delivering the MAS did have to use GVA as an indicator but they measured it slightly 
differently and the variation in indicators across the various RDAs made it quite difficult to 
compare and contrast different ways of running the service. The indicators that the MAC now 
use emerged from the review process conducted by BIS when the decision was made to 
bring the MAS back into a national delivery model and to procure the service.  
                                                             
29
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110614205941/mas.bis.gov.uk/ 
30
 Similar activities were carried out in Wales by the Welsh Government Department of Economy and Transport, 
in Northern Ireland by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment and in Scotland by Scottish 
Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise.  
31
 Funded from HM Treasury via six different central government departments: Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills; Department for Communities and Local Government; Department for Energy and Climate 
Change; Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Department for Culture, Media and Sport; and UK 
Trade and Investment. 
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 This new model (MAS IV) emerged from the best operational practices elsewhere but 
also allowed it to be cross compared with other support delivery for which the BIS is 
responsible to create fairly common indicators and to standardize outcome measures across 
the other business support services.32 From the BIS perspective they are now more able to 
evaluate and understand which elements of service are working well and which are not. 
 
6.3. Structure and Operational Model 
 
Via the national consortium led by Grant Thornton, the MAS draws on private sector 
expertise and national sector specialists to provide services to local businesses through a 
consistent delivery framework. The decision to change the operational model arose due to 
the abolition of the RDAs. The MAS is now delivered through a single organization, with the 
aim of delivering national consistency in service provision and ensuring that all services are 
available to companies throughout England. It has been suggested that this single 
organization model allows better sharing of best practice, although regional differences 
continue.  
 The role of the lead private operator Grant Thornton is in part to deliver the service in 
the South East of England. It has also taken on the role of lead contractor for the consortium 
and deals directly with the MAS on behalf of the consortium in all matters related to the 
contract. In essence there are two parts to the governmentÕs relationship with the appointed 
service delivery team. On the one hand there are management board meetings every month 
for all the consortium members to discuss aspects of service delivery. On the other hand, 
there is a quarterly contract review session, which is between the BIS and Grant Thornton as 
lead contractor. This effectively means there is a separation of the issues of practical 
delivery, where the BIS engages with the whole consortium, and contractual issues where 
the BIS speaks solely to Grant Thornton.  
 Although a national service, the MAS is delivered in England through four regional 
operations, and these can be viewed as regional based centers. The advisors are managed 
through one of the four regional areas and operate out of one of the regional centers only. 
Regions have different practices and advisors may work differently in each. The four areas 
are London and the South East, the South West of England, the North and West of England, 
and the East of England (Map 3). The West Midlands Manufacturing Consortium (WMMC), 
one of the regional delivery partners of the MAS in the North and West of England, is profiled 
in Box 7. 
 
                                                             
32
 Towards the end of 2014, MAS became part of the UK GovernmentÕs Business Growth Service Ð a gateway to 
a range of business services for SMEs (see: http://www.greatbusiness.gov.uk/businessgrowthservice/). 
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Map 3. MAS Regions (England) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Manufacturing Advisory Service (Regional designations as of 2013). 
 
 
Box 7. The West Midlands Manufacturing Consortium 
The West Midlands, and the North East and North West regions of England have long had a strong 
manufacturing presence, particularly the automotive industry in the West Midlands, but this industry 
has experienced declines in recent years. Conversely, new and developing technology is flourishing 
and a good proportion of the UKÕs pharmaceutical, medical and process engineering production is 
carried out in the North West. Nearly one-third of all manufacturing employment in England is in these 
two combined regions. 
 
One of the regional delivery partners of the MAS in England is the West Midlands Manufacturing 
Consortium (WMMC). WMMC was established in 2002 as a special purpose vehicle to deliver the 
MAS in the West Midlands. WMMC Ltd. was set up as a not-for-profit company by three member 
organizations, Warwick Manufacturing Group, the Engineering Employment Federation (EEF) and 
Business Link West Midlands. Since its creation it reports that it has worked with nearly 17,000 
manufacturers, delivered 5,484 in-depth interventions and generated around £100m of Quality Cost 
and Delivery (QCD) improvements per year. In addition to the MAS, WMMC delivers sector support 
programs for Rail (Rail Alliance), Aerospace (SC21) and Automotive and has also run the Inside 
Manufacturing Enterprise which worked with local businesses and schools to encourage 14-17 year 
olds to work in the manufacturing sector.  
 
WMMC is currently contracted to Grant Thornton to deliver the MAS in the North East and North West 
regions of England in addition to the West Midlands. This is a three-year contract in the first instance. 
It may be renewed for one further year or may be put out to competitive tender again; this has yet to 
be decided. There is a board for the regional delivery of the MAS that comprises two members each 
from the Warwick Manufacturing Group, the EEF and the delivery teamÐArea Manager MAS and 
Finance Director Area MASÐplus two people who are independent appointments, both of whom used 
to work for the car manufacturing company Rover. The composition of the board was designed to 
ensure a good representation of the manufacturing community, although it does seem mainly 
representative of the West Midlands element of the region.  
 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration from MAS interviews and reports. 
South West 
England
East
England
London &
South East
North 
and 
West 
England
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The MAS also maintains multiple strategic partnerships, including with Growth 
Accelerator, UK Trade & Investment (UKTI), the Technology Strategy Board and Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). These agencies offer a range of mentoring, growth, export, 
technology, and other business support services. The UK Government expects these 
various agencies to collaborate to deliver a connected approach to business support. The 
MAS, for example, refers manufacturing companies to the relevant partner agencies; a 
company with a growth strategy including exports would be referred to UKTI and if a 
company has a problem with leadership, the MAS would refer that company to the Growth 
Accelerator which offers a management and leadership program.  
 The MAS has evolved over time and it is one of the few facilities that has survived 
the revamps and changes to the structure of service support from a national policy point of 
view. From the BIS perspective it sits centrally as part of the business support structure. The 
BIS supports few direct delivery schemes at present and when considering business support 
services Growth Accelerator33 and UKTI34 are always included because they are the key 
direct delivery end services BIS currently have in place. The BIS funds the rest of the 
investment in services supporting business, but the delivery is at armÕs length, not directly by 
BIS. These include the Advanced Manufacturing Supply Chain Initiative,35 which is more 
reliant on other partners in delivering its particular objectives. The MAS is a central part of 
the core enterprise delivery services of the BIS but is distinctive because of the specific 
services provided and its focus on manufacturing.  
 
6.4. Program Scale and Financing 
 
The annual funding available to the MAS from the BIS was reduced from £20m in 2010 to 
£15m in 2011, as part of the governmentÕs austerity drive to reduce public expenditures 
following the global financial crisis. Subsequently, as the government has shifted more 
towards a growth agenda, additional funding has been made available to the MAS. The UK 
government has committed £50 million over three years commencing in April 2012 to 
provide what they describe as an enhanced service through the MAS, tailored to suit the 
needs of the individual business and the local economic environment. The annual budget for 
2013 was £19m ($30.7m). Additional funding came in 2014 in the form of E.U. European 
Regional Development Funding (EDRF) and providing an additional £10Ð12m. Two MAS 
regionsÑthe South West and the North and West areasÑhave now secured ERDF funding. 
The South West MAS received ERDF funding for two specific projects, whereas the 
                                                             
33
 Note both Grant Thornton and Pera are also involved in delivery of this service. 
34
 See https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-trade-investment. 
35
 See http://centreofenterprise.com/amsci/. 
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North/West MAS secured ERDF funding to extend the service. The other two regions have 
not yet applied for ERDF. This is likely to lead to a mixed picture of funding across the 
various MAS regions, and related regional differences in service scale and scope. 
The national dimensions of the service that are increasingly important are the sector 
and the supply chain offers as these do not respect regional boundaries constructed from 
historical or administrative convenience. The MAS is seeking national focus and coordination 
in both of these dimensions. Yet, although the framework is set nationally, there are different 
providers, varying needs to respond to different sectoral and local circumstances and 
differences in the availability of and access to ERDF funding across the four regions. 
 MAS (2013) (covering the period January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2013) offers some 
insight into performance and the number of firms that received MAS support and provides a 
comparison against targets (Manufacturing Advisory Service, 2013). 
¥ 12,093 business reviews delivered to manufacturers (target 10,294) 
¥ 2,341 in -depth support projects completed (target 2,064) 
¥ 3,965 in -depth support projects currently in progress (target 3,329) 
¥ 7,277 new jobs forecast by manufacturers (target 4,955) 
¥ 19,985 jobs safeguarded  
¥ £619.6 m of Gross Value Added (GVA) for the English economy (target £301.4m)36 
¥ MAS reports delivering over a return on investment that is over twentyfold (target 
14:1)  
Since the MAS IV contract began in 2012 the MAS has undertaken the following: 
¥ 25,000 enquiries (Level 1) 
¥ 19,500 manufacturing diagnostics (Level 2), 13,100 of which were individual 
companies  
¥ 600 (Level 3) events and best practice visits 
¥ 4,800 intensive interventions (Level 4) with a further 1,900 active currently  
 
From the BIS perspective the contract is national and run on identical lines in all 
regions. It is managed by the MAC, which is made up of four partners with a regional 
presence. These regions are aligned to old Government Office (GO) boundaries37 and bid 
for ERDF funds within these boundaries. The BIS is most definite that this is a national 
contract and should be seen as one; the resource flexes across boundaries when necessary 
and the staffing is aligned with the manufacturing base.  
                                                             
36
 The GVA data is from the Blue Book (ONS, 2013). The data refer to 2012. 
37
 Government Offices for the Regions were established across England in 1994 and closed in March 2011 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/geography/beginner-s-guide/administrative/england/government-office-
regions/index.html 
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6.5. Services 
 
The MAS provides companies with direct access to expert advisors, who work with them to 
identify and implement productivity and innovation improvements to their business. The MAS 
states their service is driven by strategic insights gained through a continuous feedback loop 
with industry. There are 800 plus strategic reviews with companies performed each month. 
Critical research from the MAS National Barometer is also used to guide service offerings. 
Core services provided by the MAS are focused on its stated aim to help manufacturers 
streamline their processes, reduce waste, become more energy efficient and generally 
improve and grow the business (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Core Services Offered by MAS 
MAS Core 
Service 
Elaboration 
Strategic support Performance benchmarking 
Business model development  
Finance Expert program for manufacturing SMEs 
Leadership training and workforces development 
Market analysis and sales planning 
Achieving 
manufacturing 
efficiencies 
Applying lean techniques across the whole business 
Improving quality and delivery performance 
Implementing 5S and visual management 
Building effective teams 
Value stream mapping and process mapping 
Waste reduction 
Commercialization 
of ideas 
Assistance with produce idea generation 
Using automation and design for manufacture and assembly 
Intellectual property review audits 
Sourcing prototyping partners  
Assistance with conformance and compliance 
Identifying routes to market  
Source: http://www.mas.bis.gov.uk. 
 
The delivery model for the MAS services has a five-level structure (see Box 8). A 
telephone helpline is available to companies and it can conduct a free manufacturing review 
for SME manufacturers, offer subsidized consultancy (up to 50 percent), and organize 
appropriate local events for manufacturing companies. The final level of the service provision 
is referral to other organizations (i.e., the brokerage element of the MAS). 
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Box 8. MAS Services: Five Levels 
 
The MAS offers a five-level service model to manufacturing companies delivered or coordinated by its 
expert advisors. The levels are not necessarily followed by companies in a linear fashion, but are 
used by MAS to categorize the types and intensity of its service offerings. 
 
Level 1  
Enquiries 
Experienced advisors who are geographically dispersed around the 
country provide support at the Level 1 stage. Advisors provide local 
support to address initial requests from companies and to suggest 
appropriate next steps. Online support packages are also available to 
companies who access the service via the MAS website. 
 
Level 2  
Manufacturing Review 
At Level 2, the MAS provides an onsite specialist manufacturing 
diagnostic review. This is usually one day, but may be two days for 
more complex businesses. A diagnostic process based on the 
principles of Manufacturing Excellence is used. This has been 
developed in conjunction with the Warwick Manufacturing Group and 
includes comparisons against best-in-class performance. In addition, a 
Fast Track telephone Level 2 review is used for common, well-
understood issues. The Level 2 review usually results in a series of 
business improvement actions for the client. 
 
Level 3  
Events 
Level 3 involves training and networking events, including best 
practice visits. This is an integral part of delivering the business 
improvement actions identified in Level 2. It is complemented by a 
sustainable improvement community using best practice social 
networking procedures to provide peer-led best practice examples and 
less costly forms of self-help. 
 
Level 4  
Consultancy 
Level 4 services provide support for additional consultancy, with a 
three-tier menu of project support options. (i) MAS Foundation 
Service: Funding up to £1,000 (or a maximum of 50 percent) toward 
an improvement project, targeted at companies who need basic low-
level help. (ii) MAS Step Change Service: Funding of up to £3,000 (or 
5 percent maximum) toward a more significant improvement program. 
(iii) MAS Transformation Service: Funding of up to £10,000 (or 50 
percent maximum) for a strategic change to the business. 
 
Level 5  
Referrals 
 
 
 
Under Level 5 referrals, MAS advisors are responsible for identifying 
partner organization support. The advisors retain responsibility for the 
referral until it is demonstrated and confirmed by the client that the 
partner organization has addressed the client need. 
 
Source: http://www.mas.bis.gov.uk. 
The MAS also offers supply chain support. This includes helping SMEs diversify into 
advanced manufacturing supply chains, aiding original equipment manufacturers and their 
supply chains to develop better relationships and greater efficiency, and assisting groups of 
SMEs in supply chains or clusters to interact more effectively. MAS supply chain projects 
use the processes available through Levels 1Ð5 with custom implementation packages 
assembled to suit client needs, delivered by a team of dedicated supply chain experts. The 
way in which the MAS operates avoids unfair competition with private sector providers; MAS 
primarily acts a broker and, like other field services such as the U.S. MEP, reduces 
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transaction costs, opens up new market opportunities, and ensures quality control in linking 
SMEs with private sector consultants. 
6.6. Clients  
 
A dedicated approach has been developed by the MAS to support the key sectors 
highlighted in the governmentÕs Industrial Strategy (BIS, 2012). The BIS has selected these 
sectors as offering the best opportunities for growth and where UK manufacturers have a 
particular strength or competitive advantage. The focus areas are a mix of established and 
new industries and include the automotive, nuclear, oil and gas, aerospace, offshore wind, 
and chemical sectors.  
Any manufacturing company can avail itself of MAS support.38 While any size of 
business can apply for MAS assistance, funded (subsidized) support is available only to 
SMEs (fewer than 250 employees, annual turnover under £40m, and not part of a group 
which exceeds these criteria). Additionally, in practice, the MAS indicates that there is an 
emphasis on working with more capable larger SMEs. There is no differentiation in terms of 
the key performance indicators (KPIs) but the MAS prefers to focus on the larger SMEs, 
these are categorized as companies with 30 people plus with £5Ð10m in annual sales. A 
challenge is that the majority of British manufacturing companies employ fewer than 30 
people and have annual sales under £2m (90 percent of the manufacturing companies in the 
UK are SMEs and 90 percent of them employ less than 25 people). 
 
6.7. Personnel 
 
The MAS has four area directors. Each area director has responsibility for a region of 
England. The four areas are London and the South East, the South West of England, the 
North and West of England and the East of England. Each sub-region has from 4 to 12 
manufacturing advisors (Table 12) .39  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
38
 The MAS defines a manufacturer as an enterprise involved in the process of Ògetting raw materials to goods 
and their associated services.Ó Even if a company outsourced its production, it would still be included as a 
manufacturer in the MAS definition. http://www.mymas.org/manufacturing-support/who-we-can-help. 
39
 Source: MAS website (accessed August 2013); North West region validated by interview with NW MAS 
advisor. 
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Table 12. MAS Personnel, 2013 
Area director Region and Sub-region Manufacturing advisors 
Director for London and SE  
 
London 
South East 
4 
9 
Director for South West South West 18 
Director for East of England  East Midlands 7 
Yorkshire and Humber 7 
East of England 12 
Director for the North and West of 
England 
West Midlands 12 
North East 4 
North West 8 
Source: MAS interviews, 2013. 
 
MAS advisors typically have an engineering background. Most have worked in 
industry (e.g., as production managers) or have other hands-on manufacturing experience. 
Examples of MAS advisor experience and expertise are summarized in Table 13.  Using this 
experience as the foundation for the job requirements, the MAS then trains and develops 
advisory skills. The advisory staff benefit from a performance related pay structure. For the 
advisors, performance measures are linked closely to the contract measures that the MAS 
has to deliver. An element of the non-client facing staff is linked to overall performance of 
contractual targets plus their own performance measures geared to the role of the individual.  
Figure 9 presents the organizational chart for the North and West of England MAS 
region. The MAS core advisors for this region report directly to the operations director. In 
addition to the core advisors (shown in Table 13), there are sector specific advisors. There is 
only one at present for the automotive sector in the North and West of England MAS and 
one for the South of England for offshore wind but further specialist advisors are being 
recruited. 
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Figure 9. MAS North and West of England, Organization Chart 
 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration from MAS interviews, 2013. 
 
Table 13. Examples of MAS Advisor Expertise, MAS NW Region 
Background Experience Skills Sectors 
Experienced manager 
with a background in 
engineering, design 
and change 
management 
Highly experienced in 
production engineering 
activities with a broad 
knowledge of issues 
related to implementing 
and sustaining lean 
manufacturing 
 
Manufacturing process  
Design  
Production 
End of life recycling 
Electronics 
Refrigeration 
Mechanical assembly 
 
Held a number of 
senior positions in the 
manufacturing sector 
As director of a 
manufacturing 
operation, led team of 
180 people, grew 
turnover, and reduced 
operational costs 
through the 
implementation of lean 
business principles 
 
Operational 
Improvement 
Lean Office 
Lean Manufacturing 
Benchmarking 
Furniture 
General manufacturing 
Aerospace 
Healthcare 
Experienced manager 
with laboratory 
experience. Held posts 
as operational 
excellence manager, 
logistics manager and 
consultant 
Manufacturing and 
supply chain 
experience in blue chip 
companies 
Efficiency 
Strategy  
Planning and 
scheduling 
Performance 
measurement  
Supply chain  
Logistics  
Process improvement 
Food 
Automotive 
Continuous 
Manufacturing 
Source: MAS interviews, 2013. 
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6.8. Infrastructure 
 
Infrastructure provision (including use of equipment, laboratories, or testing) is not provided 
directly within the MAS program. However, the MAS provides brokerage support for clients 
who have infrastructure requirements. For example, the WMMC (West Midlands) MAS would 
take clients to Warwick University (with its internationally recognized Warwick Manufacturing 
Centre). This is part of the MAS role: to know where appropriate facilities and equipment are 
available for businesses and broker the clients with that infrastructure 
 
6.9. Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
The Department for Business Innovation and Skills sets targets for the MAS. The targets are 
set out in the main contract with the lead contractor, Grant Thornton, and reflected in the 
subcontracts with the regional MAS delivery teams. The MAS (2013) identifies several KPIs 
used to assess MAS performance. These are essentially quantitative indicators and include 
the following: 
¥ Business reviews delivered to manufacturers 
¥ In-depth support projects completed 
¥ In-depth support projects underway 
¥ New jobs forecast by SME manufacturers 
¥ Jobs safeguarded 
¥ GVA for the English economy 
¥ Days of in-depth consultancy provided 
¥ Value of media coverage secured 
¥ Number of followers on Twitter 
 
In practice, the two key measures for a business supported with a grant by MAS are 
related to GVA and jobs. The business is asked at the beginning of the process how they 
believe the grant will improve their GVA and how many jobs it will safeguard or create. The 
MAS subsequently monitors that original assessment. These figures are reported through 
the Business Activity Tracker (BAT).  
Importantly, the current indicators have emerged from the process that the BIS 
underwent when the decision was made to bring MAS back into a national delivery model 
and to procure the service. This reorganization allowed the BIS to select performance 
indicators that allow cross comparison with other support delivery under its remit. Thus when 
the BIS is evaluating they have a better chance of understanding what is working and what 
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is not across all their business support delivery services. There is, however, an element of 
performance measurement that is specific to MAS and these are the related to the MAS 
levels of service provided (1Ð5). 
The regional monitoring process registers volume of activity across the various levels 
of service provision, for example the numbers of Level 1 enquiries are recorded. At the start 
of every business intervention the MAS conducts a Level 2 business review. If at this stage a 
need emerges and the MAS believes it can support the business financially then the 
business will be asked: if you receive MAS support how will that improve your GVA, by how 
much will it improve your GVA; will it create new jobs and if so how many? Subsequently the 
MAS will revisit and conduct a further Level 2 Business Review to reassess the initial 
answers provided and then record the results. The MAS establishes the baseline figures in 
the first review and also collects the metrics to work that out in the first Level 2 review; a year 
later the MAS will conduct another review to monitor what actually happened to the business 
versus what was predicted to happen. Using this process the MAS gathers the required 
indicators for monitoring and assessment of the program achievements. This monitoring is 
repeated in subsequent years. 
 The reporting process allows advisors to record their activity at the local level on their 
laptops or tablets. Material is scanned in and the advisor automatically generates documents 
and this input is available directly to BIS through its computer network. This allows BIS to 
generate reports easily and analyze in depth the regional and sectoral MAS activity. The 
monitoring system is a usable Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system. This is a 
recording tool at service provider end and advisors have access to it on their laptops or 
iPads/tablets and into which they can enter information, for example the customer 
satisfaction questionnaires (see appendices 3 and 4). It is a practical solution for data 
collection that allows the advisors to scan or enter material and run the automatic generation 
of documents. The data input goes directly into the central computer system managed by 
SWMAS, which the BIS can directly access and in turn easily generate reports and look at 
regional and sectoral activity on a day to day basis. The BIS can use this data to consider 
how the evolving MAS will look in the future by using past data and assessing successes 
and failures. 
 The following three-way relationship is a further re-elaboration of the monitoring 
process. The MAS client undergoes a Level 2 review. This involves meeting with a MAS 
advisor from one of the regional bases for example, the West Midlands. The MAS advisor 
reviews the clientÕs needs and requirements and this process will identify a specific 
requirement such as a business plan. The MAS advisor then locates the appropriate person 
from the supplier registry to carry out this requirement activity. The client contracts with that 
supplier. The supplier undertakes the work and the client, if satisfied, will pay the invoice. 
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The client then goes back to MAS to be reimbursed for example, 50 percent of the cost (if 
that is what they have been awarded) from the MAS. At that point the MAS advisor revisits 
the client and collects data around the growth projections and asks a number of key 
questions such as: Did it happen? Did it not? Were they happy? Were they unhappy? The 
MAS will not approve the payment of the grant until that information is pulled together. By 
this process the advisor directly gathers the information and inputs the data directly into the 
monitoring system. 
 Monitoring of the qualitative experience for MAS customers is conducted through a 
customer satisfaction survey. Questions are related to the level of service received by the 
client (see Appendix). A separate private company is subcontracted to draw samples 
monthly from the businesses, which have received support at the different MAS levels. The 
survey comprises standard questions with options to distinguish whether it has been useful 
and beneficial; if are there are other elements of service the company would prefer; if there 
are elements of the service that could be improved. At the other end of the scale, the BIS 
has access to complaints that come in either directly or to the MAS. These two aspects of 
customer input cover the full spectrum of the business experience of the Manufacturing 
Advisory Service.  
 The MAS is also subject to formal program-wide assessments. The current 
Manufacturing Advisory Service is operating under a restructured delivery model, with a new 
contract and delivery consortium and has not yet been formerly evaluated in its current 
format (Phase IV, see Table 9). Previous phases of the MAS were evaluated in 2010 (DIUS, 
2010) and 2007 (DTZ, 2007). The 2007 review concluded that the scheme worked well and 
was well received by the sector and its target market. A good and long-term relationship is 
valued highly by businesses. A main weakness identified was the patchy performance data 
collected, which posed significant challenges for monitoring and review of the scheme. This 
weakness has clearly been addressed in later years with a more robust system of 
performance measurement now in place nationally. 
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Box 9. Summary of the 2007 Evaluation 
DTZ Consulting & Research (London) reviewed the 2002Ð2005 MAS program (MAS I) in 2006, and their 
report was published in 2007. The aim of the evaluation was to provide an independent review of the 
achievements of the MAS, its effectiveness and impact in the first three years of its operation (2002Ð2005), 
and to make recommendations to inform policy and delivery of this intervention in the future. The evaluation 
focused on the most significant MAS support packages Level 2 diagnostic and Level 4 consultancy.  
 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods was deployed. These included: interviews 
with key staff in the Regional Development Agencies and the MAS regional centers; a telephone survey of 
946 firms that received Level 2 and/or Level 4 assistance from the MAS between June 2002 and June 
2005; a survey of a control group of 401 firms that did not receive support from the MAS (referred to as 
nonusers); case studies of 20 beneficiary companies that received Level 4 support; and econometric 
analysis to identify the characteristics of MAS users and explore attribution and impact of the MAS 
intervention in quantitative terms. 
 
Main Findings  
 SMEs in the manufacturing sector that were in need of practical assistance for best practice 
manufacturing techniques and improvement of productivity had been targeted.  
 The main market for MAS consisted of small enterprises (employing 10Ð49 employees) and in general, 
of SMEs. 
 MAS served businesses across all size bands. A typical MAS user was an established small/medium 
size business in manufacturing (Tier 1 or below, rather than an Original Equipment Manufacturer), and 
likely to be exporting. 
 The MAS outperformed its original key objectives by nearly 50 percent in terms of numbers of 
diagnostic visits (Level 2 support) and by 100 percent in terms of consultancy support (Level 4 
support). 
 The ten MAS regional centers ran nearly 1,300 events across the country in the first three years of the 
operation of the program. 
 Companies that received Level 4 consultancy were significantly more likely to experience higher 
productivity and additional intermediate benefits than companies that received only Level 2 assistance. 
 In comparison with other forms of business advice the MAS program was rated highly by businesses. 
A relationship of trust has been built between the MAS and its client base. 
 On average, two in three businesses claimed clearly that they would not have achieved all/part of the 
improvements they have achieved and as quickly without MAS support. 
 Overall, the evaluation evidence concluded the scheme worked and was well received by the sector 
and its target market. Regional variations in delivery and performance existed but these were justified 
by demand, supply and infrastructure, sector and region related issues. 
 In the absence of the scheme, there were strong indications that no other form of business support 
would be sought by many businesses that used the MAS to improve aspects of their operations. 
 The nature of benefits also varied by size of business. For example, more microbusinesses than other 
businesses reported increased turnover/sales as benefit yielded by MAS support. On the other hand 
larger SME businesses (50+) were more likely than other businesses to have benefited from improved 
just-in-time (JIT) practices. 
 The MAS addressed two of the key underlying reasons for public sector intervention: introducing 
manufacturing firms to external business advice and providing them with access to affordable and 
tangible manufacturing advice, which they had not experienced before or from other sources, possibly 
leading them to buy further external support at the commercial rate.a  
 Value for Money (VFM): £1 of public funding allocated to the provision of MAS Level 4 support 
generated approximately £1.4-£1.8 of economic benefit for firms supported between 2002 and 2005. b 
 
a Nearly one-third of MAS users had either not accessed any other form of business advice, or had not 
accessed a comparable service. In addition, 70 percent of manufacturers that did not access MAS did not 
appear to be accessing external expertise that is of a similar nature to MAS. 
b The evaluation could not isolate the exact cost of Level 2 and Level 4, or the benefits of providing Level 1 
enquiry handling and Level 3 assistance (training and seminars), and could not establish whether the MAS 
could be in principle self-sustaining without subsidy. 
Source: DTZ (2007). 
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Box 10. Summary of the 2010 Evaluation 
In 2010, BIS and the RDAs commissioned a review was commissioned by to determine if there was a case 
for the continuation of funding for MAS beyond April 2011 and to provide lessons for future MAS design, 
management and delivery. DTZ Consulting conducted the evaluation, in partnership with the Cambridge 
Institute for Manufacturing. The methodology adopted to meet the objectives of the evaluation included 
both primary and secondary research. The primary research consisted of 31 interviews with key 
stakeholders in the MAS centers, RDAs, the CBI and commercial providers and 200 interviews with 
manufacturers in the UK. Secondary research included a desk-based review of relevant documentation, 
trends and indicators. Specifically the review looked at past performance and achievements of the MAS 
program at national and regional levels drawing upon review of relevant evaluation reports produced by the 
BIS and RDAs; the UK policy context for the manufacturing sector and headline indicators for the sector 
(business by size and employment); and relevant global trends, strategic analysis and identification of 
implications for the UK manufacturing. Some of the key findings and conclusions from this work are 
summarized below. 
 The evidence suggests that MAS has played a significant role in helping businesses to grow and the 
more in-depth the intervention, the higher the impact. 
 The service is also highly valued by manufacturers. 
 If the MAS did not exist, no other service/product in the market could currently deal with the very 
technical nature of many requests from manufacturers currently dealt with by MAS. 
 With additionality on the in-depth intervention work shown to be 90 percent and with satisfaction rate 
above 80 percent the service offers significant impact and satisfaction to manufacturers.  
 The service can demonstrate a wide range of benefits for UK manufacturers to date and has proved 
very responsive to the needs of the sector.  
 The MAS offering includes lean, strategy, leadership, and new process innovation and introduction. 
MAS practitioners possess both technical expertise and generic skills of team building, problem solving 
methods, facilitation, mentoring and coaching that are applicable to all levels of a manufacturing 
company from the shop floor to the boardroom.  
 Estimates of value for money suggest that the return on public investment/spending on the MAS since 
2002 is approximately £6.2 of additional GVA for every £1 of public spending allocated to the provision 
of the MAS for firms supported between 2002 and 2009.  
 Most importantly, the evidence to date also suggests that the MAS has addressed a number of the 
original market failures. For example: With Level 2 support, MAS reaches companies where the culture 
of getting external advice has been traditionally limited.  
 Public funding to alleviate the costs of assistance made available by the MAS also enables companies 
that would not have undertaken the program and/or would not pay for external advice to participate and 
be prepared to pay for advice in the future.  
 It also triggers the appetite for further advice with over two thirds of businesses stating that they would 
now seek advice in the future following the positive experience from MAS.  
 A review of key manufacturing trends indicates that although the manufacturing sector in the UK has 
been quite resilient to global changes and economic recession, a number of global drivers currently 
emerging would change radically the landscape for manufacturing and industry in general.  
 Overall, it could be argued that key market failures that led to the establishment of MAS in the first 
place are still present. 
 Furthermore, all manufacturers continue to need practical advice on both standard production 
processes and new sectors/areas such as resource efficiency, environmental technologies and 
recycling.  
 All manufacturers, not just SMEs, will need support to be able to understand and then implement 
changes affecting the sector at global level in order for their businesses to remain competitive. For 
example: It is likely that manufacturing businesses will to need to restructure and this requires sector 
specialist knowledge. This is an area where the MAS has traditionally added value and could continue 
to do so in a fast changing business environment where the speed of adoption of new production 
techniques and/or new products is competitive.  
 It also appears that the core MAS offering of lean thinking and operational efficiency will remain 
important, as cost reduction remains an issue for UK companies. This, however, goes beyond 
production and would require implementation of lean thinking across the entire organization.  
Designing the future MAS:  
 For the way forward, for the MAS to increase its Strategic Added Value it would also need to address 
the emerging requirements of manufacturing businesses by offering strategic advice in areas that 
matter to the UK competitive position as a whole, including servitization, value chains, sustainability 
and strategic interventions aligned to sectors/technologies. 
Source: DTZ (2007). 
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6.10. Conclusions  
 
The Manufacturing Advisory Service in England is a constantly evolving service that 
engages with many actors in the area of business support. This variety of actors offers the 
various elements of what could be a more systematized and coherent package of business 
support. The existing system has evolved in response to government objectives but also to 
targets of the time, for example a focus on poor productivity in the first decade of the century 
moving to more focus on GVA and securing jobs at the present time.  
The MAS literature states that the move to a national MAS model was undertaken to 
ensure a consistent quality of service across England. However, in losing the input of the 
RDAs, the additional funding and individual activities each RDA offered, an external reviewer 
might consider if there has also been some valuable regional diversity lost in the system.  
Nonetheless, despite the various evolutions of this technology extension service, 
many of the same actors (e.g., advisors, third party providers) are involved in the delivery of 
the service and in the business support landscape of England although the configurations 
and branding may differ over time. The focus of UK government intervention on business 
support now is the growth agenda and job creation, and targeting growth oriented 
companies.  
Several positive lessons can be derived from the MAS case. First, the MAS does 
have a clear measurement system, as has been described, for monitoring and evaluating the 
service. This is an essential prerequisite for any successful TES. It needs to be established 
at the outset who will execute the measurement system, what to measure, and how to 
measure in line with the identified aims and objectives of the service. Second, the MAS has 
appropriately qualified expert advisors from engineering backgrounds who can speak the 
language of the manufacturing business and who can easily establish a rapport with the 
companies with which they are working. Third, a TES service should ensure that the process 
of receiving advice and being referred to other appropriate agencies for support not directly 
delivered by the TES is as easy and clear as possible for the companies.  
The MAS has identified strengths but the organization of the service presents a 
number of challenges. The organization of service delivery is complicated for outside 
observers and for those working within the system to understand. This is a national service 
but is delivered by regional based organizations that are made up of different member 
organizations, as in the WMMC example. The configuration of the delivery model, however, 
is probably in practice not that important to the recipients of the service, provided the service 
they receive is appropriate and accessible and that there is some degree of consistency. 
This message of consistent branding should be emphasized, and if there is a lesson to be 
learnt from the MAS case study it is that there is strength in maintaining a common brand 
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and trying to preserve a common theme. The service can be tweaked around the edges, but 
the bureaucracy surrounding service provision and the complexity of the system should not 
change. These beneficiaries essentially require a quick, clean, professional, and easy way to 
access service.  
7. Tecnalia, Basque Region, Spain 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The Tecnalia Corporation is a strategic partnership between Tecnalia Research and 
Innovation, Neiker-Tecnalia and AZTI-Tecnalia.40 Tecnalia Research and Innovation was set 
up in 2011 with the merger of six technology centers: CIDEMCO, ESI, FATRONIK, 
INASMET, LABEIN, and ROBOTIKER. Tecnalia highlights its key objectives to offer 
technological solutions to help its business clients grow.41 TecnaliaÕs activities include 
research and technical development (RTD) and demonstration projects, technical services, 
exploitation of research through licensing and spin-offs, and services for organizational 
innovation and business diversification. TecnaliaÕs fields of activity are sustainable 
construction, energy and environment, information and communication technology (ICT), 
industry and transport, and health. Tecnalia has a total staff of around 1,470 people, and a 
turnover of !110 million.42  
 
7.2. History and Evolution  
 
The Basque Country, in Northern Spain, has a population of 2.1 million (4.7 percent of 
SpainÕs total population) and contributes 6 percent of the Spanish GDP. The region is 
characterized by having strong political autonomy and its own fiscal system, a complex 
governance (with a multitier system of regional government, three provincial governments, 
twenty counties and over 200 municipalities). The current Basque regional innovation 
system is dense and complex, comprising a multitude of organizations for scientific research, 
technological development, training and intermediation.  
 The Basque technology centers have been the cornerstone of the regional innovation 
system. However many of the technology centers (LABEIN, INASMET, IKERLAN, CEIT, and 
TEKNIKER) predate the creation of the Basque Autonomous Community 1978, and some of 
                                                             
40
 This case draws from secondary sources and interviews with experts and stakeholders, including Edurne 
Magro and Mikel Navarro (Orkestra, Instituto Vasco de Competitividad), Arantza Zubiaurre (University of Deusto), 
Jaime del Castillo (University of the Basque Country), Iaki San Sebastian (Tecnalia), and Rogelio Pozo (Azti-
Tecnalia).  
41
 www.tecnalia.com 
42
 Euros (!) are used throughout this case. !1 = US$1.376. 
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them even date back to the 1950s and 1960s. These centers were mainly testing labs 
created by local industrialists or engineering schools. The first technology centers had 
diverse origins, governance and focus, generally with a private legal status and organized 
around sectoral lines of business (Table 14) (Rico Castro, 2007). The Engineering School of 
Bilbao set up LABEIN in 1955, initially with a focus on construction, mechanical engineering, 
machinery and the environment. INASMET, formed in 1962 by industrialists in Guipuzcoa, 
focused on quality certification, testing, chemistry and technological marketing. The 
Mondragon Cooperative group, with private funding and a focus on electronics, mechanics, 
IT and thermodynamics set up IKERLAN in 1974. The University of Navarra as CIT formed 
CEIT in 1963 with a specialization in materials, mechanics, electricity, informatics and the 
environment.  
 
Table 14. Origin of Selected Basque Technology Centers 
Name Year 
formed 
Origin (and 
formation) 
Sectors 
LABEIN 1955 Engineering school of 
Bilbao (bottom up) 
Construction, mechanical engineering, 
environment, nuclear technology, 
mechanics, hydraulics and machinery 
INASMET 1962 Business association 
in Guipuzcoa (bottom 
up) 
Processes, quality control, technical 
trials 
CEIT- C 1963 University of Navarra 
(bottom-up) 
Materials, mechanics, electricity, IT, 
environment 
IKERLAN 1974 Mondragon 
cooperative group 
Electronics, mechanics, IT, 
thermodynamics 
TEKNIKER 1981 Armery School of 
Eibar (bottom-up) 
Mechanical trials, chemical analysis, 
metalography and chemical treatment 
GAIKER 1985 Vizcaya provincial 
government (top-
down) 
Plastics and composites, environment 
and recycling 
ROBOTIKER  1985 Vizcaya provincial 
government (top-
down) 
Electronics, IT, engineering equipment 
goods, automotive and aerospace, 
energy 
LEIA 1989 Alava provincial 
government (top-
down) 
Environment, recycling and waste 
management; new materials 
ESI- European 
Software Institute 
1993 European 
Commission, Basque 
Government (top-
down) 
Software process improvement 
Source: Rico Castro (2007). 
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Science, technology, and innovation policy in the Basque region has moved through 
several key stages (Aranguren et al, 2012). A first stage in the 1980s was oriented towards 
capacity building, mainly dedicated towards the development of a technological 
infrastructure. A second stage, particularly after the latter part of the 1990s, focused on 
consolidating the Basque network of science, technology, and innovation; the setting up of 
specific technology and innovation priorities; and responding to the needs of the industrial 
and social stakeholders of the region. A third period, in effect since the mid-2000s, is more 
results-oriented and looks toward diversifying the industrial fabric (see Figure 10). During 
this 30-year period the number of technology centers more than doubled and their role and 
orientation has changed considerably.  
 
Figure 10. Key Milestones of Basque Science and Technology Policy 
 
Source: OECD (2011). 
 
The 2000s witnessed further changes in the regional institutional landscape for science, 
technology, and innovation in the Basque Country. In terms of infrastructure, the Basque 
network of technology parks was expanded.43 Additionally, more support was given to 
                                                             
43
 The Basque Country had been a pioneer with the creation of the Bizkaia Technology Park in 1985, one of the 
first in Spain. In the 1990s additional parks were created in Alava and San Sebastian. In 2005, the Garaia 
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scientific research through the creation of Cooperative Research Centers (CICs) and Basic 
Excellence Research Centers (BERCs), and the creation of the science agency Ikerbasque. 
The Basque Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (CVCTI), led by the president 
of the region, was created to provide strategic orientation and coordination. The Basque 
Innovation Agency, set up in 2007 as a nonprofit making privateÐpublic partnership to 
coordinate and stimulate innovation in the public and social sectors as well as the private 
sector, supports the council.  
Since these changes in the 2000s, technology centers have also undergone 
restructuring and integration. As a result of this integration, two main groups have emerged: 
Tecnalia and the IK4 Research Alliance. These groups were set up to address international 
technology competitiveness challenges, exploit synergies across the centers and find 
alternative funding sources to compensate for the reduction of regional funds.  
 In the case of Tecnalia, the integration of the centers started in 2001 and continued 
for almost a decade until a full merger became effective in 2011. IK4 was created in 2005 as 
a network of 9 centers (AZTERLAN, CEIT, CIDETEC, GAIKER, IDEKO, IKERLAN, 
LORTEK, TEKNIKER and VICOMTech), not so much to achieve critical mass and joint 
presence in international markets, but to achieve greater complementarities. These centers 
employ 1,162 people. The other difference between Tecnalia and IK4 is that Tecnalia is a 
nonprofit private foundation, while some of the centers in the IK4 group are foundations, 
whereas others are associations or cooperatives. Unlike Tecnalia, all these centers have 
kept their autonomy and governance structures.  
 
7.2. Tecnalia: Current Structure 
 
Tecnalia Corporation is a strategic partnership between Tecnalia Research and Innovation, 
Neiker-Tecnalia and AZTI-Tecnalia. Tecnalia Research and Innovation was set up in 2011 
as the merger of six technology centers: CIDEMCO, ESI, FATRONIK, INASMET, LABEIN, 
and ROBOTIKER. AZTI, focusing on the fisheries sector, and NEIKER, dedicated to 
agricultural research, maintain a different status because they are public centers, dependent 
on the Department of Environment of the Basque Government. They are not as fully 
integrated as the other centers but form part of the broader strategic partnership (Figure 11).  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Innovation Center (headed by the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation and with the support of Mondragon 
University and Ikerlan) was set up. 
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Figure 11. Tecnalia Corporacion Tecnologica, Organization Chart, 2013 
 
 
Source: Montero (2011). 
 
 This strategic alliance was motivated by the small scale of Basque technology 
centers compared with most of their European counterparts (such as the Fraunhofer centers, 
see section 2 of this report, TNO in the Netherlands and VTT in Finland).44 Greater scale 
was deemed necessary in order to exploit synergies, achieve greater specialization and be 
better positioned to access and lead international research projects in a context of 
diminishing regional government funds. Integration was initially motivated from the bottom up 
by the centers involved, however delays and coordination difficulties led the government to 
eventually drive the merger from the top down. 
 Tecnalia research and innovation brought together organizations with different 
activities, orientation and client base. Most centers were created as testing labs to cater to 
the needs of industrial clusters (by groups of firms or engineering centers). The oldest 
centers such as LABEIN combined traditional service activities, related to the assessment of 
conformity, diagnosis, maintenance, etc., with applied R&D projects, whereas the activity of 
the newest centers such as CIDEMCO was more centered on applied R&D projects with 
firms. Some had a more sector-based orientation (for instance AZTI) whereas others 
specialized in a particular technology (e.g., INASMETÕs focus on materials technology) and 
operated across sectors.  
 The operating business model of Tecnalia is now based on sector oriented business 
divisions targeting key markets. There are seven divisions, made up of multidisciplinary and 
multicenter teams that coordinate their technology offer to different strategic sectors. Five of 
                                                             
44
 TNO was previously the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek 
(Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research). VTT was previously the Valtion Teknillinen 
Tutkimuskeskus (State Technical Research Center) of Finland. 
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these divisions relate to the different R&D markets, namely: sustainable construction, energy 
and environment, ICT, industry and transport, and health. The other two divisions are 
technology services and innovation strategies. Each division has a director, a business 
development director, a market director, and a trading account. This means in practice that 
each unit tends to involve several centers in different locations. The integration has not 
involved any closing of the centers, or relocation of staff from one center to another. 
However over time, a number of people have relocated between the different sites to 
improve the critical mass of some sites and enable specialization in service provision. 
 
7.3. Scale 
 
Tecnalia is the largest private research, development, and innovation organization in Spain 
and the fifth largest in Europe. In 2012, 1,473 people were employed across its 29 offices in 
21 locations worldwide (in the Basque Country, the rest of Spain, France, Italy, and Mexico) 
and its turnover was !110 million. Tecnalia grew considerably between 2008 and 2010, only 
to reduce its activity and staff in 2011 and 2012 (Table 15). It has an increasing patent 
portfolio, and an increased interest in the creation of new technology based firms. Of the 
new technology based firms created by Tecnalia, around 25 are operating today employing 
132 people. Tecnalia maintains an equity stake in 17 of these firms. 
 
Table 15. Tecnalia, Personnel and Revenues, 2007Ð2012 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Personnel 1,322 1,378 1,636 1,819 1,475 1,473 
Revenues (!m) 111 128 142 153 116 110 
Source: Tecnalia annual reports, various years, including Tecnalia (2012). 
 
Of the total number of Tecnalia employees, around 250 staff (about 17 percent of the 
total) are dedicated to technological services such as certification, conformity assessment, 
and calibration.  
 
7.4. Financing  
 
Tecnalia has three sources of funding: core (noncompetitive) public funding, competitive 
public funding and private funding. Although the funding model of Tecnalia and IK4 was 
inspired by the German Fraunhofer system of technology centers, the share of public 
sources in total funding has diminished over time, which has translated into increased 
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pressure to find new funding sources. Both Tecnalia and IK4 have lower shares of 
institutional funding in their total budgets when compared with GermanyÕs Fraunhofer 
Institute and FinlandÕs VTT Centers (Table 16). 
 
Table 16. Funding of Tecnalia and IK4 in International Comparison 
Funding (EUR millions) Fraunhofe
r 
VTT Tecnalia IK4 
Government base funding  621.4 85 15.3 12.3 
Own activities 940.5 184 106.3 81.8 
Government funding (research projects) 391  21.4 15.3 
Government contracts 15    
Business contracts 427.8  74.5 57.2 
External research funding institutions 106.7 37 10.4 9.2 
Other 88.9    
Total government funding 1,027.4  36.7  
TOTAL 1,650.8 269 121.6 94.1 
Share base funding (public) 38% 31% 13% 13% 
Share total public funding (includes 
base funding) 
62%  30% 29% 
Share own resources 62% 69% 87% 87% 
Source: OECD (2011). 
 
Currently, around 30 percent of Tecnalia funding comes from competitive R&D 
programs (at EU, national or regional levels) and around 15 percent is institutional funding 
from the Basque Government. Noncompetitive core funding received from the government 
has decreased considerably in the last few years (e.g., from 21 percent in 2007). In terms of 
competitive public funding, one of the growing sources of funding for Tecnalia is participation 
in EU projects. It has seen a dramatic increase in participation including a near doubling 
from 2008 to 2009. Tecnalia participated in 353 Seventh Framework (2007-2011) projects, 
leading 76 of them, which places Tecnalia high in the worldwide ranking of private 
organizations participating in the Seventh Framework in terms of projects and economic 
returns. 
 Over 50 percent of TecnaliaÕs income is derived from services and technology 
projects with firms. It is important to differentiate, however, between the income associated 
with the provision of technology services and the income from technology projects. Some of 
the reported private funding from applied R&D projects is actually supported by public 
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programs for collaborative R&D (see next section). The provision of technical services, on 
the other hand, is not supported by any public funding program and undertaken purely on a 
market basis.  
 
7.5. Services 
 
TecnaliaÕs business model is nowadays oriented towards the provision of integrated support 
to companies serving all their innovation needs. More specifically TecnaliaÕs activities are 
articulated around four key services or activities: (i) technology services, (ii) collaborative 
R&D, (iii) exploitation of research through licensing and spin-offs, and (iv) services for 
organizational innovation and business diversification (Figure 12). TecnaliaÕs activities thus 
include market services that are closer to the original activities of the technology centers, 
and research oriented activities that involve greater technological risks and are supported by 
public funds.  
 
Figure 12. Tecnalia's Service Model for Working with Companies 
 
Source: www.tecnalia.es. 
 
Collaborative projects are the core of TecnaliaÕs activity, followed by the provision of 
technical services. Recently, there has been an increased focus toward the exploitation of 
research through licensing and spin-off on the one hand and the provision of strategic advice 
for business development on the other. This shift has responded to both an increasing 
technological sophistication of the centers (resulting from their increasing scale and 
specialization and exposure to international research networks) and changing demand of 
firms toward more added value services. The potential of gaining additional revenues 
through licensing and increasing the portfolio of services offered to firms is an additional 
factor (Box 11).  
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Box 11. TecnaliaÕs Services to Companies 
Tecnalia offers four major services to companies. 
 
Technical Services. The provision of technical services accounts for around 16-18 percent of total 
turnover. These are similar to the original services of the Basque Country technology centers, which 
included testing, calibrations, inspections, audits, and certifications, but now the broader portfolio provided 
by different labs in different centers is integrated under a single division. These vary widely depending on 
the markets served, which include construction, health, energy, chemicals, transport, casting and 
steelmaking, and mechanical welding. These are often one-off contracts and are used by a larger number 
of firms (about 3,500). 
 
Collaborative Projects with industry (contract R&D) represent TecnaliaÕs largest service category, 
accounting for some 60 percent of its total turnover. These are long-term applied research projects. 
Collaborative contracts with firms are supported by funding schemes for collaborative R&D by the Basque 
and Spanish Governments. The regional governmentÕs INTEK program, launched in 1997, has long been 
the main instrument fostering such collaborations between the technology centers and industry. The 
program aimed to support R&D in firms and foster systemic links between firms and the technology centers 
(and other members of the RVCTI). INTEK would fund up to 50 percent of cooperative or individual projects 
in firms on a competitive basis. Eligible projects would include at least two firms and at least one member 
of the RVCTI. Individual projects funded by INTEK could also include subcontracting to a member of 
RVCTI. As Magro (2011) notes Òalthough the only direct type of beneficiary of the program is firms, agents 
from the Basque Network are the indirect beneficiaries of the program.Ó Since 2009 and under the program 
Aukera, Tecnalia has started to offer a new modality of risk-sharing contract, whereby Tecnalia would 
share part of the cost of the collaborative research project and in return also share part of the benefits 
should they occur. These are more flexible contracts, which aim to encourage greater exploitation of 
results, as well as generate incentives for firms to contract the services of Tecnalia during times of 
economic uncertainty.  
 
Knowledge Exploitation and Spin-Off Firms. An emerging activity is the exploitation of knowledge via 
licensing or spin-off firms, which since 2012 has been developed through the Tecnalia Ventures division. In 
the past, there has been little tradition of spin-off creation among the Basque technology centers, with 
some exceptions (e.g., CEIT). Tecnalia Ventures S.L. is a separate legal entity fully owned by Tecnalia. Its 
objective is to evaluate TecnaliaÕs in-house R&D activity (that is not contract research with firms) to 
maximize its commercial exploitation. It assesses the potential market interest of different technological 
assets and projects and decides whether to support their development or discard them. It is staffed with 
around 12 people with technical and business profiles. Around 4 percent of turnover is currently obtained 
from this activity.  
 
Innovation Strategy. A further mechanism used by Tecnalia to support firms is via the innovation strategy 
division, the objective of which is to help companies articulate their innovation strategies for growth and 
diversification. By helping firms to design their innovation strategy, their needs in terms of projects and 
technology services are identified along the innovation life cycle and Tecnalia is able to provide an 
integrated portfolio of activities that are fine-tuned to those needs and challenges, including technical 
services, R&D contracts, or licensing opportunities. 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration from Tecnalia interviews and reports. 
 
The provision of technical services consists of three main activities:  
1. Legal requirements and standards (for instance, in relation to health and safety or 
environmental standards). This may involve conformity assessment of electrical 
equipment or construction materials to ensure compliance with national and international 
standards.  
2. Process quality controls to help firms to improve their production processes and 
efficiency and reduce waste. This may involve the calibration of technical equipment to 
ensure the reliability of their measurements. 
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3. The reduction of time-to-market of new products, for instance through testing and 
certification.  
 
The technical service portfolio offered to firms therefore includes calibration services, 
conformity assessment, studies and analysis, technical guidance, certification, diagnosis, 
inspection, and technical training. These are provided in TecnaliaÕs variously accredited labs 
(see section 7.9) to a range of sectors and markets. These sectors are slightly different to 
the target markets for R&D projects and include: construction, electrical energy, materials, 
metrology, health and quality of life, and sustainability.  
Tecnalia seeks to maintain a balanced portfolio of activities between services that are 
relatively more profitable and stable (such as technical services) with other activities of a 
more exploratory nature, and to exploit synergies between these more market oriented and 
more research oriented activities. An example of these synergies is the introduction of new 
technical services as a result of R&D activities. For instance, the services that Tecnalia 
provides in smart meters and smart grids equipment testing is the result of advanced 
research activities that it has been developing in the area of electrical systems. Conversely, 
there is often a sequencing or progression of activities from more routine to more advanced 
services. Many companies that benefit from TecnaliaÕs technical services progressively 
demand other, more advanced activities, such as business strategy advice and R&D 
projects. It is very common that repeat customers of technology services start demanding 
technologically more advanced activities.  
Clients are targeted through market segmentation and technical services are 
advertised through formal marketing channels, such as commercial visits to companies, 
mailings, pamphlets, etc. The marketing of these services has intensified as a result of the 
economic crisis, which has affected some industrial clients, particularly in the construction 
sector.  
Unlike the R&D projects with firms supported by public funding, Tecnalia competes 
with other private providers in the provision of technical services. The price of these services 
is therefore not subsidized but set by the market.  
Tecnalia does address some market failure weaknesses in the provision of private 
consulting services to SMEs. However, in the area of contract technical services, Tecnalia 
competes not only with other private sector providers, including multinationals such as 
Applus+ and SGS, but also with IK4. An internal reflection is taking place with regard to the 
activities that Tecnalia should focus on as a technology center, and those it should stop 
providing or provide through third parties.  
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7.6. Clients 
 
Tecnalia serves both public and private sector clients. The work with public sector 
organizations lies mainly within the innovation strategies division, through for instance the 
provision of advice to organizations (mainly at the regional and local level) on the use of 
technology or on the definition and implementation of innovation policies and programs for 
technology-based competitiveness. The target clients, as emphasized by Tecnalia, are 
Òthose firms whose needs coincide with the solutions that we can provide.Ó Size is not a 
criterion, rather the criteria used when targeting firms is alignment with their services and the 
growth potential of the firm.  
  According to TecnaliaÕs annual reports, the group has a client base of around 4,000 
companies (Table 17). Technical services are provided to a large proportion of these clients 
(about 3,500). 
 
Table 17. TecnaliaÕs Client Base: 2007Ð2012 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Companies assisted 3,235 3,800 4,059 4,700 n.a. 4,000 
Source: Tecnalia annual reports, various years, including, Tecnalia (2012). 
 
In terms of size and intensity of research, the main client base of Tecnalia is SMEs 
(primarily medium sized firms) undertaking R&D. This is partly due to the structure of 
Basque industry, mainly SMEs employing between 50 and 200 people, often family run and 
with a productive specialization in sectors such as machine tools, automotive, white goods, 
electronics, aerospace and wind energy. However, different types of clients benefit from 
different types of services. In the case of applied research projects, links are dominantly with 
more technologically advanced medium to large firms. In the case of technical services, the 
size and technological intensity of the firm decreases. 
Geographically, around 70 percent of TecnaliaÕs clients are Basque firms, 20 percent 
Spanish and 10 percent foreign. The client base of IK4 is slightly more regional and less 
international. In the case of technical services, the geographical spread of clients varies 
greatly according to the services because some, such as certain testing activities, are more 
sensitive to distance, whereas others can be provided globally. Around 20 percent of the 
technical service clients are international. Much of the demand for these services is linked to 
access to international markets, for instance by firms seeking certification in EU markets or 
Spanish or Basque firms seeking to expand their international markets.  
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Another characteristic of TecnaliaÕs client base is that it is relatively stable, 
particularly in the case of advanced technology services. Many current clients are 
longstanding clients of Tecnalia. Often relationships leading to firms seeking services have 
been forged through mobility of personnel. In the past, engineers working on collaborative 
research projects may have been subsequently employed with the partner company, thus 
increasing links with the centers.  
Tecnalia is increasingly developing collaborations with third parties (such as 
universities and private firms) for the provision of services and the development of new 
services, for instance through the sharing of infrastructure and equipment, strategic alliances 
and the setting up of joint ventures. They are also leveraging relationships with business 
associations, local development agencies, cluster associations, Chambers of Commerce 
and vocational training centers in order to expand the client base and reach out to these 
smaller firms. In Spain Basque vocational training centers are pioneers in the provision of 
innovation support services. These centers have greater employment orientation, more 
extensive links to firms, and recent public support for new equipment that allows them to 
provide specialist services (certification, testing, etc.) to firms (Navarro et al, 2013). This 
does, however, remain a challenge.  
 
7.7. Governance 
 
In order to understand TecnaliaÕs present governance arrangements it is important to recall 
how technology centers were governed before Tecnalia was constituted. Until the 1990s 
different technology centers had different legal statuses, but generally they were nonprofit 
associations or cooperatives. Since the 1990s, most centers have changed their legal status 
to that of a foundation allowing for greater private sector involvement. This is in line with the 
Science and Technology Plan 1997Ð2000 policy priorities calling for a shift from a mainly 
supply-side to a demand side orientation (Rico Castro, 2007). The governing bodies (board 
of trustees) of the technology centers were composed mainly of representatives of firms but 
the different administrations (regional and provincial) were also represented. There were 
exceptions where the public sector was dominant, for instance in NEIKER (public research 
center), CEIT, IKERLAN and AZTI. The participation of organizations from the scientific 
sector in the governing structures of the Basque technology centers has traditionally been 
small. Participation by private trustees was generally firms belonging to the particular area or 
sectoral specialization of the center. Navarro (2010) questions whether this greater presence 
of firms in the governance of the centers actually translated into greater ownership of firms 
and involvement in shaping priorities for the centers.  
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Tecnalia is a nonprofit private foundation. The board of trustees has representatives 
from firms, business organizations, public administrations (provincial and regional) and the 
research system (University of the Basque Country). Business members play an active role 
in organizational decision-making and in the definition of research priorities. Additionally, it 
could be argued that the regional government has a relatively more involved approach in 
relation to the strategic priorities and orientation of Tecnalia than was the case with the 
individual technology centers. This is reflected by the role of the government in the merger 
process and the fact that the director general of Tecnalia is the former Technology Director 
of the Basque Government.  
Tecnalia has several business units: sustainable construction, energy and 
environment, ICT, industry and transport, health, technology services, and innovation 
strategies. In addition to the board of trustees, the different business units in Tecnalia have 
advisory groups from the private sector that provide specialist advice for the definition of 
market and technological priorities. Overall, it is estimated that around 150 firms are present 
in the various governance structures of Tecnalia (board of trustees, advisory groups, etc.).  
Tecnalia also participates in the governing structures of business associations 
(Adegui, Confebask), cluster associations, vocational training centers, and chambers of 
commerce. However it is not clear whether cluster associations are active in the advisory 
groups of Tecnalia. Similarly, while Tecnalia is represented in the governing bodies of the 
CIC, the reverse is not true. The CICs, and the research system generally are 
underrepresented in TecnaliaÕs governing structures (Navarro et al, 2013). Internationally, 
Tecnalia is a member of the EARTO Executive Committee and its Board of Directors, 
together with organizations such as TNO and Fraunhofer.  
 
7.8. Personnel 
 
As of 2013, Tecnalia employed 1,473 people (with an average age of 39). Of these, 192 
have doctoral degrees (a relatively low proportion compared with research universities, 
confirming TecnaliaÕs orientation to applied development and consulting rather than basic 
research). Around 250 people work in the division of technology services. Their profile is 
more technical compared to the rest of Tecnalia. They have a lower proportion of PhD 
holders (only 4 or 5 members of staff), and the rest of the staff have a mixture of university 
degrees (40 percent) or technical/vocational training (around 60 percent). Generally, no 
additional educational experience is required; instead Tecnalia prefers to provide in-house 
training tailored to the specific lab and person. Remuneration of technical personnel is fixed, 
while performance incentives related for instance to sales apply to staff in sales and 
management activities.  
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Tecnalia has not hitherto encountered difficulties in finding the right personnel for the 
technology services division, although finding staff with commercial skills to market the 
services is proving more of a challenge. In the other divisions of Tecnalia, management and 
business skills are becoming more valued, as a result of the shift toward added value in the 
provision of services, including those for business innovation. This is manifested in retraining 
(to improve management and business skills among staff) and requiring new skills of 
potential recruits.  
In the past, the technology centers ran an internship program for graduates. After 
their internship many of the beneficiaries of this program would find employment in one of 
the firms of the technology centers. This had the positive effect of improved links between 
the centers and industry. The internship program was discontinued as a result of a dispute 
with the unions with the effect of increasing the cost of services, already an issue for client 
firms. Navarro (2010) argues that the government should reinstitute a sound internship 
program in the technology centers with well-defined objectives. 
 
7.9. Infrastructure 
 
Tecnalia maintains a range of laboratories across nine sites to provide technical services, 
including trials, quality control, calibration and inspections. The labsÕ different locations 
sometimes pose coordination problems. On a different note, the merger has enabled greater 
specialization of these labs and there is a progressive movement of personnel from one 
location to another to support this specialization, reduce duplication and improve critical 
mass.  
Technical services are tied to specialized equipment maintained by the centers and 
are formally accredited by the Entidad Nacional de Acreditacin (ENAC).45. Tecnalia invests 
heavily in maintaining this infrastructure. For instance, of the !141.5 million of total income 
that Tecnalia obtained in 2009, around !10.5 million was invested back in technological 
equipment and infrastructure. 
 
7.10.  Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Tecnalia operates a balanced scorecard that defines clear baselines and targets and 
includes indicators related to value added (income from R&D contracts in new technologies), 
demand (projects with clusters), productivity (patent applications and patents granted), 
entrepreneurship (creation of new technology-based firms), networking (leading and 
                                                             
45
 ENAC is the body designated by the government to assess technical competence in accordance with 
international standards. 
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participating in European projects, European projects with Basque firms), scientific 
excellence (number of publications), and economic results (total income from R&D contracts, 
economic returns from European R&D projects). These data are collected by Tecnalia and 
are related in its annual report.46 
 More specifically, in the technical services division, customer satisfaction surveys are 
carried out regularly to improve relationships with customers and move the activities of the 
division closer to the market. Customer satisfaction metrics are the most valued for Tecnalia, 
with an important emphasis on the improvement of lead times, quality and customer 
satisfaction. In particular, one of the most important metrics is customer retention, namely 
whether customers make repeat demands of these services rather than one-off 
engagements. As a result of the economic crisis, Tecnalia has made additional efforts to 
increase flexibility and responsiveness to client needs, which has translated into significantly 
improved customer satisfaction.  
 
7.11. Conclusions 
 
The creation of Tecnalia is relatively recent, and as a result it is difficult to fully assess its 
strategic orientation and performance. The strategic process of the merger is not fully 
completed and Tecnalia is undergoing a process of reflection about the types of activities it 
should focus on moving forward. Nonetheless, despite being a relatively new organization, 
Tecnalia builds on over 50 years of experience in supporting Basque firms in their 
technological and innovation needs. Its activities are a product of this legacy and advanced 
R&D activities with concrete services to firms.  
 Tecnalia has several strengths but also a number of challenges. Over time, the 
mandate of the Basque technology centers has evolved from a focus on technical service 
provision to small firms to an R&D focus. This has to a large extent been driven by the need 
to secure income from R&D projects in response to the reduction in their core funding but 
also by the policy orientation of the Basque Government, more geared towards R&D 
funding. The priorities of the Basque policy led to an increasing scale, specialization and 
technological sophistication of the centers in terms of applied research capacities in strategic 
areas.  
 Major strengths of Tecnalia lie in its applied research capabilities, the quality of its 
facilities and the skills of its personnel. Tecnalia is able to recruit qualified personnel thanks 
to the high quality of engineering and technical training in the region. The translation of the 
                                                             
46
See, for example, TecnaliaÕs 2012 Annual Report, at 
http://www.tecnalia.com/images/stories/Informes_anuales/TECNALIA-Report2012.pdf 
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Tecnalia model elsewhere would require working closely with engineering faculties and 
technical colleges.  
 A challenge for Tecnalia is finding out where they can add more value and where 
their activities respond to a perceived market failure. For technical services that are closer to 
the market, they are competing with other private sector businesses that provide similar 
services (and other technology centers such as those within IK4). Even though Tecnalia is a 
private organization, since it is partly supported by public funding their provision of TES 
could be perceived as unfair competition by other providers.  
 Finally, questions remain about whether the needs of the traditional industrial SME 
base in the Basque country are sufficiently addressed. Most of the public funding to support 
innovation in the Basque Country takes the form of collaborative R&D subsidies, yet there 
are no public programs supporting the use of technical services or technology extension 
services by SMEs. There is not a perceived shortage of private sector providers for 
technology extension services in the Basque Country; there is already a functioning market 
in place. However, the demand of these services by the least innovative firms could be 
stimulated through additional public funding vehicles. The needs of these firms could be 
further channeled via other actors in the system, such as technical colleges, local 
development agencies or chambers of commerce, which could act as brokers between 
SMEs and technical service providers. 
8. Lessons and Insights  
This concluding section presents lessons and insights based on the four primary case 
studies. There is a discussion of crosscutting insights related to the evolution, structure, 
scale, financing, services, targeted clients, governance, personnel, and evaluation of 
technology extension services and their associated institutions. 
 
8.1. Lessons from the Case Studies 
 
Multiple insights are offered through the case studies of the U.S. Manufacturing Extension 
Partnership, the Manufacturing Advisory Service (England), Industrial Research and 
Assistance Program (Canada), and Tecnalia (Basque Country). Key points emerging from 
each program are discussed below. 
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8.1.1. U.S. Manufacturing Extension Partnership 
 
The first insight from the MEP is the role of private sector organizations in raising the need 
for the program and their significance in the creation of the MEP. Another lesson lies in the 
ability of the MEP to ramp up the program to all 50 states by leveraging other funding 
sources at the state and client levels to match federal program funds. With regard to 
infrastructure, it is interesting to note that if states did not have sufficient infrastructure to 
implement an MEP center, interim multistate infrastructures were useful, although no longer 
needed today. The ability of the program to evolve its orientation in response to customer 
and sector needs provides a lesson in showing how the MEP stays relevant to 
manufacturing customers. Likewise, both the SCMEP and the GaMEP show how local 
centers can evolve with the national program. The SCMEP changed from a new university 
based center with limited capacity to reach out to the stateÕs manufacturers to a private 
nonprofit center able to serve the stateÕs manufacturing base through a combination of in-
house field specialists and consulting firms.  
The GaMEP changed from a state industrial extension program offering mostly free 
basic process improvement services to a member of the national MEP network that offers 
growth services as well as process improvement and energy and environmental services of 
value to private manufacturers based on fee revenue from these firms. Insights into the 
governance structure illustrate how the MEPÕs use of cooperative agreements rather than 
contracts is important in enabling both the national program and the center to be jointly 
involved in designing the service. The cooperative agreement also enables the MEP to allow 
for flexibility in the operation of state centers that fit into the historical and structural 
framework of the state. Finally, the resources that the program expends on its monitoring 
and evaluation system have played a role in providing justification for ongoing federal 
investment, although issues with the evaluation system, use of indicators, and lack of 
systematic sharing of best practices across centers remain ongoing.  
 
8.1.2. Manufacturing Advisory Services (England) 
 
The MAS case offers several key program elements that are useful to consider for the 
design of a TES program. First, the MAS has a clear measurement system for monitoring 
and evaluating the service. It is an essential prerequisite for any successful TES to establish 
at the outset who will measure, what to measure and how to measure in line with the 
identified aims and objectives of the service. Second, the MAS has appropriately qualified 
expert advisors from engineering backgrounds who speak the language of manufacturing 
business and can easily establish a rapport with the companies with which they are working. 
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Third, the service has established a clear process for referring other appropriate agencies 
and private sector firms for support not directly delivered by in-house advisors. Moreover, 
the program has made this process as easy and straightforward as possible for clients.  
 
8.1.3. Industrial Research Assistance Program (Canada)  
 
The IRAP presents an example of the integration of TES into a nonextension service offer of 
funding for applied R&D projects, to make this type of funding more effective at the firm 
level. Another lesson to be learned from this case study is how to integrate TES into funding 
for organizations to provide assistance to SMEs. Important insights are gleaned from the 
ways the program is able to leverage extremely experienced and capable specialists (the 
ITAs) for the benefit of SMEs. Although the program does not have a rigorous ongoing 
evaluation system, it does make use of monitoring and independent evaluation for program 
improvement as well as program justification. A further lesson is the longevity of the 
program, which reflects its ability to learn and adapt and from time to time be used as a 
delivery mechanism for other Canadian technology-based economic development programs.  
 
8.1.4. Tecnalia (Basque Country, Spain) 
 
The main insight from Tecnalia is that it is the product of contingent decisions and events, in 
particular the need to rationalize a dense technology infrastructure and increase the critical 
mass and international competitiveness of the technology centers. Thus, it is important not to 
lose sight of the origins of the technology centers, namely as locally embedded, bottom up 
initiatives designed to cater to the technology needs of companies in the local clusters. The 
Tecnalia case also offers a lesson concerning the role of public funding. The precursory 
centers to Tecnalia were generously supported by the public sector, particularly during the 
1980s and 1990s, and these moneys, enabled the center to address a perceived gap in 
technology service provision for SMEs. The private sector has had a dominant role in the 
governance and orientation of the technology centers. A number of these centers are now 
absorbed into Tecnalia. Driven in part by the funding model, with limited public support and 
the need to secure private and European project revenues, TecnaliaÕs services are moving 
up market, focusing more on medium-sized and larger companies. Direct TES to SMEs 
appear to be declining in importance, as Tecnalia develops its R&D capabilities and seeks a 
wider reach. Another aspect of the reduced role of public support is that Tecnalia conducts 
performance measurement, but without significant external formal evaluation. On the plus 
side, TecnaliaÕs new orientation to add value to firms, share risks and capitalize on 
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intellectual capital presents a promising orientation for an applied research system that is 
also seeking to be relevant to, and linked with, business. 
 
8.2 Insights for Implementation 
 
In the following section, we compare and contrast the four cases, drawing out insights 
organized around the key probes which were identified for the study (see Box 2).  
 
8.2.1. Historical Evolution 
 
Three key factors in launching a TES program are: (i) establishing pilot centers or activities, 
(ii) obtaining private sector support for the program, and (iii) planning for evolutionary 
phases. Each program has a distinctive historical evolution, generally developing from a 
prior base or pilot program. Having an initial pilot effort or single center/set of centers is 
important for starting the program. The MEP was built on an earlier model of state programs 
and a small set of federally sponsored centers. The IRAP developed from a small pilot 
initiative. The MAS evolved from earlier rounds of existing business assistance programs. 
Tecnalia is the result of a merger of a prior set of technology centers. In each of the cases, 
we have noted the pre-history, chronology, and changing institutional arrangements, which 
framed the development of the current programs. This pre-history highlights the importance 
of activities that indicate the need for assistance to manufacturers (MEP), stronger 
innovation institutions (Tecnalia), or more industrial R&D (IRAP).  
Support from the private sector and broader policy efforts to foster economic 
competitiveness were important in the creation of these pilot efforts. For example, the MEP 
was able to leverage broader concerns of private sector leaders about manufacturing 
competitiveness to obtain initial legislative support for its creation. In addition, program 
priorities have shifted with different phases of development and this change in emphasis, 
should figure in program planning. The MEP moved from an initial emphasis on scaling up a 
national program from a base of three technology centers to focusing on system wide 
services to the current stress on growth services (e.g., product and marketing development). 
The MAS likewise moved through initial stages emphasizing productivity improvement 
services to stages emphasizing brokerage of third party providers to the current more 
comprehensive company-wide service approach. Tecnalia is progressively moving from a 
traditional collaborative technology project model towards adding more value through 
commercialization of IP and business innovation services. 
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8.2.2. Structure and Governance 
 
What is the appropriate organizational context for TES? Each sponsoring organization has 
its strengths and weaknesses. A basic research organization is too science oriented to be 
the appropriate home for TES. On the other hand, an organization with a purely commerce 
function may lack sufficient technological gravitas to be the best host. The four programs 
profiled here represent efforts to balance these structural characteristics. All of them are 
structured under the authority of a government agency (national or regional). Often the 
organizational situation and management structure reflect the history of the program and its 
mission. The IRAP was established to enhance industrial R&D in SMEs, hence it was 
situated in an applied research unit in the National Research Council. The MEP was placed 
under the National Institute of Standards and Technology because of its initial intent to 
transfer industrially relevant advanced technologies. The MAS fell within the remit of the UK 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills because of its business and innovation 
orientation. In the British case, there has been significant high-level reorganization of 
agencies. In 2007 the current Department for Business, Innovation and Skills replaced 
separate agencies for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and for Innovation, 
Universities and Skills. Regional Development Agencies have been abolished, and regional 
devolution has resulted in separate structures for business support in England as well as in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  
The MAS has been maintained throughout these changes, now targeted at a national 
level in England and operated under an outsourced arrangement with a private consultancy 
consortium. Tecnalia was created under the auspices of the Basque regional government as 
a stand-alone private nonprofit organization and as a result of the merger of several 
technology centers patterned after the Fraunhofer Institutes to add greater institutional 
capabilities to the Basque regionÕs innovation system and to rationalize an arguably overly 
complex configuration of multiple individual technology centers. The use of flexible 
contracting mechanisms is evidenced in these case studies, with both the MEP and the 
IRAP using cooperative agreements rather than contracts to enable ongoing involvement 
and experimentation. Although government plays a major role in oversight, if not 
governance, of these TES programs, the programs also include private clients in their 
governance structure, usually through advisory board participation. 
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8.2.3. Program Scale 
 
The ideal TES program should have sufficient program scale including field specialists and 
offices located close to clusters of companies. Likewise, plans should consider that, because 
TES relies on a decentralized service delivery, the larger the region, the greater the program 
costs. The differences in the economic scope (and number of potential companies) of the 
nations and regions covered by the four cases and in the scale of each program illustrate 
these divergent costs. They are apparent in the comparative program scale metrics that 
have been developed for the individual programs (Table 18). The most recent year available 
is presented (2012-13 for budgetary and center information, 2011 for customer information). 
The number of manufacturing SMEÕs and customers per TES staff are lowest for Tecnalia, 
highest for the MAS, with the MEP and the IRAP falling in the middle. The budget per client 
served is higher for the MEP and the IRAP than for MAS (no budgetary information for TES 
alone is available for Tecnalia). These ratios suggest that the MAS, with its outsourced 
administration of TES, is relatively efficient. However, differences in actual services provided 
suggest that all such comparisons should be viewed with caution. Additionally, the extent to 
which all costs are captured is unclear. These numbers are primarily input and service 
measures and do not assess the benefits achieved relative to cost (value for money). 
Despite these limitations, it can be concluded from these metrics that TES has minimal scale 
economies. Fewer, bigger centers are not better than multiple, smaller locations in integrated 
TES systems. 
 
8.2.4. Financing 
 
Core public funding is essential to maintain the public mission of TES. Without it TES 
programs have a tendency to charge the same as private consultants, which drives service 
to larger and repeat clients and fundraising outside the service region. Moreover, if core 
funding is unstable, SMEs come to distrust the program and take-up is significantly reduced. 
In light of the importance of core public funding, each of the four programs has developed a 
different financing model. The MEP requires two dollars of matching funding (from clients, 
state governments, or other nonfederal sources) for every dollar of federal funding. The 
IRAP is fully funded by the national government. The MAS is also funded by the national 
government with some moneys coming from the European Union.  
The IRAP and the MAS require companies to either contribute fund matches or cover 
the full costs for follow-up program activities or customized projects. Tecnalia receives 43 
percent of its funding from public sources and only 15 percent via core, noncompetitive 
public funding (although it could be argued that some of the income derived from R&D 
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projects with firms is partly subsidized by other government programs), with the rest coming 
from contracts and other sources; sometimes these fundraising efforts are outside of the 
public mission of the organization. In sum, a common thread is that core government funding 
is critical to the ability of these programs to serve the public mission. The lower the level of 
core public funding, the greater the propensity for a program to move up market to serve 
medium size or larger firms in order to raise private revenues with lower transaction costs. 
 
Table 18. TES Comparative Program Metrics 
Comparative Program Metrics  MEP MAS IRAP Tecnalia 
Total budget US$m 300.0 48.2 292.8 148.1 
National (federal) contribution to the budget US$m 123.0 48.2 292.8 70.0 
Budget devoted to TES US$m 300.0 48.2 60.8 25 
Manufacturers in country* x 000 334.8 109.2 52.8 13.5 
Manufacturing SMEs in country* x 000 332.0 97.7 52.5 12.6 
Companies served (total, all services) x 000 31.4 13.1 1.8 4.0 
Companies served by TES services x 000 7.0 13.1 1.8 3.5 
TES customers that are SMEs x 000 7.0 13.1 1.8  
TES customers that are manufacturing SMEs x 000 7.0 13.1 0.2  
States, provinces, or regional areas in program  50 4 13 3 
Centers in program  60  5 10 
Offices, field locations in program  370 10 120 21 
Total staff in program  1,300 120 397 1,473 
Number of field agents in program  926 82 240  
Number of TES projects or engagements completed x 000 49.0 13.1 1.8  
Scale Ratios      
Manufacturing SMEs /Staff  258 910 133 9 
TES customers / Staff  5.4 109.5 4.5 2.7 
TES $ / customer (all) US$ x 000 9.6 3.7 163.8 37.0 
TES $ / TES service customers US $ x 000 42.9 3.7 34.0  
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration from available program reports 
Notes: Annual data, for most recent year (generally 2012Ð2013 for budget data, 2011 for customer information). 
Comparative numbers and ratio should be interpreted cautiously given the differences in program operations.  
* For Tecnalia, figures relate to the Basque region rather than the country. 
 
8.2.5. Clients 
 
TES broadly serves SMEs with a manufacturing or product oriented nonmanufacturing 
emphasis. Target sectors are given consideration but usually not rigidly applied. Tecnalia is 
the most sector-focused program, building on the orientations and expertise of its constituent 
centers. The MAS has certain priority sectors designated as such by the government, but in 
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practice it serves all manufacturers. The MEP is designed to serve small and medium-sized 
establishments across all manufacturing industries, but federal funding can only be used to 
serve SMEs in manufacturing industry classifications. The IRAP serves manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing SMEs that generate some type of product based on a diverse range of 
industry classifications. If the program charges for service, it should recognize the diversity 
of client capacity to pay for services and reduce fees (i.e., apply more subsidy) accordingly 
for smaller clients. 
 
8.2.6. Services  
 
TES uses a pragmatic approach to providing services to client firms. As a result of 
monitoring of company needs services on offer tend to be driven by demand. At the same 
time they can be guided by broader strategic issues such as the case of the MEP with its 
inclusion of growth services or the enhanced consideration given by the MAS to strategic 
support services. Accessing TES services should be easy, without requiring much form filling 
and red tape on the part of the business client. Multiple points of entry should be possible, 
including point solutions (i.e., undertaking initial work with the company to solve a particular 
technological or business problem that the company has today), companywide 
assessments, and through group processes such as open training programs and peer-to-
peer networks. By way of example, services offered by the case study programs range from 
R&D oriented (Tecnalia and, to some extent the IRAP) to off-the-shelf manufacturing 
technologies and techniques (the MAS and MEP). Typical TES services can be seen in the 
MAS three-pronged categorization of strategic support, process efficiencies, and 
commercialization of ideas, or the MEP five-pronged categorization: continuous 
improvement, technology acceleration, supply chain, sustainability, and workforce.  
Most of the IRAPÕs budget goes toward non-TES applied R&D funding, with TES 
advisory services viewed as having the ability to lead to and improve applied R&D projects in 
SMEs. Third party providers are commonly used, but their use should be easy for the 
company and quality should be maintained through the certification of providers and ongoing 
involvement of the TES specialist. Indeed, most of the case study programs use some 
combination of in-house expertise and third party providers to deliver TES services. 
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8.2.7. Infrastructure 
 
In-house laboratory or equipment infrastructure is not an element in TES services offered by 
the IRAP, MEP and MAS; if infrastructure is required these programs will usually refer the 
client to another organization. Core TES services in product and process improvement areas 
do not require infrastructure, but TES services can be offered to complement infrastructure. 
Tecnalia maintains some in-house infrastructure for testing and certification in delivering 
non-TES services. The high cost of acquisition, customization, maintenance, upgrading, and 
operation of infrastructure precludes considerable investment, with TES programs preferring 
instead to put these moneys toward investing in capable personnel. 
 
8.2.8. Personnel 
 
A key factor in these TES programs is the expertise of extension professionals. The IRAP, 
MAS, and MEP emphasize the importance of decades of industry experience (often with 
multiple industries) in its extension professionals. In contrast, Tecnalia focuses on research 
capability (e.g., staff with PhDs), and is said to be weaker in terms of proven industrial 
expertise. Programs with targeted sectors do not require that the extension professionals 
have long experience in one of these particular sectors, rather they should be broadly 
conversant with the services needed. Extension professionals should be able to fill any of 
three roles common to TES services: (i) account manager performing outreach and client 
management functions; (ii) general extension professional performing assessments and 
basic services; and (iii) specialized extension professional providing in-depth information and 
advice in a given service area. Any given extension professional may perform more than one 
of these TES roles. For example, the GaMEP has field engineers that perform account 
management and basic general extension services and each field engineer is also assigned 
an area in which to provide specialized services; in contrast the SCMEP has separate staff 
members for account management, general extension, and specialized extension services 
(with some general extension staff also engaged in specialized service provision). Programs 
should plan to provide funding for training and certification of TES professionals. Monetary 
incentives are not always possible, particularly if the program is housed in a public 
organization, so other benefits are emphasized. Program managers in the IRAP, MAS, and 
MEP emphasized the lack of turnover and satisfaction with giving back to the region and its 
smaller industries by private sector managers after having had a successful career in 
industry. 
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8.2.9. Evaluation 
 
TES programs typically use monitoring and tracking systems to capture information on 
companies served, services provided, hours of service, fee income, immediate outputs, and 
other metrics. These metrics may be collected by program staff or by third-party 
organizations, and often involve post-project customer surveys and/or questionnaires. Some 
programs openly publish aggregated summaries of these metrics, for example the MEPÕs 
performance metrics or in the MAS Quarterly Manufacturing Barometer. TES programs are 
also subject to a range of formal evaluations. These generally take a longer perspective to 
allow full benefits and costs to materialize or focus on measuring results against particular 
goals (such as increasing gross value added in England). Evaluation methods vary, but can 
include surveys, controlled studies, and case studies. Examples of findings of evaluations for 
intermediate outputs, business outcomes, and broader economic impacts are reported in 
Table 19. A full review of studies of the impacts of TES services is provided in Shapira and 
Youtie (2013). 
 Overall, the case studies emphasize that effective monitoring and assessment 
through a robust evaluation system is important not only for justifying the program to 
sponsors but also for ongoing learning. Measuring client impacts should be the primary goal 
of this system. For example, the MEP has an extensive monitoring system built around a 
survey of all clients receiving a level of intense services (usually at least eight hours of 
service). National administrators use this survey, along with national program ratings of 
centers and review of operating plans, to oversee center performance. The MEP 
complements its monitoring system with special studies and reviews. The MAS also has a 
set of indicators that it tracks in its annual report and the program has sponsored detailed 
econometric evaluations of program performance based on a comparison of client and 
nonclient outcomes. The MAS, however, uses a sampling approach for surveying clients 
rather than the census approach used by the MEP.  
The MAS in particular and, to some extent the MEP, emphasize the importance of 
having an effect on value added per employee, even though this is a difficult measure to 
estimate and it is of marginal usefulness in program improvement efforts. Optimal 
measurement of value added per employee requires comparison group studies and efforts to 
account for selection bias in this type of measurement. In contrast, the IRAP primarily relies 
on legislatively mandated reviews performed every five years (the MAS also has this 
requirement). The IRAP uses due diligence in monitoring its applied R&D projects, but not 
much is captured about the programÕs advisory services. Tecnalia has a relatively narrow set 
of output indicators that are mandated by the Government and reported in their annual 
review, but no extensive monitoring or evaluation system is in place to assess the impact of 
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their services. It should be noted that even the MEP and the MAS have evolved their 
evaluation approaches to better align them with changes in the program mission. Thus TES 
programs should plan for changes in their indicators over time and include multiple 
qualitative and quantitative approaches in their evaluation systems.47 
 
Table 19. Examples of Selected TES Evaluation Results 
Intermediate outputs 
Capacity for change, changes in 
practice, improved firm 
capabilities 
MAS Clients, 2002Ð2005 (DTZ Consultancy evaluation, 2007) 
 Survey of clients, percent of clients reporting output 
Improved productive use of equipment  47% 
Increased investment in skills  37% 
Improved just-in-time manufacturing practices  35% 
Better stock turns/stock holding/delivery  33% 
Increased space utilization, and  30% 
Increased investment in capital equipment 20% 
IRAP clients (Goss Gilroy, 2012)  
Increase in firmÕs business skills and knowledge 70% 
Increase in scientific and technical knowledge 82% 
Enhanced technical knowledge or capabilities 90% 
Enhanced ability to perform R&D 62% 
Enhanced business knowledge/capabilities  68% 
Business outcomes 
Performance changes for 
clients 
Findings from selected MEP evaluations 
Customized services in product development and 
marketing lead to bigger benefits, routine services 
for quality and process improvement lead to more 
modest firm effects. (Oldsman and Heye, 1998; 
Thomson, 1998; Youtie and Shapira, 1997)  
Compared with nonclients, growth in labor 
productivity of MEP clients over a 5-year period in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s [2]  
3.4%Ð16% 
greater 
growth 
An update to Jarmin (1999) using a comparable 
control group method, found mixed results for the 
MEPÕs overall net productivity impacts on assisted 
firms for the period 1997 to 2002, but did find that 
MEP services were associated with significant 
productivity improvements for smaller firms and 
certain types of services (Ordowich et al,. 2012).  
Broader economic outputs 
Economic returns generated 
MAS evaluation, 2002Ð2005 services (DTZ Consultancy, 2007) 
Economic benefit received by firms, on average, for 
each £1 of public funding (Level 4 consultancy 
services) 
£1.40Ð£1.80 
Estimated internal rate of return of over a five-year 
period.  
15%Ð17% 
Additional Gross Value Added through Level 4 and 
quantified Level 2 services between 2002-2005.  
£155m 
IRAP (NRC and Goss Gilroy, 2007; Goss Gilroy 2012) 
Benefits relative to public sector costsÐbased on 
multipliers derived from input-output models.  
More than 
10 to 1 
Source: Programs reports as referenced in table. 
 
 
 
                                                             
47
 For more on TES evaluation and impacts, see Shapira and Youtie (2013).  
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8.3. Insights for Evolving TES Programs 
 
The case studies offer a series of insights for evolving TES programs including programs in 
other countries, for example in Latin America, seeking to benchmark, improve, or establish 
new TES programs. The direct transfer of program approaches is probably not viable, given 
the unique institutional and industrial contexts of program countries and those developing 
new initiatives. A comparative review of key insights and practices is however instructive and 
useful, particularly if combined with initiatives to adapt those practices to new contexts. The 
following are among the key insights and practices highlighted by the analysis of the cases 
described in this report: 
¥ An evolutionary approach to development. Startup of TES programs can be 
usefully tested through initial pilot efforts, particularly where significant changes 
are proposed to existing structures. Private sector firms should be involved in 
helping to make the case for TES programs. In terms of their evolution, these 
programs should plan on a national build-up phase and subsequent phases 
designed to hone offers of service.  
¥ An appropriate organizational context. TES programs can be established in 
organizations ranging from economic development agencies to research 
agencies. Structures that emphasize a dedicated field staff, R&D centers, and 
technology-oriented business support can be used. Leveraging key partners is 
important for providing a full complement of services to meet the needs of SMEs. 
These partnerships should involve agreements that enable a review of 
performance and other changes (including ending the partnership) in response to 
changes in the program. Centralized structures are particularly useful for covering 
smaller regions whereas larger regions can consider decentralized approaches 
depending on the extent to which these regions have diverse existing TES-
oriented organizations.  
¥ Sufficient program scale. TES programs should have sufficient scale to provide 
services across the region. Scale should be primarily focused on having sufficient 
field specialists and decentralized offices. Because the decentralized network 
constitutes the lionÕs share of the program, TES has limited economies of scale. 
¥ Core public funding. A base of sufficient public core funding is required for the 
financial sustainability of centers. A lack of core funding can lead TES programs 
to move away from their SME service mission and more toward larger companies 
(including outside the service region) who can fully cover service costs. It also 
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can lead to program instability hampering client confidence and trust in the 
service.  
¥ Broad client base. TES requires a stable base of SMEs around which services 
should be designed. Manufacturing can be considered a core clientele for these 
services. However, as economies become more service oriented, service 
industries with a product orientation (such as software firms) can be considered. 
While setting out target industries can be useful in addressing economic 
development goals to strengthen regional economies, it can also add 
administrative complications to service provision and thus is to be implemented 
with considerable flexibility. Most TES programs do not rigidly apply target 
industry approaches in practice. 
¥ Structured approach to services. TES should have a strong element of being 
demand drivenÑthat is they should respond to needs prioritized by potential 
SME clientele. These needs will change over time, so programs should monitor 
and keep ahead of these changes. Several points of entry for initial work with 
SME clients should be permitted, including the ability to address technological 
problems encountered by an SME and follow up with more comprehensive 
services, as well as the ability to perform companywide assessments (either 
informally or through assessment tools). The range of services should not only 
emphasize cost savings and operational improvements but also cover and aim 
for strategic assistance. Technological and marketing needs to bring in new sales 
should also be a part of the TES portfolio. Formal or informal processes for 
referring partners providing access to specialized equipment or to private sector 
firms should include a prequalification or vetting process of these third party 
providers and, some level of management of the third party engagement (rather 
than a complete handoff of the client to the third party). Service pricing should 
allow for subsidies that decrease according to company size. While most TES 
should be delivered in a one-on-one manner, programs should also consider 
group approaches for the delivery of noncompetitive TES such as adoption of 
operational efficiencies; these types of services allow for effective peer-to-peer 
learning among companies in a region. 
¥ Links to equipment and infrastructure. TES is not an infrastructure program. 
Because of the high cost of acquiring, operating, maintaining, and upgrading 
equipment and infrastructure, programs should link with partner organizations to 
provide equipment and infrastructure related services rather than devoting TES 
resources to equipment and infrastructure acquisition and maintenance. 
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¥ Public-private governance that incorporates flexibility and experimentation. 
Private sector participation is a requirement of program governance. Such 
participation is most optimally accomplished through advisory board 
mechanisms, in which private sector firms can provide strategic guidance in 
current and future offers of service. Where there is sufficient governance capacity 
in the central public agency, the agency should use cooperative agreements to 
combine flexibility (in terms of being able to make changes to the program as 
needed) with oversight.  
¥ Industrially experienced personnel. Highly qualified TES specialists are at the 
core of the service. A significant length of experience in one or more industries is 
the most important criterion for hiring TES specialists. Also important is the ability 
of the specialist to perform at least one, if not more than one, of the three 
common TES specialist roles: account management, general TES provision, and 
specialized TES provision. Programs should plan on allocating a portion of the 
TES budget to training and certification so that TES specialists can maintain their 
expertise. Hiring in certain target industries is not as important as the ability of the 
specialist to be broadly conversant in process improvement, product 
development/marketing, strategic planning, and human resource needs of SME 
clients. Performance based incentives can be useful but are not always possible 
in a public agency environment; hence the ability to give back or do good should 
be emphasized along with a degree of latitude (subject to a level of oversight) in 
serving SME clients. 
¥ Effective monitoring and robust evaluation. A strong evaluation system that 
provides information for program learning as well as program justification should 
be implemented. While geographic coverage should be a consideration, client 
impact should be given precedence in any evaluation system. Client surveys 
should be a core methodology in TES evaluation systems. However, because of 
the multidimensional, demand driven nature of TES programs, multiple methods 
should be used to capture impacts, including qualitative logic base case studies, 
peer-to-peer learning, and special studies of new initiatives. Comparison group 
approaches that gauge the effects of client firms relative to nonclient firms should 
be implemented from time-to-time and should take into account predispositions of 
higher performing SMEs to use the service (self-selection bias). Performance 
indicators should be monitored over time but changes in some of these indicators 
should be planned as the program evolves. 
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8.4. Good Practices and Debates 
 
In starting or developing a TES program, stakeholders agree that there is a set of good practices 
evident in other programs that should be considered (with the usual caveat that good practices 
often need to be interpreted in context and adjusted to fit particular local conditions). First, TES 
should represent a pragmatic approach to the diffusion of technologies, focusing on the adoption 
of proven technologies. Second, while TES may begin with solving a particular company 
problem, the long-term goal should be to build up client capabilities. Third, TES should be 
designed to be flexible in delivering assistance to companies, offer services that are customized 
to the needs of the client, and aim for intensive engagements that will make a difference to 
company performance. Fourth, expert-led, long-term relationships with businesses are critical to 
developing trust. Fifth, the program requires a long-term perspective to boost its scale and reach 
to clients in the region. Sixth, the program is not just about direct relationships with customers but 
also involves coordinating and developing linkages with other service providers and financial 
resources. And seventh, TES should seek to combine good governance with flexibility and 
experimentation to be able to respond to changing business needs. 
 In recognizing these good practices, debates still exist about the best way to design and 
offer TES. The first debate is whether to focus on high growth potential firms rather than blanket 
support; it is recommended that intensive services be provided to the former firms while light 
touch services (such as open training) be offered to serve the larger population of potential 
clients. Second, the effectiveness of general strategic versus specialized demand driven diffusion 
is debated; it is observed that specialized support should be integrated with broader 
companywide strategic concerns to significantly affect business performance. Third, the debate 
as to whether it is better to target the program to a given region or industry cluster or broadly 
serve all firms depends on the composition of the industries in the region. Fourth, there is a 
debate as to whether online methods can be used or whether face-to-face approaches are 
required. In the current context, face-to-face delivery, usually at the company site, is more 
effective than online databases, although this face-to-face advantage may diminish in future 
generations. Fifth, there is a debate about what should count in measuring the program. While 
business performance indicators are at the core of TES, the work that these programs do in 
coordinating and linking service providers is critically important but difficult to measure. Sixth, 
debates about whether TES programs can be self-sustaining stand in contrast to the 
dependence on public funds to maintain the public mission. Finally, it is important to consider 
perspectives on TES as a stand-alone program versus one that exists in a broader ecosystem. 
While the start-up of a TES program is a major effort, careful attention should be paid to how the 
program is integrated into national and regional innovation strategies.   
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Appendix 1. U.S. Manufacturing Extension Milestones 
Key Milestones in the development of manufacturing extension in the United States: 
1890 Hatch Act establishes state agricultural extension stations 
1914 Smith-Lever Act establishes USDA-state cooperative agricultural extension service 
1934 Engineering Experiment Station at Georgia Tech 
1955 North Carolina State University Industrial Extension Service 
1960 Industrial Extension Service at Georgia Tech 
1963 Tennessee Industrial Research Advisory Service 
1965 PENNTAP program at Penn State University 
1966 Department of Commerce State Technical Services, federal-state program (until 1971) 
1982 Massachusetts Commission on the Future of Mature Industries 
1985 Michigan Modernization Service 
1986 Machine Action Project, Springfield, Massachusetts 
  Council on Competitiveness formed, called for greater manufacturing efforts 
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act Ð NIST established (from NBS) 
  Modernization Forum founded as MEP trade and lobbying association 
 Pennsylvania Industrial Resource Centers program established 
  Southern Technology Council establishes Consortium for Manufacturing Competitiveness 
1989 3 Manufacturing Technology Centers (MTCs) established - in New York, Ohio, South Carolina 
  National Coalition for Advanced Technology founded 
1990 2 MTCs established - Michigan and Kansas 
 Office of Technology Assessment ÒMaking Things BetterÓ published 
  Modernizing America's Industrial Base - Modernization Forum, Pittsburgh, PA - 300 attendees 
1991 2 MTCs established - Minnesota and California 
1993 Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) funding through Department of Defense 
  Clinton administration support for formal Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) 
 National Research Council ÒLearning to ChangeÓ reshaped program orientation 
1994 TRP funds transferred to Department of Commerce (single appropriation in 2005) 
 MEP centers in 32 states 
1995 GAO study: Manufacturing Extension Programs: Manufacturers' Views of Services 
1996 MEP centers in all 50 states; National survey of clients introduced 
  USNet established (1996Ð1998); MEP-SBDC partnership 
1998 Technology Administration Act eliminated six-year sunset clause, allowing for ongoing federal 
role 
  Modernization Forum National Conference, Cleveland, OH, 1300 attendees 
2001 Minimally Acceptable Impact Measures (MAIM) introduced 
 Supply America Corporation partnership 
2003Ð04 National Academy of Public Administration program review 
2005 American Small Business Coalition created  
2006 Eureka! Winning Ways pilots (full implementation 2007Ð08) 
2008 Next Generation Strategy: The Future of the Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership 
2009 First class of the MEP Emerging Leaders Program 
2010 Partnership with E3 to promote sustainable manufacturing 
 MEP awards US$9.1 million for projects to develop client engagement or business models and 
deployment strategies that integrate two or more of the MEP Strategic Growth Areas 
2011 GAO study: NIST Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program Cost Share 
2012 Center Operations Review and Evaluation (CORE) system replacement for MAIM 
 National GovernorÕs Association Policy Academy: "Making" Our Future: Encouraging Growth 
Opportunities in Manufacturing through Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Investment 
 MEP University closed 
 MEP National Conference, Orlando, FL, more than 800 attendees 
2013 
 
National Academies study: 21st Century Manufacturing: The Role of the Manufacturing 
Extension Partnership Program, November 2013 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration from program data and reports. 
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Appendix 2. IRAP Milestones 
 Key milestones in the development of the Industrial Research Assistance Program in Canada: 
 
1916  National Research Council established 
1930  Research Information Service (RIS) established in NRC 
1945  RIS became Technical Information Service (TIS) 
  IRAP voted into existence  
Committee on Industrial Research Assistance created  
1962  IRAP established 
1965  Initial IRAP pilot period 
1968  Status report 
1969  IRAPÕs first evaluation 
1960sÐ
1970s 
 Program ramped up to 40 ITAs concentrated in Ottawa,  
1973  IRAP and TIS reported into the Industrial Research, Assistance, and Promotion 
Office of the NRC  
IRAP Policies and Practices  
1975  Science and Engineering Student Program funded (now known as the Youth 
Employment Program) 
Pilot Industry/Laboratory Program (PILP, renamed Program for Industry/Laboratory 
Projects in 1978, renamed LabNet) ended in the 1990s 
1977  Keith Glegg Vice President of Industry and Technology Transfer until 1990 
1978  IRAP-M for small projects to the Provincial Research Organizations (p. 92), IRAP-P 
Industry Technology Advisors, IRAP-H from SESP  
IRAP support changed from grants to contributions  
1981  Manufacturing Assistance Program transferred from Department of industry and 
Technology to IRAP 
1982  Consolidation of IRAP and TIS  
1980s  ITA network expands to roughly 200 ITAs throughout Canada through contracting 
with network members 
1987  IRAP Advisory Board established 
1998  Canadian Technology Network partnered with IRAP to provide repayable financing 
for pre-commercial R&D 
Customer relationship management CRM software introduced (SONAR) 
Early 2000s  Associate regional directors established 
Post project review began 
2001  Network member ITAs became NRC ITAs 
2002  External evaluation  
2004  Canadian Technology Network integrated with IRAP 
2007  7,645 clients served; 1,971 received funding 
External evaluation: IRAP estimated to contribute C$2 billionÐC$6 billion to 
Canadian economy, 4Ð12:1 benefit cost ratio 
2008Ð2009  Online field manual created 
2010Ð2011  8,063 clients served; 3,098 received funding 
2012  External evaluation: 11:1 benefit cost ratio 
Reorganization: IRAP Vice President on NRC leadership committee 
2011Ð2012  9,385 clients served; 1,853 received funding 
2012  A vice-president for IRAP established 
2012Ð2013  11,459 clients served; 3,047 received funding 
Source: AuthorsÕ elaboration from program data and reports. 
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Appendix 3. MAS Customer Satisfaction Questionnaire for Level 2s 
1. Please rate the following where 1 is Òvery poorÓ and 10 is ÒexcellentÓ: 
1.1 The quality of service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.2 The capability of the Specialist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.3 The SpecialistÕs speed of response 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1.4 How would you rate your Ôoverall satisfactionÕ with MAS 
Very Satisfied / Satisfied / Dissatisfied 
 2. Please indicate the response that reflects your view, below: 
2.1 I intend to act on the advice/information received  Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
2.2 I would use the MAS service again in the future  Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
2.3 
I would use the MAS service again in the future even if I 
had to pay the full cost 
Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
2.4 I would be happy to recommend MAS Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
2.5 MAS is good value for money / time investment Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
2.6 
I have taken action to make improvements to my business 
as a result of the assistance 
Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
 3. What are the key benefits to your business now and for the future? (following MAS 
interaction) 
  
  
 4. How might the delivery of the service be improved? 
  
  
 5. How did you hear about MAS? 
  
  
 6. How satisfied were you with the process of referrals if the Advisor made any? 
Very Satisfied / Satisfied / Dissatisfied 
7. May we pass your identity along with your feedback to MAS Yes / No 
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Appendix 4. MAS Customer Satisfaction Questionnaire for Level 4s 
1. Please rate the following where 1 is Òvery poorÓ and 10 is ÒexcellentÓ: 
1.1 The quality of service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.2 The capability of the Specialist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.3 
The benefits obtained from the 
assistance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.4 The SpecialistÕs speed of response 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.5 The overall value of the service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1.6 How would you rate your Ôoverall satisfactionÕ with MAS 
Very Satisfied / Satisfied / Dissatisfied 
 2. Please indicate the response that reflects your view, below: 
2.1 I would use the MAS service again in the future  Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
2.2 
I would use the MAS service again in the future even if I 
had to pay the full cost 
Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
2.3 I would be happy to recommend MAS Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
2.4 MAS is good value for money / time investment Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
2.5 
The information and/or paperwork I was asked to complete 
in order to qualify for MAS assistance was clear and 
concise 
Yes No N/A 
Not 
yet 
Maybe 
 3. What are the key benefits to your business now and for the future? (following MAS 
interaction) 
  
  
  
 
